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STATEMENT REGARDING PRIOR APPEALS
This is the second appeal between these parties. The First Appeal, case no.
20031030-CA, was appealed by Ogden City Corporation. That appeal resulted in
the reversal of the Civil Service Commission's determination that Daniel Harmon
should not be discharged in the published decision of this Court, Ogden City
Corp. v. Harmon, 116 P.3d 973 (Utah App. 2005), wherein the Court
admonished the Civil Service Commission of its duties that "the Commission is
under an obligation to address each of the grounds for termination stated by the
department head" citing to Section 10-3-1012.

VI

I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On September 10, 11, 12, and 15, 2003, a three-member Ogden Civil Service
Commission held a hearing on the appeal of petitioner/appellant Daniel Harmon
("Harmon") of his termination from the Ogden City Fire Department (the "OFD"). On
November 20, 2003, with one member dissenting, the Commission issued Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order (the "Majority Decision") reversing Harmon's
termination. (See R. 164-79). On December 19, 2003, Ogden City filed a Petitioner for
Review of the Majority Decision. (R. 180-82). This Court in that first review ("Harmon
I") issued a published decision on June 16, 2006 and remanded the matter back to the
Commission. (R. 3367-73). (Addendum A). The new Commission consisting of
A.K.Greenwood, Jeremy Taylor and John Lemke reconsidered the former Majority
Decision as required by Harmon I. (R. 143-63). On April 13, 1006, the new Commission
rendered its new Majority Decision. (R. 3481-96). That order by the new Majority
Decision violated the law and the instructions of this Court in Harmon I. See Ogden City
Corp. v. Harmon. 116 P.3d 973, 977 If 14 (Utah App. 2005) (R. 3367-73) (Addendum A)
("the Commission is under an obligation to address each of the grounds for termination
stated by the department head" citing to Section 10-3-1012). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Utah R. App. P. 14.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the new Commission deliberately violated the law and this

Court's instructions issued in Harmon I?
Standard of Review: This involves a question of law since the
Commission abused its discretion and exceeded its authority. The final decision of a civil
service commission is reviewed on appeal '"for the purpose of determining if the
commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.'" Kelly v. Salt Lake City
Civil Serv. Comm'n. 2000 UT App 235, U 15, 8 P.3d 1048 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 103-1102.5). "A claim that a tribunal has 'abused its discretion' may more accurately be
framed as a claim that the tribunal has 'misused' or 'exceeded' its discretion." Tolman v.
Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "An abuse of
discretion, therefore, is an act by a tribunal, not a standard of review in and of itself." Id
"If... a party claims that a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of discretion and thereby
crossed the law, [the appellate court] review[s] using a correction of error standard,
giving no deference to the tribunal's legal determination." IcL An "abuse of discretion"
is '"a legal term to indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was a
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an improvident exercise of
discretion; an error of law." Id (citing State v. Draper. 27 P.2d 39, 49-50 (Utah 1933).
Further, in determining whether charges warrant the discipline imposed, the
"discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the Chief."
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Lucas v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)' accord, Kelly,
2000 UT App 235, \ 22, 8 P.3d 1048. The Chief "exceeds the scope of his discretion if
the punishment imposed is in excess of 'the range of sanctions permitted by statute or
regulation, or if, in light of all of the circumstances, the punishment is disproportionate to
the offense." Lucas. 949 P.3d at 761.
Preservation of Issue: R. 3367-73; 3442-59; 3469-72.
2.

Issue: Whether the new Commission violated Harmon's Constitutional

rights to Due Process when it violated the law and this Court's instructions in Harmon L
when it refused to fully determine the matter - it refused to determine Harmon's honesty
issue and in light of Harmon's Garrity challenges.
Standard of Review: The same as issue 1, above.
Preservation of Issue: R. 3367-73; 3442-59; 3469-72.
3.

Issue: What remedy is available in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of Constitutional rights through the course of Civil Service Proceedings?
Standard of Review: The same as issue 1, above.
Preservation of Issue: R. 3367-73; 3442-59; 3469-72.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES.*
(* See these provisions in Addendum D).
U.S. Const., 1st Amend.

U.S. Const., 14th Amend.

Utah Const., Art. I, § 7.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (2005)

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (2005)

42 U.S.C. § 1983
3

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
Harmon I arose out of the Ogden City's appeal of the 2-1 Decision of the
Commission reversing Harmon's termination. Upon remand, the Ogden Civil Service
Commission was directed by this Court to "address each of the grounds for termination
stated by the department head." Ogden City Corp. v. Harmoa 116 P.3d 973, 977 ^ 14
(Utah App. 2005). (R. 3367-73). This appeal Harmon II arises out of clear error
committed by the new Majority Decision during reconsideration which created
Constitutional Injuries to Harmon. The new Commission, not including Commission
Lemke, failed to decide two interlinked questions of critically importance to Mr. Harmon,
the honesty grounds considered by the Chief for discharge. The Chiefs question of
Harmon's honesty challenged by Harmon's Garrity challenge. Harmon asserted he was
not being dishonest because he had invoked Garrity due to his attorney's inability to
attend the second predetermination hearing and he had provided the responses to
questions his former counsel Joe O'Keefe had prepared for the Chief.
After an initial investigation and two predetermination hearings, Harmon, a
Captain of the OFD, had been terminated based on seven charges of alleged misconduct,
which can be summaries as follows:
(1)
Harmon's urination into a shower stall occupied by a fellow
firefighter in "the late eighties or early nineties, eight to ten years before the
investigation" (the "Shower Incident"); (R. 148).
4

(2)
Harmon's urination into a drafting pit during a firefighter training
session where Harmon was the senior officer present in the Summer of 2000 (the
"Drafting Pit Incident"); (R. 153-54).
(3)
In response to a former Battalion Chiefs request to Harmon for a
bottle of "Roundup" weedkiller in Summer of 1999 (over a year before the
investigation), Harmon's urination into the bottle which the former Battalion Chief
later mistakenly picked up (the "Weedkiller Incident"); (R. 151-52).
(4)
Harmon's giving a greased zucchini to a subordinate, female,
probationary employee during November 1998 (about two years before the
investigation), at a time when Harmon was her direct supervisor, and asking her a
question with a sexual connotation -in response to her initiation (the "Zucchini
Incident"); (R. 151).
(5)
In 1999-2000, Harmon's missing a training session meeting for the
fourth time in 18 months after being warned and cautioned to correct the behavior;
(R. 153-54).
(6)
in the Fall of 1996, Harmon's planning and coordinating a dinner
regarding the firefighter union's efforts to raise money for the Muscular Dystrophy
Association, which was attended by the bikini-clad "Budweiser Girls," one of
whom posed topless for pictures with the firefighters (Harmon was not the only
Captain in attendance and the event was at another Captain's station) (the "MDA
Incident"); (R. 148-50) and
(7)
Harmon's participation as a senior officer in sexually oriented
horseplay where male firefighters would "dry-hump" each other (the "Horseplay
Incidents"). (R. 154-55) (A department widespread practice which occurred over a
long period of time not limited to (Harmon's crew).
In deciding to terminate Harmon, Chief Mathieu also took into account Harmon's
overall performance as an employee, including his performance evaluations prepared by
Steve Thompson - who knowingly despised Harmon. (R. 2500, 2506; 483-84). The
Chief also considered what the Chief perceived to be untruthful and inconsistent
responses to the Weedkiller questions posed during a second predetermination hearing 5

Garrity applied. {See R. 152-53; 344-345; 347-49; 483-86).
An investigation into Harmon's conduct was initiated after September 8, 2000,
when an estranged husband ("Mr. Fuller") of a female probationary firefighter ("Ms.
Cassidy") complained to Chief Mathieu ("Chief Mathieu"), the head of the OFD, about
alleged incidents involving Mr. Fuller's wife and other firefighters, including Harmon's
Zucchini Incident that had occurred two years earlier, in November, 1998. (R. 143). As a
result of Mr. Fuller's complaint, Chief Matthieu gave Deputy Greg Chamberlain a "list
containing accusations of inappropriate conduct by several members" of OFD, and
"charged [Deputy Chief Chamberlain] with the responsibility to coordinate an
investigation into these [alleged] charges and to recommend discipline on the accuracy of
these charges." {See R. 276; R. 144).
On September 12, 2000, Deputy Chief Chamberlain, Deputy Chief Bruce
Champion, and Battalion Chief Mike Wood met with Harmon. (R. 144). Deputy Chief
Chamberlain conducted the questioning, and asked Harmon to tell him about anything
that had occurred in the workplace in the past four years that "could reasonably be
deemed inappropriate behavior in the workplace." (R. 144).
On November 6, 2000, Deputy Chief Chamberlain sent Chief Mathieu the
investigators' "Joint Statement of Findings and Disciplinary Recommendation in
Investigation of Accusations of Inappropriate Conduct and Failure to Act by Captain
Daniel Harmon" ("Investigation R&R"). (R. 276-95). The Investigation R&R
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recommended that Harmon be demoted to the rank he had held before being promoted to
captain in March 1991, (R. 276) based on Harmon's misconduct in the November 1998
Zucchini Incident, the Fall 1996 MDA Incident, and the department's history of
Horseplay Incidents. (R. 292-95).
On November 14, 2000, Chief Mathieu sent a letter to Harmon notifying him that
his first predetermination hearing would be held on November 14, 2000, based on an
investigation into "allegatinos of misconduct of a sexual nature and poor supervisory
decision making on your part. (R. 297). At Harmon's request, the hearing was
rescheduled to December 1, 2000. (R. 299, 301). On November 29, 2000, Chief Mathieu
sent a letter to Harmon providing him with a copy of the Investigation R&R, and letting
him know that he could review audiotapes of the investigation. (R.302). The letter also
informed Harmon that his failure to appear at a reserve corps training session on
November 14, 2000 (after the Investigation R&R was issued) would also be considered at
the upcoming hearing. Id. The first predetermination hearing was held December 1,
2000, and attended by Chief Mathieu, James Bristow (City Human Resources Director),
Deputy Chief Chamberlain, Harmon, and Harmon's attorney, Joseph O'Keefe. (See R.
304-40) (Trans. First Hrg.). After the hearing, Chief Mathieu informed Harmon that he
would make a decision within fourteen days. (R. 340). On December 8, 2000, before
issuing his decision, Chief Mathieu sent a letter to Harmon stating he had learned of three
additional allegations of misconduct involving Harmon: the late 80s or early 90s Shower
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Incident, the Summer 2000 Drafting Pit, and the Summer 1999 Weedkiller Incident. (R.
342). A second predetermination hearing was held on December 11, 2000 to discuss
these three incidents1 {See R. 347-49)(Addendum J), where Harmon handed him a letter
prepared by his attorney in lieu of questioning {See R. 344-45).
On December 15, 2000, Chief Mathieu sent a letter to Harmon terminating his
employment, in the "best interests of the Department," for violating or failing to adhere to
OFD regulations and City personnel policies and procedures. {See R. 351) (Termination
Letter). The policies and procedures violated are as follows:
(1) . . OFD General Rules & Regulations, R. 0497, Article to "familiarize myself
with and be obedient to the Rules and Regulations and orders or the Ogden Fire
Department, and faithfully serve the City of Ogden in the discharge of my duties as a
firefighter to the best of my knowledge and ability";
(2) . . OFD General Rules & Regulations R. 0497, Article 3, § 3.01 "Any violation of
these Rules and Regulations by any members of the Department may be grounds for
disciplinary action";
(3) . . OFD General Rules & Regulations, R. 0497, Chapter 3, § 13'All members of
the Department, regardless of assignment, are subject to the rules, regulations, and
orders concerning the uniformed force, particularly such rules as apply to conduct,
disciplines and violations of law":
(4) . . OFD General Rules & Regulations, R. 0497, Chapter 3, § 15 "In matters of
conduct, members shall be governed by the ordinary and reasonable rules of behavior
observed by law-abiding and self-respecting citizens and shall commit no act tending
to bring reproach or discredit upon the City, the Department, or its members"

1

A debated issue whether Garrity had been invoked or was required linked to the
honesty issue considered by the Chief, is unresolved in the Commission. {See R. 161, "In the
hearing, repeated references were made to the Garrity warning. Given the decision reached
by the Commission, it does not believe this issue needs to be decided").
8

(5) .. OFD General Rules & Regulations, R.0497, Chapter 3, § 16 "No member shall
conduct himself/herself in a manner, or be a party to any act which would tend to
impair the good order and discipline of the department";
(6) .. OFD General Rules & Regulations, R. 0497, Chapter 3, § 30 "No member shall
engage in any ... activity which would tend to disrupt Department morale or, bring
discredit to the department or any member thereof;
(7) .. OFD General Rules & Regulations, R. 0497, Chapter 3, § 32 "The falsification
of records, the making of misleading entries or statements with, intent to deceive, or
the willful mutilation of any useful Department record, book, paper, or document
shall be cause for disciplinary action";
(8) .. The following section of the Ogden city Employee Policies & Procedures
Manual, § 9-6-B, which states that "behavior or conduct which may result in
disciplinary action, up to and including termination " includes:
a. § 9-6-B(l): "Actions which violate City ordinances or other local, state or
federal laws, including statements or comments which serve as proof or an
admission of proof that the employee violated such laws, whether or not a
conviction occurred with respect to such violation";
b. § 9-6-B(3): "Violations of applicable Departmental rules and procedures";.
c. § 9-6-B(7): "Behavior or activity which reflects an intent to be dishonest or
untruthful";
d. § 9-6-B(8): "Insubordination or disrespectful conduct or language toward
members of the public, superiors, or other employees";
e. § 9-6-B(9): "Actions which serve to discredit the name, reputation, or
public mission or interest of the City";
f. § 9-6-B(l 1): "Boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace; behavior
or activity which serve to ,create disharmony or disorderly environment
without regard for the interest of the City in conducting its business in an
efficient, effective and orderly manner";
g. § 9-6-8(15): "Violation of health or safety rules established by the city or its
9

departments or divisions, or other safety or health rules or regulations as
governed by applicable code or competent authority";
h. § 9-6-8(17): "Unsatisfactory performance or conduct."
i. § 9-6-8(18): "Unauthorized absence from work station during the
workday";
(9) .. Ogden City Employee Policies & Procedures Manual § 9-2 Harassment
policy, including "[a]ctions, words, jokes, or comments based on an individual's sex
will not be tolerated"; "allowing] a working environment or condition to exist which
is intimidating or hostile on account of one's sex"; "sexual harassment may occur
when a supervisor or employee allows a working environment or condition to exist
which is intimidating or hostile on account of one's sex"; hostile work environment
"is said to exist when a person's sex ... is the object of... inappropriate behavior,
gesture or commentary; "[a]ny supervisor or manager who becomes aware of possible
sexual harassment should promptly notify the personnel office . . . . "
{See id.; R. 258-62; R. 3002-3037 (OFD Rules); R. 3197-3201 (harassment policy)).
On December 20, 2000, Harmon appealed his termination to the Commission.
R.l.2 On September 10, 11, 12, and 15, 2003, a hearing on Harmon's appeal was held
before the Commission. (R. 143). On November 20,2003, Commissioner McCall issued
the Majority Decision, reversing Harmon's termination. (See R. 143-61)(Addendum E).
Of Harmon], the Majority Decision's "Findings of Fact" indicated that all of the
incidents cited by Chief Mathieu occurred (see R. 148-55), and that Harmon received a

2

On May 11, 2001, the City provided Harmon with a six-page Memorandum
detailing "violations of Department or City policy that Captain Harmon committed which led
to his termination." (R.357-62). Prior to the conclusion of the hearing before the
Commission, the City also provided the Commission and Harmon with a Summary of
Alleged City Policy Violations," detailing the policies violated regarding each alleged
charge. (R. 1236-43).
10

"Notice of Caution" on October 11, 1999, for failing to attend meetings on June 10,
August 17, and September 18, 1999, in which he was scheduled to participate (R. 153).
Despite finding that all incidents occurred as alleged, the Harmon I Majority
Decision concluded that the facts only supported the following four charges: (1) the MDA
Incident; (2) the Drafting Pit Incident; (3) the Weedkiller Incident; and (4) Harmon's
failure to attend meetings. (R. 155-59). The Harmon I Majority Decision concluded that
the facts did not support the charges regarding the 80s-or-90s single Shower Incident, the
consensual 1998 Zucchini Incident, and general department wide Horseplay Incidents.
(R. 156-57). Those conclusions may have been rational to support discipline, but due to
numerous mitigating factors existing, said discipline should have been in something other
than discharge. The Harmon I Majority Decision found the Shower Incident did not
support the charges because: (1) it was "inappropriate" to consider it because it occurred
too far in the past; and (2) "it was impossible to determine" whether it occurred before or
after Harmon became captain so it was impossible to show he urinated into a "shower
stall while a subordinate was showering." See id. Although the Commission did not give
the following as reasons for finding that the facts did not support the charges, it also
found that: (1) "[i]t was unclear whether the urine stream actually struck his feet or
merely the floor"; (2) "[bjecause Harmon believed this incident occurred before he was
promoted [to Captain]," he denied it in responding to Chief Mathieu's letter. (R. 148).
The Harmon I Majority Decision found the 1998 Zucchini Incident did not support
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the charges because the incident either was not sexual harassment or did not violate OFD
policy because: (1) Ms. Cassidy "had initiated the sexually-oriented joke and laughed at
Harmon's later continuation of the joke"; (2) it had happened two years earlier, and Ms.
Cassidy's estranged husband was the person to report it to Chief Mathieu; (3) it seemed
consensual, was isolated, and was not offensive to Ms. Cassidy; and (4) no one
complained about it at the time it occurred and no one was disciplined for it. {See R. 151,
156-57; 3448). Although the Commission did not include the following as reasons why
the facts did not support the charges, it also found that: (1) there were no other incidents
involving Harmon and femalefirefighters;and (2) "one female firefighter testified that
Harmon treated women with respect." (R. 151).
The Harmon I Majority Decision found the Horseplay Incidents did not support the
charges because dry humping: (1) "was common in the Department"; (2) was
"consensual"; (3) "did not involve females"; (4) "had continued for many years without
anyone (sic) ever being told that it violated Department policy." (R. 154-55, 159).
Although the Commission did not give the following as reasons why facts did not support
the charges, it also found: (1) the dry humping "occurred between firefighters of equal
rank and between supervisors and subordinates"; (2) after the incidents, "both parties
would fall down laughing"; (3) no one had ever complained about or been disciplined for
dry humping. (R. 154-55).
The Harmon I Majority Decision then concluded that even if all seven charges
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were considered, termination still was not proportional to those offenses, and termination
"certainly" was not proportional to the four offenses where the Commission found the
facts did support the charges. (R. 160). The Harmon I Majority Decision found Harmon
was not given progressive discipline and "was given no punishment at all until the seven
incidents were lumped together and he was terminated," and that "had he been disciplined
when each incident occurred, he could have modified his inappropriate behavior before it
reached the point where the Chief felt the need to terminate him." (R. 160). The Harmon
I Majority Decision further stated that in some of the incidents at issue, other firefighters
were not punished as severely as Harmon, and noted that one firefighter was
complimented for missing two meetings in ten years, whereas Harmon was disciplined for
missing four meetings in twenty-one years. (R. 160). Finally, the Harmon I Majority
Decision found "inapplicable" the question of whether the sanction was consistent with
previous sanctions, because u[n]o evidence was introduced at the hearing regarding any
fire fighter who had been charged with the variety of offenses over such an extended
period of time as Harmon." (R. 161).
In Harmon L Commissioner Lemke issued a Concurring Opinion (Addendum F)
stating that Harmon deserved some punishment short of termination, but that appellate
decisions (with which he disagrees) only allow the Commission to affirm or reverse, and
not to modify, the Chiefs decision. (See R. 162-63) (See Addendum F).
Chairman Taylor issued a Dissenting Opinion (Addendum G) (now the part of the
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Majority), which concluded that Harmon's termination should be affirmed. (See R. 16479) (Addendum G). He stated that: (1) the Shower, Zucchini, and Horseplay Incidents
should be considered; (2) Harmon caused Chief Mathieu "to conclude that Harmon was
being misleading and less than truthful" by refusing to answer questions during the
second predetermination hearing and simply saying his answer was "in the letter";3 (3) the
facts support all charges; and (4) the charges warrant termination.4 See id.
After issuance of the Harmon I Majority Decision, Harmon was reinstated to the
position of captain in the OFD. On December 10, 2003, Ogden City filed its Petition for
Review of the Harmon I Majority Decision. (R. 180-82). Briefing by the parties took
place, resulting in this Court's June 16, 2005 published decision Ogden City Corp. v.
Harmon. 116 P.3d 973 (Utah App. 2005) (R. 3367-73) (Addendum A), wherein the
Commission was instructed "that the Commission is under an obligation to address each
of the grounds for termination stated by the department head." Id.9 at 977 f 14. (See R.
3367-73).
Thereafter, a new final Majority Decision was issued on April 13, 2006. (R 3481-

3

This determination is offensive to Garrity where termination for wishing to remain
silent is violative of the Fifth Amendment.
4
In the Harmon I appeal, Ogden City argued the Dissenting Opinion was a "wellreasoned and compelling decision that persuasively outlines the deficiencies and errors of the
Majority Decision. It would appear from reading Harmon I, this Court was persuaded;
however, the new Commission failed to determine the linked honesty-Garrity questions
despite this Court's instructions as recognized by the new Concurring decision of
Commissioner Lemke. (See Addenda C & F) (See also R. 161).
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96) (Addendum B). Realizing the new Majority Decision violated clearly established law
and the directives of this Court's published decision of June 16, 2005, Petitioner Daniel
Harmon timely petitioned for review the new Majority Decision under Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1012.5. He also seeks remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the new Majority
Commissioners Greenwood and Taylor deliberately disregarded the law and the rights
afforded to Harmon thereunder. Said disregard not only violated the law and was an
obvious abuse of discretion, but also violated Harmon's rights to substantive and
procedural Due Process leaving him constitutionally injured as to his reputation and his
future employment opportunities.
In part, this Court should issue a published decision outlining remedies available
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of rights and issue instructions for Civil Service
Commissions providing understandings of procedure, forum, and remedies available
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in light of (1) past case law; (2) the restrictions suggested in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1953, as amended); and (3) the limited authority granted to
the Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1953, as amended).
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1.

HARMON'S EMPLOYMENT RECORD AND EVALUATIONS.
Harmon was hired by the City as a firefighter on September 10, 1979. (R.143).

He became a captain on March 2, 1991 and held that position until he was terminated.
(R. 431). As a member of OFD, Harmon was trained in preventing sexual harassment,
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and signed acknowledgments of receipt of sexual harassment prevention information
and/or having received training on the City's "No Harassment Policy" numerous times.
R.364-69 (acknowledgments signed by Harmon 12/18/93; 12/29/94; 8/20/96; 10/28/98;
9/8/99).
Harmon's annual employee evaluations from February 17, 1991 through March
2000 reflect that he typically received mid-range marks from Steve Thompson who
knowingly disliked Captain Harmon, and was frequently unfairly cautioned and received
low marks. (See R. 2500, 2506; 375-471; 1773-2022). From approximately 1995
through 2000, Harmon's performance allegedly deteriorated under Battalion Chief Steve
Thompson. On December 13, 1995, he received a Second Written Warning cautioning
him about his poor work performance, inefficient work habits, failure to discipline
subordinates, conflicts with peer supervisors, and failure to stay on-task, including failing
to provide timely evaluations. (R. 278, 388). Harmon's annual evaluations were also
rated unfairly. His 1996 annual evaluation notes he has "trouble working with others on a
mutual respect basis," and he received "marginal" scores on that evaluation in leadership,
planning/organization, personnel management/interpersonal skills, meeting schedules/
utilizing resources, and flexibility/adaptability/ initiative. (R.403-06). The March 3,
1997 annual evaluation expressed concerns with Harmon's problems in "sizing up" and
prioritizing tasks, and the evaluator was concerned about Harmon's reliability. (R. 439).
In his March 3, 1998, annual evaluation, Harmon again unjustly received
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"marginal" in the categories of planning/organization, and meeting schedules/utilizing
resources. (See R. 446-54). In Harmon's March 2, 2000, evaluation, Captain Harmon's
new evaluator fairly stated he had good leadership traits and his crew liked him. (R. 465).
He was scored "marginal" in the 2000 evaluation for productivity/efficiency, and for
meeting schedules/utilizing resources. (R. 466-67). Those comments related to his
captain duties, irrespective of his firefighting skills and 21 years of career service from
1979.
OFD records suggested other concerns about Harmon's performance and reliability
in the two to three years before his termination. On April 19, 1998, he was counseled
about leaving his assigned location at a fire without informing IC (Incident Commander).
(R. 444; 2014). In addition, from June 1999 to November 2000 he failed to attend: (1) a
June 10, 1999, workgroup leaders meeting (he was Team Leader) because he "spaced it"
(R. 458); (2) an August 17, 1999, CPR class for reservists that he had scheduled and
where he was an instructor (R. 289); (3) a September 18,1999, Reserve Corps meeting
that he set up as the Team Leader (R. 289); (4) a November 14, 2000 class he was
supposed to teach, which had been set for eight months and was shown on posted OFD
yearly and monthly calendars (R. 473-74). On November 11, 1999, Harmon received a
Notice of Caution for missing the 1999 meetings, and removed as Team Leader. (R.
289).

1?

2.

INITIAL COMPLAINT AND INVESTIGATION
The investigation which culminated in Harmon's termination began with a

September 8, 2000, complaint to Chief Mathieu by the estranged husband of Ms. Cassidy,
a female probationary firefighter, about incidents involving Ms. Cassidy and other fire
fighters, including single Harmon's Zucchini Incident which took place in November of
1998 and in which he did not initiate. (R. 143). As a result of this complaint, Chief
Mathieu assigned Deputy Chief Chamberlain to coordinate an investigation and
recommend whether discipline was warranted. (See R. 144; 276).
As part of the investigation, which also included the investigation and discipline of
firefighters in addition to Harmon (R. 1435), the three investigators met with Harmon on
September 12, 2000, and asked him to tell them about any inappropriate things he might
have seen in the workplace in the past four years. (R. 144; see also R. 490-593).
Harmon said the only thing he could think of as to "inappropriate things" was the MDA
Incident, where firefighters at Captain Owen's Fire Station No. 2 were to receive a
reward for raising the most money for the Muscular Dystrophy Association. (R. 494).
This incident had occurred in the fall of 1996 and was attended by three Captains and one
Battalion Chief (No. 2 was not Harmon's station). (R. 280; 3446-47).5

5

In the 20031030 Appeal, Ogden also reported with respect to the MDA Incident,
Harmon told the investigators that he knew that the women preparing the meal would be
wearing swimsuits, and that when he saw that one woman had changed into a "g-string"
thong bikini bottom to pose for photos, he got his Captain's helmet out of the ambulance he
was driving so that she could pose with it. (R. 494-95,498). While discussing photos taken
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On November 6, 2000, the investigators sent their report and recommendation
("Investigation R&R") to Chief Mathieu. It contained: (1) copies of Harmon's annual
employee evaluations from February 1995 through March 2000 and (2) a chronological
listing of verified accusations. (R. 276-95). At the Commission Hearing, Deputy Chief
Chamberlain testified that the investigators' analysis of the evaluations "took issue with
the way [Harmon] made judgments, took care of time management, being an example to
the other people he was supervising and stuff like that." (R. 1584).
The verified accusations detailed in the Investigation R&R were the November
1998 Zucchini Incident, the MDA Incident in the fall of 1996 where three bikini-clad
Budweiser Girls posed for photographs, and the "dry-humping" Horseplay Incidents
involving Harmon and male firefighters he supervised, occurring as late as August 2000.
(SeeR. 276-292, 309, 311-12).

of the woman, Harmon said that he used a disposable camera to "get a butt shot of her
standing with her butt toward the camera" while she was wearing his helmet. (R. 498).
Harmon said he later was surprised to see the woman took off her bikini top and was posing
for photos while lying on a cot in the ambulance with firemen sitting on the squad bench
around her. (R. 500). He stated that he "should have stopped it right there" but did not. (R.
500). He told investigators that he instead left (R. 501), and that he later "heard that she had
some more pictures taken downstairs and that they were worse than the pictures upstairs"
(R. 508).
Harmon told the investigators that wives offiremenwere invited to the meal, and one
wife showed up. (R. 50l;seealsoR. 1527). He reported that the wife was "embarrassed by
the way [the women] were dressed" but she left before any pictures had been taken. (R.501 02). He said that he led the effort to prevent embarrassment for the department of what had
taken place, and that he suggested they get "rid of the frigging film." (R. 504-06; 1588-59).
He also told the Commission that it was his idea to dispose of the photos. (R. 2657, 2659).
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3.

FIRST AND SECOND PREDETERMINATION HEARINGS

At the first predetermination hearing on December 1, 2000, Harmon admitted the
1996 MDA, the 1998 Zucchini, and widespread "dry-humping" Horseplay Incidents, (see
R. 317-23, 325-27). Harmon admitted that it was not appropriate for him "as a Captain,
as a supervisor," to participate in an act of dry-humping other firefighters"6 and that he
had done that (R. 328). He admitted he thought Ms. Cassidy's joke about
"homewreckers" was "somewhat" inappropriate but that he did not caution her about the
"inappropriate nature of that joke in the workplace," (R. 2143), and admitted that his
response to Ms. Cassidy had a sexual connotation (R. 2144). He admitted that as a
supervisor, he was responsible for "workplace conduct of introductory firefighters," and
that as a supervisor, he established "what is acceptable and what is not acceptable" for his
subordinates. (R. 327). However, as noted above, the incident was admittedly isolated
and not a pattern of sexual harassment. (R. 151). It could not be construed as a Title VII
violation - no one timely reported feeling harassed by either comments.
On December 8, 2000, before issuing his decision, Chief Mathieu sent a letter to
Harmon stating he had just learned of three additional allegations of misconduct
involving Harmon, namely the 80s-or-early-90s Shower incident, the 2000 Drafting Pit

6

Harmon's attorney explained the Horseplay Incidents as "it doesn't imply anything
other than comradery and good spirit in the workplace." (R. 336,1fij 9-10). Counsel also
adds that this type of shenanigans is department-wide, even nation-wide, not isolated to
Harmon's crew.
2d

and 1999 Weedkiller Incident. (R. 342). Chief Mathieu testified at the Commission
Hearing that he saw a pattern of "inappropriate behavior" by Harmon with respect to
these three incidents. (R. 1733). The Harmon I Majority Decision this Court's published
decision agreed these three incidents occurred, but found mitigating circumstances
against considering them. (R. 148,151-154). The Harmon I Majority Decision
concluded it was impossible to determine when the Shower Incident occurred. (R. 156).
Harmon testified at the Commission Hearing that he was waiting for the second
predetermination hearing to start when Chief Mathieu came out to ask him to come in.
(R. 2686). Harmon testified that at that point he handed Chief Mathieu his attorney's
prepared letter that he had written December 9, 2000, by Joe O'Keefe and told Chief
Mathieu that his answer to the allegations was in the letter and that "I don't see any need
for me to go into the hearing." (R. 2886). (See letter at R. 344-45) (Addendum I). (See
2nd Predetermination Hearing Transcript at R 347-49) (Addendum J). That was
undisputably Garrity, See Garritv v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17
L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967). Harmon's letter to Chief Mathieu: (1) admitted the Summer 2000
Drafting Pit Incident, (2) denied urinating into a shower stall "since I have been a
Captain," (3) denied the Weedkiller Incident as stated by the Chiefs letter; and (4) said
he did not need another hearing. (R. 344-345; R. 2686). Harmon testified that after he
gave the letter to Chief Mathieu he began to walk away, but Chief Mathieu said "I want
you in this meeting." (R. 2686). Harmon said Chief Mathieu told him "he had some
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questions about those allegations and he wants to get some answers from me. And I said,
My answers are in that letter I gave you." (R. 2686). Obviously in light of this exchange
between Chief Mathieu and Harmon Garrity was invoked by Harmon desiring to remain
silent, and there being no clear and convincing evidence otherwise of any intent to
defraud or deceive the Chief. The letter contained both admissions and denials and
Harmon testified at the Commission asserting ample admissions, freely. (Id).
Concerning the Weedkiller matter, Harmon denied providing the urine to his former
retired Battalion Chief Steve Thompson.
4.

TESTIMONY AT COMMISSION HEARING
a.

Horseplay Incidents

Deputy Chief Chamberlain testified that Harmon admitted participating in the
department-wide "dry-humping" conduct, and that "as a supervisor, he was failing to stop
that conduct amongst his subordinates," and that Harmon "viewed this as appropriate
behavior as long as it was male to male but wrong if male to female." (R. 1604-06).
Deputy Chief Chamberlain agreed that investigators found this was "pattern behavior
related to poor judgment and poor leadership." (R. 1606). But the conduct was not
limited to Harmon or his Station. (See R. 155).
Ms. Cassidy's Affidavit, read at the Hearing, stating that:
"I have observed Captain Harmon and members of his crew engage in dryhumping, where one person is standing behind another person would reach into the
front pockets of the forward person, causing the forward person to bend over, after
which the rear person would mimic the pelvic thrusts of a sex act. It was
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considered a joke . . . . I have observed Captain Harmon participate in this activity
both in the rear and forward positions."
(R. 2078).
With the exception of Harmon, Ms. Cassidy testified at the Hearing that she
wouldn't swear under oath" that she had ever seen an officer present during a dryhumping incident, but they might have been. (R. 2477).
James Bristow, Ogden City Human Resources Manager, testified regarding sexual
harassment training that"[ w]e basically teach employees, supervisors to keep sexual
issues out of the workplace." (R. 2216). However, the testimony is out-of-context to the
conduct alleged. (Id.)
b.

Shower Incident

Steve Gunnell ("Gunnell") testified that he was taking a shower in a personal
shower stall when Harmon opened the door and "started urinating in my shower." (R.
2436). He said that he has never heard of anyone at OFD urinating into a shower where
someone was showering (R. 2437), and that he "was shocked," "a little offended," and
thought it "was kind of disrespectful" (R. 2437). The alleged incident was said to have
taken place in the late eighties or early nineties (R. 154-55) some date prior to Harmon's
promotion to Captain. Harmon was promoted to Captain on March 2, 1991. (R. 3483).
c.

Drafting Pit Incident

Chief Mathieu testified that the training facility where the drafting pit is located
sits back onto 12th Street and can be seen from public view through the surrounding
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chain link fence. (R. 1834,1850). He responded "yes, I do" when asked by Harmon's
attorney whether he believed that Harmon's "exposing his genitals caused your other
male firefighters affront or alarm." (R. 1835). Chief Mathieu stated that" [i]t was told to
me by some of the members present that they were totally caught off guard, totally
surprised, thought it was a totally inappropriate act," and that when urinating into the
drafting pit Harmon said "I'll fill it up." (R. 1837). The comment and the alleged conduct
was intended for laughs. It was not reported by anyone so it must not have been so
offensive.
Chief Mathieu testified that somefirefighterssaid "it was bizarre and they couldn't
imagine that somebody would do that in front of them, that would just expose themselves
and urinate into the drafting pit." (R. 1838). He testified that some firefighters told him
that when they were opening lids to take water out of the pit, "Dan made a gesture, says
Let me fill it up or 111fillit up and, that's when the urination began." (R. 1847-48; 229596). Chief Mathieu also testified that trainees were present at the drafting pit when the
incident occurred. (R. 1849; 2294). The conduct was intended for comradery.
Gunnell testified he was standing about four to five feet away from Harmon, on
the other side of the pit. (R.2442-43). He testified that someone commented that the
"drafting pit was getting low, and [Harmon] said that he'd help fill it up or something like
that." (R. 2444). Gunnell testified he thought that Harmon's intent was to shock (R.
2444), and that Gunnell's reaction was "I was surprised, somewhat shocked, and just
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turned and walked away" (R. 2445). Gunnell testified that anotherfirefighter,Dennis
Kennedy, appeared upset and commented "I can't believe he did that." (R. 2445, 2447).
This alleged incident took place in Summer of 2000 (R. 153-54).
OFD firefighter Stephen Reynolds was present at the drafting pit, standing behind
a truck. (R. 2561). He testified he did not see Harmon urinate, but that he later refused to
take the hose out of the pit because of the urine and because he "didn't want to touch the
hose." (R. 2562).
Harmon testified he urinated into the pit because "I had to go real bad," and the
restroom in the drill tower was locked and that it is a "real pain" to get the key. (R.
1277).
d.

Weedkiller Incident

Chief Mathieu testified that based on what he had learned and the surrounding
circumstances, he did not believe the urination into the bottle was intended to be a
practical joke. (R. 2372). He stated that he considered Harmon's testimony in his
deposition about whether he had urinated into the bottle as "a contradiction of his denial
at the second predetermination hearing." (R. 2383).
Harmon testified that he left the bottle containing urine on or under the counter,
and that he later learned that his former Battalion Chief Thompson had picked it up and
left a $20 bill on the counter. (R. 2709-11). He testified he did not intend Thompson to
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have the bottle of urine. (R. 1313; see also Affidavit of Dan Gibson at R. 483-85).7 He
testified that urinating into the bottle was a "symbolic act of defiance" by himself and his
crew against Thompson (R. 2708, 2773), and that he viewed urinating into the bottle as "a
fire house joke," and as a "camaraderie building experience" (R. 2774-75). He testified
he "completely approved of [the incident] up to the point [Thompson] received [the urinefilled bottle]," and that his only culpability was not removing the bottle before Thompson
got it. (R. 2776-77). He said he joked about Thompson "walking around his yard
spraying urine on his lawn." (R. 2778). The truth is that "Because it took a year for the
Chief to discover the alleged conduct, its clear that the Battalion Chief took the conduct
as humor." (R.3451).
e.

Leadership

At the Hearing, Harmon agreed: (1) "with the axiom a leader sets up, leads by
example"; (2) "that a leader is assigned and takes responsibility, takes responsibility for
his actions and is always ready to be held accountable"; and (3) "the leader makes []
decisions based on his judgment and, therefore, is also held accountable if something
goes wrong." (R. 2821-22).
Harmon agreed that "a captain is to be an example to his crew." (R. 1257). He
agreed it was his "duty as a captain to train [a new] employee to know what is appropriate

7

Dan Gibson admits that urinating in the bottle was his idea and that he and two
others urinated in the bottle and that it was intended only to be a joke.
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and not appropriate in the Ogden City Fire Department." (R. 1258). Harmon also
testified that the 1998 Zucchini Incident, the '80s-90s single Shower Incident, and the
Summer 2000 Drafting Pit Incident were all "inappropriate actions" and "stupid things to
do." (R. 2832-34). He testified that his understanding of "sexual harassment" is there "is
no sexual harassment unless and until there is a complaint of sexual harassment." (R.
2839). Harmon informed the Commission that his conduct was not Sexual Harassment,
stating that "Popular public misconceptions defines 'Sexual Harassment' as a separate
freestanding tort. It is not, it is a form of employment discrimination. In this matter,
there was no discrimination. See, e.g., Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 237 (4th Cir. 1994)
(supervisor's unfair criticism of subordinate's work in retaliation for rejecting his sexual
advances not within scope of employment); Wood v. United States, 995 F.2d 1122,1123
(1st Cir. 1993)." (R. 3448).
f.

Progressive Discipline

Mr. Bristow testified that the City does not "have a pure progressive discipline
system. Based on the severity of the action, that action alone can be grounds for
termination." (R. 2228). Based upon the evidence presented to the Civil Service
Commission and the recommendations of the investigators, Captain Harmon should not
have been discharged. Other less severe sanctions were available and although some
conduct showed poor judgment, the intentions were sincere in that they were intended to
be career comradery building. Making an example of Captain Harmon is arbitrary in light
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of the overall circumstances, including Harmon's own admissions. (R. 3454) ("The
decision wets arbitrary and capricious. In light of a 21 [year] career, a lack of reporting,
and in light of the entire body of conduct surrounding the work environment, the decision
is disproportionate, and not bound by reasonableness or rationality." (R. 3454).
5.

FACTUAL FINDINGS OF MAJORITY DECISION BEFORE
HARMON I

The Harmon I Majority Decision described the 1996 MDA Incident in detail in its
Findings of Fact, and found that: (1) Harmon coordinated the event; (2) Chief Mathieu set
ground rules for the event, including telling Harmon that the women must be
"appropriately attired"; (3) Harmon did not tell Chief Mathieu when the Budweiser Girls
were substituted for the Jazz Dancers; (4) Harmon attended the dinner and when he
arrived the Budweiser Girls were there preparing dinner while wearing bikini swimsuits
and high heels; (5) Harmon saw one of the Budweiser Girls having her photo taken in
front of a fire engine and later in an ambulance where she had taken off her top and was
wearing only a thong Bikini bottom; (6) Harmon admitted he was in the best position to
have stopped things "before they 'got out of hand.'" (R. 149-51).
Regarding the Zucchini Incident, the Harmon I Majority Decision found that: (1) it
took place in November of 1998 and involved Ms. Cassidy; (2) Ms. Cassidy held up a
cucumber or zucchini in front of the whole crew and said "Do you know what they call
these where I'm from-'home wreckers'"; (3) everyone laughed; (4) when Ms. Cassidy
was later on the phone, Harmon showed her a greased zucchini or cucumber and said "Is
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this big enough?"; (5) Ms. Cassidy and Harmon laughed; (6) Harmon admitted that "this
type of joke was not appropriate in the work place"; (7) at the time, no one complained of
the incident, and no one was disciplined for it. (R. 151).
The Harmon I Majority Decision concluded that the "Horseplay Incidents"
occurred and was wide-spread, finding that: (1) during Harmon's employment with OFD,
incidents had occurred between male firefighters of equal rank as well as between
supervisors and subordinates, where one man would approach another man from behind,
place his hands in the man's pockets and tickle his hips so he would bend forward, and the
man in the back would then "imitate the sex act by performing pelvic thrusts"; (2) both
men would laugh; (3) Harmon and the crew he supervised did this more than any other
crew; (4) no one complained or was disciplined for it prior to Harmon's termination. (R.
12-13).
Regarding the Shower Incident, the Harmon I Majority Decision found that: (1)
"Harmon opened a shower door while another male firefighter was showering and
urinated at his feet"; (2) "it was unclear whether the urine stream actually struck
[Gunnell's] feet or merely the shower floor"; (3) Harmon denied the incident in his letter
to Chief Mathieu because he believed it took place before he was Gunnell's superior; (4)
Gunnell never reported it and he and Harmon remained mends; (5) Harmon was not
disciplined for this incident prior to being terminated. (R. 148).
Regarding the Drafting Pit Incident, the Harmon I Majority Decision found that:
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(1) in the spring or early Summer of 2000, "Harmon and his crew went to assist another
crew in putting some things away after this crew had completed some training at the drill
tower at the training grounds on West 12th Street in Ogden"; (2) the "training consisted
of inserting a hose into a drafting pit and then sucking water out of that open source"; (3)
the other crew was just leaving as Harmon and his crew arrived; (4) Harmon "needed to
relieve himself, so he chose to urinate into the drafting pit" instead of using the restroom
in the training tower or "going to the more isolated back part of the training area"; (5)
other firefighters were present and saw what Harmon was doing. (R. 153-54).
The Harmon I Majority Decision's Findings of Fact agree that the 1999 Weedkiller
Incident took place finding that: (1) Harmon could obtain Roundup weedkiller at a
reduced price because he had a lawn fertilizing business; (2) in the summer of 1999, a
retired Battalion Chief, who had previously been Harmon's supervisor, asked Harmon to
provide him with "about a pint of Roundup for his personal use"; (3) the former Battalion
Chief and Harmon had had a bad relationship; (4) Harmon agreed to the request and told
the Battalion Chief to drop off a container at Station No.3, which he did; (5) one of
Harmon's crew picked up the container from the counter and urinated into it, then another
firefighter and Harmon urinated into it; (6) Harmon testified this was a joke and he had
intended to empty the bottle and not have the Battalion Chief pick it up; (7) the Battalion
Chief did pick up the bottle, recognized it as urine, and poured it out; (8) Harmon denied
the allegation in his December 9, 2000, letter to Chief Mathieu because Chiefs Mathieu's
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provision of weed killer as urine" "to a Battalion Chief," when it was actually "urine as
weedkiller," and Harmon did not "provide" it, and the Battalion Chief was retired. (R.
152-53).
The Harmon I Majority Decision's Findings of Fact agreed that Harmon: (1)
received a Notice of Caution on October 11,1999, for missing three meetings in which he
was a presenter (June 10, August 17, and September 18, 1999), and he was removed as a
team leader due to failing to meet obligations; and (2) did not attend a November 14,
2000, meeting that had been scheduled for eight months. (R. 153).
6-

CHIEF MATHIEU'S DISCIPLINARY DECISION

Chief Mathieu testified that in making the disciplinary decision, he considered all
of the offenses collectively: "In consideration, I considered all of the offenses
collectively. I didn't consider them individually." (R. 1755). He also considered
Harmon's statements at the second predetermination hearing when Harmon denied what
Chief Mathieu already had evidence that had occurred. (R. 2373-75). He testified that
he had never before had a situation arise where an employee was "involved in an incident
that in any way related to an employee urinating on somebody, in something, around a
place that was inappropriate," let alone three such incidents, so that there was no one else
to whom to compare Harmon's behavior. (R. 2396-97).
Chief Mathieu testified that in making his disciplinary decision, he took into
account Harmon's poor past annual performance evaluations and his past disciplinary
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history. (R. 1972). He also reviewed areas in evaluations where Harmon was marked as
"marginal," including with regard to staying on-task, time management, and blaming
others when criticized. (SeeR. 1973-2022).
Chief Mathieu testified that he made the decision to terminate Harmon because he
believed it was in the best interest of the City and the OFD. (R. 2402). He testified that
he felt that "there was much more than what was needed to terminate Dan Harmon." (R.
2607-08). He testified that he did not terminate Harmon solely on the basis of his finding
that Harmon had lied, and that his finding was that Harmon "displayed an intent to be
dishonest." (R. 2607-08; 2373-75). THIS TESTIMONY IS BELIED BY HARMON'S
REPEATED ADMISSIONS AND OTHER ACTS OF HONESTY. (See, e.g., R. 2383)
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 required the Ogden City Civil Service Commission
to "fully hear and determine the matter" Harmon raised in his appeal of Chief Mathieu's
termination. On remand, this Court informed this court that "fully hear and determine the
matter" meant that the Commission is under an obligation to address each of the grounds
for termination stated by the department head." Ogden City Corp. v. Harmoa 116 P.3d
973, 9771| 14 (Utah App. 2005). (R. 3367-73). The new Majority Decision failed to
fully determine the matter again despite this Court's published decision, avoiding
altogether the stigmatizing "dishonesty" grounds claimed by the Chief concerning his
answers to the Weedkiller incident addressed in his Second Predetermination Hearing
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where Garrity was invoked by Harmon. See Garrity v. State of New Jersey. 385 U.S.
493, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967). The new Commission Majority's failure
leaves Harmon to have to prove his innocense each time he applies for a new job or
benefits in violation of clearly established law under Walker v. United States. 744 F.2d 67
(10th Cir. 1984). The new Majority Decision violates Harmon's civil rights and he seeks
remedy of this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harmon raised the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Constitutional issue of Garrity during his civil service appeal, in the new
Majority Decision, the Commission Majority deliberated ignored Commission Lemke's
concerns stated in his Concurring Opinion (R. 3469) which required addressing the
Garrity issue. (R. 161).
VI. ARGUMENTS
THIS IS A SECOND APPEAL OF THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, WHERE ADDITIONALLY CONSTITUTIONAL INJURIES
HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY CAUSED; THEREFORE, REMEDIES ARE
ALSO SOUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As stated above, this is an appeal from the Ogden Civil Service Commission,
pursuant to Section 10-3-1012.5 (1953, amended). Plaintiff further seeks remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the new Majority Commissioner's clear violation of Section 10-31012(2) requiring the Commission to "fully hear and determine the matter."
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1953, as amended),
Any final action or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals for review. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the
issuance of the final action or order of the commission. The review by the Court
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of Appeals shall be on the record of the commission and shall be for the purpose of
determining if the commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (2004).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42U.S.C.A. § 1983.
In this appeal, Harmon raises Constitutional violates that must be ruled on by this
Court. Harmon requests a review of the new Commission's Majority Decision and an
ruling of the Garrity and honesty questions, the violation of Substantive and Procedural
Due Process and Harmon's stigma concerns unconstitutionally left unresolved by the
Commission. The new decision impedes Harmon's ability to obtain for future job
opportunities because his reputation is harmed causing him to prove his innocense each
time he applies for a new job or benefits. The Majority Decision's failure to address the
honesty issue (and Harmon's Garrity issue) is despite the clear, cogent, and unequivocal
direction of this Court in the Harmon I published opinion. (Addendum A).
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A.

Avoiding the Honesty Question Leaves Harmon Exposed to Future
Ridicule, Harassment, and Continuity Injury Claims Because of Harm
to His Right to Future Employment Opportunities and Due to a Per Se
Violation of Section 10-3-1012 Requiring the Commission to "Fully
Hear and Determine the Matter."

In this matter, as clearly demonstrated, the Commission was presented with
various grounds the Chief Mathieu used to form the basis of his decision to discharge
Harmon. (R. 148-55). The Chieftook into account performance evaluations prepared by
Steve Thompson - who admitted despised Harmon. (R. 2500, 2506). He also claimed
that he lost confidence in Harmon and has lost trust in him because of alleged untruthful
and inconsistent responses at the second predetermination hearing, where Garrity had
been asserted. (R. 161). In the new Commission's Majority Decision of April 13, 2006,
the new Majority did not determine the validity of the allegations against Harmon's
honesty nor did it determine that issue in light of Garrity. The new Majority was clearly
apprised of its obligations under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 as explained to it in this
Court's published decision, Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 977 U 14 (Utah
App. 2005). (R. 3367-73) (Addendum A). It is clear that the new Commission Majority
disregarded its obligation and acting deliberately indifferent to Harmon's rights avoided
the honesty question. Harmon asserts it was deliberate because the Concurring Minority
Opinion of John Lemke dated February 28, 2006, discusses that the Commission was well
aware of this Court's directives (R. 3469). The issue of Garrity was repeatedly addressed
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and was also not considered - perhaps realizing that a determination of the Garrity matter
would upset the Chiefs dishonesty claims. The Harmon I Majority Decision previously
concluded, "In the hearing, repeated references were made to the Garrity warning. Given
the decision reached by the Commission, it does not believe this issue needs to be
decided." (R. 161) (Addendum E).
The new Majority Decision's failure leaves Harmon to forever have to prove his
innocense each time he applies for another job with other departments. The U.S. Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Walker v. United States. 744 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.
1984) overturns this point. That Court in Walker, addressed the issue of stigmatization of
public employees where the dissemination harmful information occurred. "When the
termination is accompanied by public dissemination of the reasons for dismissal, and
those reasons would stigmatize the employee's reputation or foreclose future employment
opportunities, due process requires that the employee be provided a hearing at which he
may test the validity of the proffered grounds for dismissal." . . . . "Appellant should not
be forced to reestablish his innocense every time he applies for benefits or a job." Id., at
69-70. That is the very situation here needing to be corrected. One of the considered
grounds, well-established in the Commission's record, the published decision of this
Court in Harmon L and the City's briefings in the former appeal, case no. 20031030-CA,
there remains little doubt that the questioned dishonesty by the Chief was a consideration
for Harmon's dismissal. Also, there is little doubt that the grounds was publicly
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disseminated.
The new Commission Majority's failure to fully determine all of the grounds for
dismissal creates a § 1983 violation that should be resolved at this level by this Court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and well as this matter being reviewed under state law,
Section 10-3-1012.5 of the Utah Code.8
The Supreme Court has expressly held that harm to reputation alone does not
implicate the procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v.
Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 701-02, 96 S. Ct. 1155,47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976). "Reputational
harm or stigma must be coupled with a loss of or adverse effect on a person's prior legal
status or rights." Id. In this matter, Harmon alleges that the loss of reputation affects his
right to employment and future employment opportunities thus satisfying the Davis Test.
It is well-settled law, that in order for an individual to claim that he has been deprived of
a property interest in employment without due process, the plaintiff must first prove that
he had a property interest. To have a property interest in his employment "a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it." Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701
(1971). The implicated property interest, Harmon alleges that he had an interest in

8

In light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine established by the Supreme Court, no other
plain, speedy remedy exists.
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continued employment as a firefighter. Harmon's 21-year career employment has
manifest the existence of Harmon's property interest infirefightingemployment. Just
because the City investigated seven isolated and remote incidents or concluded that
Harmon was involved in non-offensive idiosyncratic conduct is insufficient to dismiss a
public employee after a loyal career of 21 years. (R. 3454, 3483). The longevity of
Harmon's admitted 21-year career speaks for itself that a continuation of that career is
desired and is not an abstract claim.
B.

Avoiding the Garrity Issue Is A Per Se Violation of 10-3-1012fs
Requirement of the Commission to "Fully Hear and Determine the
Matter."

A repeated theme in this appeal is that the Civil Service Commission failed to
"fully hear and determine the matter" violating clearly established law in Section 10-31012. Before the Commission, Harmon raised the issue of Garrity in the course of the
Civil Service hearing repeatedly as the Civil Service admits. (R. 161). The Majority
Decision in Harmon L knew the issue of Garrity was raised undetermined. Garrity is the
declarants assertion to rights explained in Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,
87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). Garrity similar in nature to Miranda, protects
public employees from discharge for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.
On December 8,2000, before issuing his decision, Chief Mathieu sent a letter to
Harmon stating he had just learned of three additional allegations of misconduct
involving Harmon, namely the 80s-or-early-90s Shower incident, the 2000 Drafting Pit
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and 1999 Weedkiller Incident. (R. 342). Responding to the letter, during the second
predetermination hearing, Harmon presented himself without counsel. The Harmon I
Majority Decision, this Court's published decision agreed these three incidents occurred,
but found mitigating circumstances against considering them. (R. 148, 151-154). The
Harmon I Majority Decision concluded it was impossible to determine when the Shower
Incident occurred (R. 156) whether before or after he was promoted to Captain on March
2, 1991. (R. 3483). This Court viewed the incidents as having mitigating value.
Harmon testified at the Commission Hearing that he was waiting for the Second
Predetermination hearing to start when Chief Mathieu came out to ask him to come in.
(R. 2686). Harmon testified that at that point he handed Chief Mathieu Joe O'Keefe's
prepared letter that he had written December 9, 2000, and told Chief Mathieu that his
answer to the allegations was in his attorney's letter and that "I don't see any need for me
to go into the hearing." (R. 2886). This act was an invocation of Garrity - to remain
silent under the Fifth Amendment. (R. 347-49) (2nd Predetermination hearing) See also,
Garritv v. State of New Jersey. 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967).
Harmon's letter to Chief Mathieu: (1) admitted the Summer 2000 Drafting Pit Incident,
(2) denied urinating into a shower stall "since I have been a Captain," (3) denied the
Weedkiller Incident as stated by the Chiefs letter; and (4) said he did not need another
hearing. (R. 344-345; R. 2686). Harmon testified that after he gave the letter to Chief
Mathieu he began to walk away, but Chief Mathieu said "I want you in this meeting." (R.
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2686). Harmon said Chief Mathieu told him "he had some questions about those
allegations and he wants to get some answers from me. And I said, My answers are in
that letter I gave you." (R. 2686). Obviously, to use this exchange as a grounds for
discharge is contrary to Garrity where it was invoked by Harmon desiring to remain
silent. Certainly there is not clear and convincing evidence otherwise of any intent to
defraud or deceive the Chief by the type of answer rendered. The letter contained both
admissions and denials and Harmon testified at the Commission asserting ample
admissions, freely. (Id). Harmon was stuck "between a rock and a whilrpool."
The Harmon I Majority Decision avoided determining the Garrity question, R.
161), claiming this was in light of its decision. After this Court issued its Harmon I
published decision on June 16, 2006, and remanded the matter to the new Commission,
the new Majority failed to even acknowledge Garrity and deliberately avoided following
this Court precedence in Harmon I. The Commission was told it abused its discretion by
not considering all of the grounds considered by the Chief. In stead of listening, it
consider the three issues previously avoided in the 20031030-CA appeal, reversed itself
turning a foil turn 180 degrees. Now, instead of being reinstated, Harmon is fired without
the benefit if a "foil determination" of the most harmfol issue, the dishonesty question (R.
3483), as recognized under Walker.
The Commission' failure violates the well-settled Fifth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clauses in that Harmon was deprived of the benefits
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of a full and fair hearing, in so creating a § 1983 Constitutional claim for Harmon.
Section 1983 provides that "every person who, under color of [law] . . . subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress." 42
U.S.C.A § 1983. The fundamental basis for due process is "the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319,
333, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). The procedural rights Harmon and other
public employees are entitled to in a civil service proceeding is to be accompanied and
advised by counsel... to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the
attendance of witnesses;... to a written . . . record of such hearing; and . . . to written . . .
findings of fact and decisions. Other rights guaranteed, are to "fair hearing before an
impartial tribunal." Roach v. Nat'l Trans. Safety B&. 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986).
Harmon asserts on this appeal, "Harmon IF. that IT WAS NOT FAIR to him to have
neither the Garrity question or the honesty question fully determined as this Court in
Harmon I and Section 10-3-1012 fully intended to occur, leaving him to have to defend
himself and prove his innocense each time HE applies or seeks other employment or
benefits. See Walker.
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C.

A Determination Based Upon Idiosyncratic and Isolated Incidents and
Bygone Issues Do Not Rise to Adequate Grounds for Discharge; Under
the Circumstances, Discharge was Disproportionate.

In this matter, this Court has the inherent authority to substitute its judgment for
the determination of a inferior tribunal. This inherent right is embodied within the de
novo review of conclusions of law. Only in situations where further facts are necessary
would remand be required by this Court for further fact-finding. Harmon believes this
Court can determine the Garrity question based upon the facts known surrounding the
second predetermination hearing and other factors considered by the Chief are sufficiently
mitigating as this Court can determine de novo.
Chief Mathieu testified that in making the disciplinary decision, he considered all
of the offenses collectively: "In consideration, I considered all of the offenses
collectively. I didn't consider them individually." (R. 1755). He also considered
Harmon's statements at the second predetermination hearing when Harmon denied what
Chief Mathieu already had evidence that had occurred. (R. 2373-75). He testified that he
had never before had a situation arise where an employee was "involved in an incident
that in any way related to an employee urinating on somebody, in something, around a
place that was inappropriate," let alone three such incidents, so that there was no one else
to whom to compare Harmon's behavior. (R. 2396-97).
Chief Mathieu testified that in making his disciplinary decision, he took into
account Harmon's poor past annual performance evaluations and his past disciplinary
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history. (R. 1972). Although, he also reviewed areas in evaluations where Harmon was
marked as "marginal," including with regard to staying on-task, time management, and
blaming others when criticized. (See R. 1973-2022). In defense of Harmon, the
Commission heard testimony that the Steve Thompson, who wrote those evaluations
disliked Harmon and that disdain reflected in the evaluations. (R. 2500, 2506).
Chief Mathieu testified that he made the decision to terminate Harmon because he
believed it was in the best interest of the City and the OFD. (R. 2402). He testified that
he felt that "there was much more than what was needed to terminate Dan Harmon." (R.
2607-08). He testified that he did not terminate Harmon solely on the basis of his finding
that Harmon had lied, and that hisfindingwas that Harmon "displayed an intent to be
dishonest." (R. 2607-08; 2373-75). THIS TESTIMONY IS BELIED BY HARMON'S
REPEATED ADMISSIONS AND ACTS OF HONESTY throughout the proceedings.
In Ogden's Opening Brief of the 20031030-CA case, Ogden City argued:
a. In the second predetermination hearing, Chief Mathieu asked the following
about the Weedkiller Incident:
It has been reported to me that your former Battalion Chief asked for some
of that and in so doing, instead of providing weed killer, you provided him
urine. Did that occur?
R. 348.
Ogden City's Opening Brief, case no. 20031030-CA, p. 31.
Harmon answered [in his attorney's prepared letter, and over his unequivocal request to
proceed with counsel present, Harmon answered], "my response is in that letter also." R.
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348. Harmon's response in the letter was "I deny." See R. 345.
In Ogden's Opening Brief, Ogden claimed:
b. Harmon admitted in the Commission Hearing that he had done the things he
had denied doing in response to Chief Mathieu's question. See 2708-11, 2773-75.
Ogden City's Opening Brief, case no. 20031030-CA, p. 31.
However, that's not so, he actually admitted preparing a bottle of urine. But he never
provided the weed killer bottle of urine to the Battalion Chief. It was mistakenly
provided by another employee without Harmon's knowledge. Id.
Harmon testified that he saw urinating into the bottle as a "fire house joke" and a
camaraderie building experience" with his crew (R. 2774-75), never intending it to leave
the station, that he "completely approved of [the incident] up to the point [Thompson]
received it," and that his only culpability was forgetting to remove the bottle before
another had provided it to Thompson (R. 2776-77). He testified that he joked afterwards
about Thompson "walking around his yard spraying urine on his lawn." (R. 2778).
In Ogden's Opening Brief, Ogden argued:
c.

Chief Mathieu testified that when he questioned Harmon about the
Weedkiller Incident in the second predetermination hearing, he knew that
the incident had occurred (R. 1737-38) and so he knew Harmon was not
honest in his response. (Id.)

Ogden City's Opening Brief, case no. 20031030-CA, p. 32.
However, key here where Ogden omitted in its former Opening Brief, is that the
letter was prepared by Harmon's counsel, was in light of a Garrity invocation, and was a
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"denial" of a compound statement. In his Commission hearing testimony, there was an
admission by Harmon. The earlier denial was in the context of the question posed.
In light of the overall circumstances, this Court is requested to substitute a
determination where the new Commission had avoided the question of disproportionaUty.
As provided in the new Commission's Conclusion of Law, rendered on April 13,
2006, the Commission can and has the authority to reverse the chief decision to terminate
an employee. The Commission wrote:
The Commission can reverse Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon only
when the discipline imposed is "clearly disproportionate" to the offenses and
"exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."
The Court also provided the following limited instruction as to factors that might
be considered in balancing the proportionality of the punishment to the offense:
We have noted that an exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of
misconduct may tip the balance against termination. On the other hand, dishonesty
or a series of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive
discipline may support termination. Other courts have given weight to
consideration of: (a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's
official duties and impedes his or her ability to carry out those duties; (b) whether
the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public confidence in the
department; (c) whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of
the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed willingly or knowingly;
rather than negligently or inadvertently. Courts have further considered whether
the misconduct is likely to reoccur.
(R. 3373) (Addendum A, IdL at 978).
The new Commission did not take mitigating factors into consideration in favor of
Harmon at all, including his exemplary record noted by this Court. Rather, the new
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Commission ruled in Chief Mathieu's favor, concluding "Based on these standards, and
taking into account any alleged mitigating factors, the Commission finds no fault with
Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon" calling the culmination of events (the
Horseplay, MDA, Zucchini, Drafting Pit, Shower, and Weedkiller Incidents) "serious"
"with sexual overtones." (R .3491) (Addendum B).
However, the new Commission was clearly erroneous in that the mitigating factors
and the standards suggested by this Court all point to avoiding discharge. None of the
four suggested points were considered. The conduct alleged here did not impede
Harmon's abilities to effectively fight fires, the alleged conduct did not adversely affect
or undermine public confidence, the alleged conduct never undermined his station's
morale - his crew admittedly loved him, and as argued about, there was no intent to lie to
the Chief- rather Harmon's invocation of Garrity inadvertently raised the Chiefs
suspicion, which later was innocently explained in the Proceedings. There was no
progressive discipline attempted. There was no intent to knowingly deceive the Chief
about the Weedkiller incident, Harmon did not give the Weedkiller bottle to his retired
Battalion Chief, Thompson 9 - it was accidently provided to him by another employee
while Harmon was away, before Harmon could dispose of the bottle. (R. 483-85).
Concerning the MDA Incident, others employees equal or senior to Harmon were

9

Has the Court noted that this was the same individual, Steve Thompson that disliked
Harmon and had rated him poorly for years before retirement.
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present. Three Captains, including the Captain of Station No. 2 and a Battalion Chief
were present for the MDA Incident-Harmon was the Captain of Station No. 3. As for the
Draft Pit, that too was a single incident which was not complained of or timely reported.
As for the 1998 Zucchini Incident, that conversation between Harmon and Ms. Cassidy
was initiated by the female subordinate, and in response to Harmon's continuation of the
joke, they all laughed, and the conversation apparently was consensual and not deemed
offensive to anyone present. It was apparent that Ms. Cassidy's estranged husband was
trying to get her fired, because he reported about a series of events not limited to the
single, isolated joke between Cassidy and Harmon.
The bulk of Ogden City's charges were acquired well, long after they had gone by.
Concerning these types of incidents, even if true, they have been ruled on by the Courts
already. The Tenth Circuit in Duncan v. Manager. Dept. of Safety. City and County of
Denver. 397 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 2005):
Title VII requires a litigant to file a claim within 300 days of the alleged
discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). The very precision of this
requirement~not a year, not six months, not the state law statute of limitations for
comparable causes of action—bespeaks Congress's concern. Title VII is not
intended to allow employees to dredge up old grievances; they must promptly
report and take action on discriminatory acts when they occur. Unlitigated
bygones are bygones.
As applied to hostile environment claims, however, this requirement has
proven problematic. Such claims do not consist primarily of discrete acts, but
often involve a series of incidents that span a period longer than 300 days. The
Supreme Court addressed this problem in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002), holding
that as long as "an act" contributing to a hostile work environment took place no
more than 300 days before the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge, a court may
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consider the complete history of acts comprising that hostile work environment.
Id., at 1308. In this matter, the alleged conduct did not occur within 300 days, and were
obviously all bygones, before the acts whether true or not were brought to the Chiefs
attention. Corrective action did not require discharge to prevent further acts not meeting
the approval by the Chief.
Finally, in light of the 21 year career of Captain Harmon, in light of the fact that
others have engaged in the same accused behavior, in light of no complaints had been
reported timely against Harmon until an investigation commenced from an estranged
spouse about various employees, including the one Zucchini Incident, two years prior in
1998, in view of the entire body of conduct, and in light of the fact that after being
reinstated no other like-incidents arose, Harmon is entitled benefit of the doubt and to the
best description of these events as being sporadic and idiosyncratic and very isolated
incidents, with the only exception being the widespread Horseplay. That conduct fits in
an entirely different category because the Commission determined it to be widespread
throughout the department.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of Walker, Harmon has the right to defend his career public service and his
reputation. Because of this Court's past order to the Civil Service Commission, and the
stigma caused by the City's overall allegations and omissions, this Court should de novo
review the honesty question under Garrity. Harmon requests this Court to determine that
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Harmon was obviously not acting dishonesty at the Second Predetermination Hearing
where Garrity was being asserted in response questioning surrounding the Weedkiller
Incident.
Harmon further requests this Court to exercise authority, if any, granted to it under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than just conduct a review under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012
(1953, as amended). In light of the new Commission Majority's clear violation of wellestablished law and its obligations stated by this Court in Ogden City Corp. v. Harmoa
116 P.3d 973, 977 ^ 14 (Utah App. 2005) (R. 3367-73), Ogden City is liable to Harmon
and, therefore, Harmon is afforded the right of redress, accordingly.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of
October, 2006.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Petitioner Daniel Harmon
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factor, or group of factors, which, taken as a
whole, support Halliday's decision to detain
Yazzie. Consequently, we conclude that the
trial court erred in denying Yazzie's motion
to suppress the evidence that resulted from
the detention.

Utah 973

by another firefighter should have been
considered by Commission when determining if city's discharge of captain was warranted.
Reversed and remanded.

CONCLUSION
1112 The State failed to prove that Halliday
had sufficient articulable facts to form the
requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to
justify the traffic stop. In absence of such a
showing, we are left with a strong impression
that Halliday's decision to detain Yazzie was
based on nothing more than a hunch, a
guess, or a "bet." Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court erred in denying Yazzie's
motion to suppress.
1f 13 Accordingly, we reverse Yazzie's convictions and remand this case to the trial
court for proceedings consistent with this
decision.
1114 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H.
JACKSON and GREGORY K. ORME,
Judges.
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Daniel HARMON and Ogden Civil
Service Commission,
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Background: City appealed from Civil
Service Commission's order reversing
city's decision to terminate fire captain.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Jackson,
J., held that shower incident where fire
captain urinated into shower stall occupied

1. Officers and Public Employees <S>72.50,
72.53
Appellate courts review the Civil Service
Commission's decision for the purpose of determining if the Commission has abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority.
2. Officers and Public Employees <S>72.54,
72.55(1)
Legislature has granted the Civil Service Commission discretion to determine the
facts and apply the law to the facts in all
cases coming before it, and appellate court
must uphold the Commission's determination
unless the determination exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness and rationality.
3. Officers and Public Employees <S>72.31
When discharged civil service employee
appeals his discharge to Civil Service Commission, the Commission makes two inquiries: (1) whether the facts support the
charges made by the department head, and if
so, (2) whether the charges warrant the sanction imposed.
4. Municipal Corporations <3=>198(2)
Shower incident where fire captain urinated into shower stall occupied by another
firefighter, captain's sexual dialogue with female firefighter involving zucchini, and captain's failure to stop the bizarre practice of
grown men "humping" each other should
have been considered by Civil Service Commission when determining if city's discharge
of captain was warranted; although shower
incident occurred 8 to 10 years earlier, it did
not erase fact that captain committed violation of fire department rules which merited
discipline, and violation of department regulations, the "humping" incident, was not justifiable merely because it was common and
consensual among the participants.
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5. Municipal Corporations <3=>198(2)
A violation of fire department regulations is not justifiable merely because it is
common and consensual among the participants.

11. Officers and Public Employees <s>69.7
Dishonesty or a series of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline may support termination of
civil service employee.

6. Officers and Public Employees <s>72.31
Civil Service Commission is under an
obligation to address each of the grounds for
termination stated by the department head.
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and Judith D. Wolferts, Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.

7. Municipal Corporations <3=*198(2, 4)

D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, and Douglas Holmes, Ogden, for Respondents.

Department head's allegation that fire
department employee was dishonest, if proven, would violate fire department regulations
and could possibly add further support to the
charges against employee, and as such, it had
to be considered by Civil Service Commission
when reviewing employee's discharge.
8. Officers and Public Employees <S>69.7
In determining whether the sanction of
dismissal is warranted, the Civil Service
Commission must affirm the sanction if it is
(1) appropriate to the offense and (2) consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the
department.
9. Municipal Corporations <S>198(4)
In weighing the punishment against the
offense, the Civil Service Commission must
give deference to the fire department chiefs
choice of punishment because, as the head of
the fire department, chief is in a position to
balance the competing concerns in pursuing a
particular disciplinary action, and Commission must give deference to the chiefs determination of whether progressive discipline is
appropriate.
10. Municipal Corporations <S=*198(4)
Given the degree of deference afforded
to the fire chiefs determination, the Civil
Service Commission may reverse the chiefs
choice of discipline as unduly excessive only
when the punishment is clearly disproportionate to the offense and exceeds the bounds
of reasonableness and rationality.
1. For convenience we refer to the 2003 version
of the statute which is, for all practical purposes,

Before Judges JACKSON, ORME, and
THORNE.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
If 1 Ogden City (the City) appeals the Ogden Civil Service Commission's (the Commission) order reversing the City's decision to
terminate Daniel Harmon's employment.
We reverse and remand the Commission's
order.
BACKGROUND
1! 2 This case involves the conduct of Daniel Harmon, a captain in the Ogden City Fire
Department (the Fire Department). On
September 8, 2000, the Fire Department received a complaint regarding an alleged incident of sexual harassment occurring two
years prior, involving Harmon and a subordinate female employee. In response, the
Fire Department conducted an investigation
in which it discovered several incidents of
misconduct involving Harmon. The Fire Department held hearings on December 11,
2000, and afterwards, on December 15, 2000,
Chief Mike L. Mathieu issued a letter notifying Harmon that his employment with the
Fire Department would be terminated the
next day due to violations of city and department regulations. Harmon appealed his dismissal to the Commission pursuant to Utah
Code section 10-3-1012. See Utah Code
Ann. § 10^3-1012(2) (2003).1
identical to that in effect in 2000.
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113 The Commission held hearings and, in
its November 20, 2003 Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the commissioners agreed that several of the incidents tended to support the Fire Department's decision
to discipline. First, the Commission found
that during the fall of 1996, Harmon had, as
an official of the Firefighter's Union, coordinated a fund-raising event for the Muscular
Dystrophy Association (MDA) in which he
permitted female entertainers to pose topless
with firefighters. Second, the Commission
found that Harmon had missed three mandatory training meetings between 1999 and
2000. Third, the Commission found that during the summer of 1999 Harmon, who also
operated a lawn fertilizing business, agreed
to provide a retired battalion chief and former supervisor with a bottle of Round-Up
weed-killer for the chiefs personal use.
Harmon and two other firefighters filled an
empty bottle with their urine, which the chief
later picked up understanding it to be the
promised weed-killer. Finally, the Commission also found that during a summer 2000
training exercise Harmon urinated into a
drafting pit, or water reservoir, being used
by his and another fire crew. Although the
Commission concluded that the incident
would not have supported a criminal charge
for public urination, it did support the present employment charges against him.
If 4 Two of the three commissioners agreed
that the remaining incidents did not support
the charges against Harmon and should not
be considered in determining whether his
employment should be terminated. The
Commission found that approximately eight
to ten years before the investigation, Harmon had urinated into a shower stall occupied by another firefighter. The majority
concluded that this should not be considered
because it was understood by the other firefighters as a joke and never resulted in
complaints by those present. Moreover, the
evidence did not indicate precisely when the
event occurred or whether Harmon had yet
been made a captain.
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fighter had apparently held up a cucumber or
zucchini and stated to Harmon, "Do you
know what they call these where I'm from?
Home-wreckers." When, as a captain, Harmon should have corrected the employee and
warned her about making improper comments, he instead furthered the exchange by
later presenting the female firefighter with a
greased cucumber or zucchini while she was
on the telephone with her husband and asking, "Is this big enough?" The majority
determined that this event did not support
the charges against Harmon because the female firefighter laughed and because "it was
a consensual exchange, was isolated, and was
not offensive to either party, [and] it could
not be considered sexual harassment or considered to otherwise violate Department policy."
116 Finally, the Commission found that
throughout his tenure as captain, Harmon
had tolerated a specific form of sexuallyoriented horseplay among the male firefighters in his station, in which they would, while
clothed, imitate sexual intercourse with each
other. The majority determined that Harmon's failure to stop the bizarre practice of
grown men "humping" each other did not
support the charges against him because the
"activity was common in the Department, did
not involve females, was consensual, and had
continued for many years without any[one]
ever being told that it violated Department
policy."

117 The majority of the commissioners reversed the Fire Department's decision to discharge Harmon. It concluded that only the
MDA incident, the Round-Up incident, the
drafting pit incident, and Harmon's absenteeism should be considered in its determination. Based on these charges, the majority
determined that discharge was an excessive
remedy because the events occurred over an
extended period of time, Harmon was not
given progressive punishment, and similar
violations by others were not punished as
severely. The third commissioner dissented,
concluding that the shower incident, the
1! 5 Further, the Commission found that in "zucchini" incident, and the "humping" horseNovember 1998 Harmon engaged in a sexual play should all be considered to support the
dialogue with a female firefighter who was a charges against Harmon; and even if they
probationary employee. The female fire- were not, dismissal would be an appropriate
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sanction because Harmon's conduct indicated
a pattern of unacceptable behavior.2

ing Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
Utah Code section 63^6b-16 (1997)).

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

ANALYSIS
[3,4] 1110 Pursuant to Utah Code section
10-3-1012, a discharged civil service employee may appeal the discharge to the Commission, "which shall fully hear and determine
the matter." Utah Code Ann. § 10-31012(2). In doing so, the Commission is to
make two inquiries: " '(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department
head, and, if so, (2) do the charges warrant
the sanction imposed?'" Kelly v. Salt Lake
City Civil Sew. Comm\ 2000 UT App 235,1116, 8 P.3d 1048 (quoting In re Discharge of
Jones, 720 P.2d 1356,1361 (Utah 1986)).

118 On appeal, the City claims the Commission's reversal of the chiefs decision to
dismiss Harmon is in error because the majority of Commissioners failed to properly
consider (a) the shower incident, (b) the "zucchini" incident, (c) the ongoing "humping"
horseplay, and (d) Harmon's failure to properly answer questions during the December
11, 2000 Fire Department hearing. The City
claims, moreover, that the Commission exceeded its authority and abused its discretion
in reversing the Fire Department's decision
to discharge Harmon.
[1,2] 119 Our review of the Commission's
order is limited to "the record of the [Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5
(2003). We review the Commission's decision "for the purpose of determining if the
[CJommission has abused its discretion or
exceeded its authority." Id. The statute itself does not further define when the Commission may have abused its discretion, but
we take guidance from the general principle
of administrative law that when " '[t]he Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to determine the facts and apply the law
to the facts in all cases coming before it . . .
we must uphold the Commission's determination .. . unless the determination exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'"
McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm\ 2002 UT
App 10, 1111, 41 P.3d 468 (third alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (interpreting Labor Commission Act, Utah Code section 34A1-301 (1997)); see also Ae Clevite, Inc. v.
Labor Comm\ 2000 UT App 35, 116, 996
P.2d 1072 ("'When the Legislature has
granted an agency discretion to determine an
issue, we review the agency's action for reasonableness.'" (citation omitted)) (interpret2. Commissioner Lemke, who was in the majority, wrote a separate opinion bemoaning the Commission's inability to substitute a lesser form of
discipline for the termination that had been ordered by Chief Mathieu, given his reading of our
opinion in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City
Civil Service Commission, 908 P.2d 871 (Utah
Ct.App.1995).

H 11 Under the first prong, the majority of
the Commission determined that the shower
incident, the "zucchini" incident, and the
"humping" did not support the charges
against Harmon. The City takes issue with
this conclusion, arguing that these incidents
should be included in the analysis because, as
the Commission itself found, the incidents
did in fact occur.
[5] 1112 We agree with the City. The
majority of the Commission disregarded the
shower incident primarily because it occurred several years prior to the investigation. Although an incident's remoteness in
time may be relevant in mitigating the degree of discipline imposed, it does not erase
the fact that Harmon committed a violation
of department rules which merited discipline.
Similarly, the majority commissioners disregarded the "zucchini" incident on grounds
that the female firefighter was a willing and
active participant. Here too, the fact that no
offense was expressed may mitigate the degree of discipline imposed, but the fact remains that such behavior was contrary to
applicable policies and regulations and, as
Harmon acknowledges, inappropriate for the
workplace.3 Finally, the majority concedes
3. The Commission found that "Harmon initially
did not think the incident was a problem" but
"later acknowledged that the type of joke with a
sexual connotation was not appropriate in the
work place."
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that the ongoing sexual horseplay among the
firefighters "might support the charge"
against Harmon, but concluded that it was
permissible given that such horseplay occurred frequently for several years without
complaint. We cannot agree that a violation
of department regulations is justifiable merely because it is common and consensual
among the participants; such considerations
are relevant only in that they may affect the
degree of discipline imposed.
If 13 The City next argues that the Commission failed to consider evidence that Harmon had been untruthful or evasive in responding to questions in the December 11,
2000 Fire Department predetermination
hearing. During the hearing, which was
headed by Chief Mathieu, Harmon was asked
regarding the incident in which he allegedly
substituted urine for weed-killer. Harmon's
attorney was not present, and he responded
only by referencing a prior letter in which he
had denied the accusation. Because several
witnesses had confirmed that the incident
had occurred, Mathieu concluded that Harmon was being untruthful. This was later
confirmed when Harmon testified before the
Commission that he had participated in the
incident.
[6,7] 1114 We reach no conclusion in regard to whether this incident does or does
not support the charges against Harmon, but
we agree with the City that the Commission
is under an obligation to address each of the
grounds for termination stated by the department head. Chief Mathieu has twice
referenced the incident, first in his memorandum summarizing Harmon's violations and
later in his testimony before the Commission;
however, the Commission does not address it
in its findings of fact or conclusions of law.
An allegation of dishonesty, if proven, would
violate Fire Department regulations4 and
could possibly add further support to the
charges against Harmon. As such, it must
be considered.
4. Fire Department regulations prohibit "the
making of misleading ... statements with the
intent to deceive." Ogden City Fire Department
Regulations, R-0497, ch. 3, § 32 (effective June
18, 1997).
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1f 15 Having determined that the shower
incident, the "zucchini" incident, and the
"humping" horseplay were relevant, support
the charges against Harmon, and should
have been considered by the Commission, we
reverse the Commission's order and remand
to allow it to determine whether these incidents, taken together with the other incidents, warrant the sanction of dismissal.5
On remand the Commission should also determine whether Chief Mathieu's allegations
of dishonesty additionally support the
charges against Harmon and, if so, whether
they further justify the Fire Department's
decision to dismiss him.
[8] 1116 In determining whether the
sanction of dismissal is warranted in this
case, the Commission must affirm the sanction if it is (1) appropriate to the offense and
(2) consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department. See Kelly v. Salt
Lake City Civil Sew. Comm'n, 2000 UT App
235, 1! 21, 8 P.3d 1048. The Commission has
already determined that Harmon offered no
evidence of inconsistency, and therefore, the
question of severity is of primary importance
in this case.
[9,10] 1117 In weighing the punishment
against the offense, the Commission must
give deference to the chiefs choice of punishment because, as the head of the Fire Department, he is in a position to balance the
competing concerns in pursuing a particular
disciplinary action. See id. at 1122 (" '[Discipline imposed for employee misconduct is
within the sound discretion of the [c]hief.'"
(quoting Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv.
Comm\ 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct.App.
1997))); cf. In re Discharge of Jones, 720
P.2d 1356, 1363 (Utah 1986) ("The sheriff
must manage and direct his deputies, and is
in the best position to know whether their
actions merit discipline."). Likewise, the
Commission must give deference to the
chiefs determination of whether progressive
5. We acknowledge a passing reference in the
Commission majority's opinion to the possibility
termination would be improper even if all the
charged incidents were considered. We are not
convinced, given the entirety of the opinion, that
this alternative rationale was meaningfully considered.
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discipline is appropriate. See Lucas, 949
P.2d at 762 ("[T]he use of progressive discipline is committed to the [c]hief s discretion,
based on the [c]hief s determination of the
severity of the offense."). Given the degree
of deference afforded to the fire chiefs determination, the Commission may reverse the
chiefs choice of discipline as unduly excessive only when the punishment is "clearly
disproportionate" to the offense, In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d at 1363, and " 'exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality,' " McKesson Corp. v. Labor
Comm'n, 2002 UT App 10, 111, 41 P.3d 468
(citation omitted).
[11] 1118 Utah law has provided little
guidance on the precise factors used to balance the proportionality of the punishment to
the offense. We have noted that an exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of
misconduct may tip the balance against termination. See Lucas, 949 P.2d at 762. On
the other hand, dishonesty, id., or a series of
violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline may support termination, see Kelly, 2000 UT App 235 at 1125,
8 P.3d 1048. Other courts have given weight
to considerations of (a) whether the violation
is directly related to the employee's official
duties and significantly impedes his or her
ability to carry out those duties; (b) whether
the offense was of a type that adversely
affects the public confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense undermines
the morale and effectiveness of the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed willfully or knowingly, rather than
negligently or inadvertently. See 5 Antieau
on Local Gov't Law, § 79.11[4], [5] (2002);
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal
Corporations § 12.237 (3d ed. 1999); 15AAm.
Jur.2d Civil Service §§ 50, 65 (2000). Courts
have further considered whether the misconduct is likely to reoccur. See Shelly v. State
Pers. Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14,
539 P.2d 774, 791 (1975).
1119 We reverse the Commission's order
and remand the case to the Commission for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1120 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K.
ORME and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.,
Judges.
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SAVE OUR CANYONS, a Utah non-profit
corporation; Herbert & Helga Lloyd, individuals; Karl Bryner, an individual;
Mark & Pamela Anderson, individuals;
Stephan & Veronique Otto, individuals;
Lionel & Janice Mausberg, individuals;
and Brian Moench, an individual, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY; Wasatch Pacific, Inc.,
a corporation; and Terry Diehl, an individual, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20040766-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 23, 2005.
Background: Environmentalists brought
action to challenge decision of the county
Board of Adjustment to grant three variances from zoning ordinances for an access
road near canyon mouth to landowner's
property. The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone E.
Medley, J., granted Board's summary
judgment motion, and environmentalists
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Billings,
P.J., held that:
(1) variances satisfied statutory requirement allowing a variance only if literal
enforcement would cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant unnecessary to carry out the general purpose of the zoning ordinance;
(2) variances satisfied statutory requirement allowing a variance only if the
variance would not substantially affect
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ADDENDUM B

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

APPEAL OF
CAPTAIN DANIEL HARMON

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

This matter is before the Commission on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals.
On June 16,2005 the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's November 20, 2003
Decision, which itself had reversed Chief Mike Mathieu's ("Chief Mathieu") termination of
Captain Daniel Harmon from the Ogden City Fire Department ("OFD"). Commissioner
John Lemke concurred in the Commission's November 20,2003 Decision, noting that he
believed Harmon's conduct warranted some discipline but did not warrant termination, and
he was concurring because Utah law allows the Commission only to affirm or reverse Chief
Mathieu's decision but not to alter it. Commissioner Jeremy Taylor dissented and would
have upheld Harmon's termination.
The Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Commission with instructions on
the manner in which to proceed. The Court instructed the Commission to: (a) take into
account that all of the incidents actually occurred as alleged; and (b) to consider Chief
Mathieu's belief that Harmon had been dishonest in responding to the Chiefs questions
during one of the predetermination hearings. The Commission also was instructed to
determine whether termination was warranted in light of all of these incidents as well as any
mitigating circumstances. The Court pointed out that in deciding whether to affirm or
reverse Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon, Utah law requires the Commission to

003481
Harmon's Addendum B

give deference to Chief Mathieu's decision unless the Commission finds that the discipline
imposed is "clearly excessive to the offense" and "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality."
On February 10, 2006, a re-hearing was held before the Commission.Commissioners A.K. Greenwood and Jeremy Taylor appeared in person at the re-hearing,
and Commissioner John Lemke appeared by telephone. At an earlier hearing on November
10,2005 to determine the procedure on remand, counsel for Ogden City (the "City") and
counsel for Harmon stipulated and agreed that the record on remand would be that which
had been the record on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Commission ordered at that
time that each party could file one brief with the Commission, to be filed concurrently. The
Commission also ordered at the November 10, 2005 hearing that counsel would be allowed
to present oral argument at the re-hearing.
The parties' briefs were to be filed with the Commission by January 3, 2006. The
City timely filed its brief. Harmon did not timely file a brief. Instead, on January 24,2006,
Harmon filed a brief in which he responded to the City's brief. The City then submitted an
objection to the Commission which did not particularly object to the untimeliness of
Harmon's brief, but did object to Harmon's having used his brief to respond to the City's
brief While the Commission recognizes that Harmon's brief did not comport with the
procedure on remand, the Commission nevertheless has reviewed and considered Harmon's
brief in reaching its decision here. As the re-hearing date approached, Harmon's counsel
indicated that he could not appear to present oral argument. In light of that, neither party
presented oral argument at the subsequent re-hearing.
Now having reviewed the facts and evidence in light of the Court of Appeals5
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instructions, and the parties* additional briefing, the Commission issues the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
Consistent with the Court of Appeals' instruction, the Commission incorporates
herein the Findings of Fact described in the Commission's November 30,2003 Decision
including those that the Commission concluded were not supported by the evidence, In
particular, Facts atffl[1-11 in the November 30, 2003 Decision are incorporated herein and
are not specifically addressed in this decision. The Commission also makes the following
additional Factual Findings:
1.

Harmon was hired by the City as a firefighter on September 10,1979. He

was promoted to captain on March 2, 1991, and held that position until his termination on
December 16, 2000.
2.

The evidence supports that the following six incidents occurred as alleged by

the City:
(a)

Sometime between 1990 and 1993, Harmon urinated into a shower stall

located in the workplace where a firefighter with less OFD seniority was showering
("Shower Incident");

Commissioner Lemke has stated in a concurring opinion that he would affirm Harmon's
dismissal based what he considers Harmon's insubordinate and evasive conduct in evading Chief
Mathieu's question about the weedkiller, combined with the Zucchini, Weedkiller, Horseplay,
Shower, MDA, and Drafting Pit Incidents and the fact that Harmon missed four meetings in the
eighteen months prior to his termination. Commissioners Greenwood's and Taylor's opinion
here is based on their opinion that the seven incidents alone are sufficient to justify Harmon's
termination. However, they also agree that the evidence shows that Harmon displayed an intent
to deceive Chief Mathieu about the Weedkiller Incident, and that this dishonesty issue would
justify dismissal with or without combining it with the other seven incidents.
3

Harmon's Addendum B

(b)

Throughout his tenure as OFD captain, Harmon tolerated and participated in

sexually-oriented "horseplay" in the workplace where fully-clothed male firefighters
under his charge would simulate sexual intercourse with each other ("Horseplay
Incidents");
(c)

In the fall of 1996, while he was a captain, Harmon coordinated an event

where the firefighters of Fire Station Number 2 were to have a luncheon prepared for
them at the station house as a reward for raising the most donations for the Muscular
Dystrophy Association ("MDA Incident"), and Harmon permitted the women
preparing the meal to wear swimsuits to the event and also tacitly condoned one
woman's posing at the event for photos withfirefighterswhile she was topless and
wearing a thong bikini;
(d)

In November of 1998, Harmon, a captain at the time, showed a zucchini to a

female probationary firefighter on his crew and said with a sexual connotation "Is
this big enough?" ("Zucchini Incident");
(e)

In the summer of 1999, while he was a Captain, Harmon and two other

firefighters in his crew urinated into a bottle which a retired Battalion chief later
picked up believing it to be the weedkiller that Harmon had promised to him
("Weedkiller Incident");
(f)

In the spring or early summer of 2000, while he was a Captain, Harmon

publically urinated into a drafting pit (water reservoir), being used for a training
exercise by his own fire crew and another fire crew ("Drafting Pit Incident").
3.

Harmon received training in at least five seminars on preventing

inappropriate sexual conduct and sexual harassment, and several times signed an
4
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acknowledgment of receipt of the City's "No Harassment Policy.1'
4.

Harmon's record shows performance problems from 1991 through 2000:

(a)

His Annual Evaluations from February 17,1991 through March 2000 exhibit

mid-range marks, with some low marks and cautions for failing to stay on task and
problems with personal relations with co-workers;
(b)

He received a Second Written Warning on December 13,1995, cautioning

him about poor work performance, inefficient work habits, failure to discipline
subordinates, conflicts with peer supervisors, and failing to stay on-task including
failing to provide timely evaluations of those under his supervision;
(c)

He scored "Marginal" on his 1996 Annual Evaluation for leadership,

flexibility, planning/evaluation, personnel management/interpersonal skills, and
meeting schedules/utilizing resources;
(d)

His March 3, 1997 Annual Evaluation reflects concerns about his reliability,

and his "sizing up*' and prioritizing tasks;
(e)

He was counseled on April 19,1998 for leaving his assigned location at a fire

without informing the Incident Commander;
(f)

His March 3, 1998 and March 3, 2000 Annual Evaluations score him as

'Marginal" in planning/organization, and meeting schedules/utilizing resources;
(g)

His March 3,2000 Annual Evaluation states he has problems fulfilling his

duties.
5.

Harmon missed the following four meetings in the eighteen months prior to

his termination:
(a)

June 10, 1999 workgroup leaders meeting where he was Team Leader, stating
5
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he had "spaced it";
(b)

August 17,1999 CPR class for reservefirefightersthat he himself had

scheduled and where he was the instructor;
(c)

September 18, 1999 Reserve Corps meeting that he had set up as Team

Leader;
(d)

November 14, 2000 class he was supposed to teach that had been scheduled

and placed on monthly calendars for eight months.
6.

On November 11 f 1999, Harmon was removed as Team Leader for missing

the 1999 meetings.
7.

Harmon knew that Chief Mathieu expected the women preparing the MDA

event meal to be appropriately dressed. When Harmon told Chief Mathieu that the Jazz
Dancers would be preparing the meal for the MDA event, Chief Mathieu told Harmon that
the women had to be appropriately clad, i.e., in their workout sweat suits.
8.

When the Jazz Dancers were unable to attend the MDA event, the Budweiser

Girls appeared instead but Harmon did not tell Chief Mathieu about the change.
9.

Harmon knew the Budweiser girls would be wearing swimsuits at the MDA

event but did not tell Chief Mathieu.
10.

Upon arriving at the MDA event Harmon saw that one woman had changed

into a thong bikini bottom to pose for photos. Harmon retrieved his own helmet from the
ambulance he was driving and asked the woman in the thong bikini bottom to pose with the
helmet while a photo was taken of her from the rear.
11.

At the MDA event, Harmon later saw that the woman in the thong bikini

bottom had taken off her top and was posing for photos while lying on the cot in the
6
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ambulance, with firemen sitting on the squad bench around her. Harmon did nothing to stop
this posing, did not tell the woman in the thong bikini bottom to get dressed, and did not tell
thefirefightersto leave the scene.
12.

Harmon led the effort to hide what had taken place at the MDA event and led

the effort to make sure that film taken at the MDA event was gotten rid of.
13.

Harmon did not come forward and inform Chief Mathieu about the details of

the MDA Incident at the time it occurred.
14.

Harmon participated m the Horseplay Incidents with other males while he

was a captain, and also failed to stop the sexually-related Horseplay activity among his
crew.
15.

One of Harmon's female crew members saw Harmon and his male crew

members participating in the Horseplay incidents, including seeing Harmon simulating
sexual activity from both the front and rear.
16.

Harmon did not come forward and tell Chief Mathieu about the Horseplay

Incidents at the time they occurred.
17.

The Zucchini Incident took place in November of 1998 while Harmon was a

captain, and involved Ms. Cassiday, a female probationary employee who was supervised by
Harmon. Ms. Cassiday held up a zucchini or cucumber in front of Harmon's crew and said
'Do you know what they call these where I come from-'home wreckers."* The crew
members laughed.
18.

When Ms, Cassiday was later on the telephone with her husband, Harmon

approached her and showed her a cucumber or zucchini and asked, with a sexual
connotation, "Is this big enough?"
7
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19.

Harmon did not discipline Ms. Cassiday for her comment about the zucchini

and did not warn her of the inappropriateness of a sexual comment in the workplace.
20.

Harmon did not tell Chief Mathieu at the time about his own and Ms.

Cassiday's zucchini comments, and Chief Mathieu learned about it from Ms. Cassiday's
estranged husband.
21.

Harmon was hired as afirefighterby OFD on September 10,1979, and Steve

Gunnell ("Gunnell") was hired as a firefighter by OFD in 1988. Harmon became
probationary Acting Captain in OFD in 1990, and he became a Captain on March 2, 1991.
22.

Harmon admits that seniority determines who is in charge when a captain,

battalion chief, or another superior is not available. Harmon at all times has had seniority
over Gunnell. Rule 3008 of OFD Rules and Regulations defines "subordinate" as u[a]
member who stands in order of rank below another." Rule 3009 of the OFD Rules and
Regulations states that "[w]hen two or more members below the rank of Captain find
themselves in a position which requires command action, the member with the most time in
the highest grade will assume command until relieved by a superior officer.'1
23.

Sometime between 1990 and 1993, Gunnell was taking a shower in a

personal shower stall when Harmon opened the door and urinated into the shower in which
Gunnell was standing.
24.

Gunnell has never heard of anyone else except Harmon urinating into a

shower where someone was standing. Gunnell was shocked and offended by Harmon's
conduct and thought it was disrespectful.
25.

The training facility where the Drafting Pit Incident occurred sits back onto

12th Street in Ogden and can be seen from public view through a chain link fence. During a
8
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training exercise, Harmon, a captain, exposed his genitals and urinated into the pit infrontof
other firefighters. OFD trainees were present. Before urinating, Harmon made a comment
to the effect that he would fill up the pit and then began urinating into it.
26.

There was a hose in the drafting pit at the time Harmon urinated into it, and a

firefighter later refused to pull the hose out after seeing Harmon urinating into the pit.
27.

Other firefighters were disgusted and offended by Harmon's urinating into

the drafting pit.
28.

At the time it occurred, Harmon did not tell Chief Mathieu about his urinating

into the drafting pit, and Chief Mathieu learned of it only incident to the investigation of
Harmon.
29.

Harmon, who has a lawn care business, was asked by a former Battalion

Chief who Harmon disliked to provide the Battalion Chief with some Roundup weedkiller.
Instead offillingan empty bottle with the requested Roundup, Harmon and a couple of
members of his crew urinated into the bottle and left it on the counter. The Battalion Chief
later picked up the bottle and left a $20 bill in its place. Harmon was a captain at the time
and viewed the urinating as a camaraderie building experience with his crew.
30.

Harmon later joked about the Battalion Chief walking around and spraying

urine on his lawn.
31.

Harmon did not tell Chief Mathieu about the Weedkiller Incident when it

occurred and Chief Mathieu learned of it only incident to the investigation of Harmon.
32.

Harmon admits that as a supervisor he is responsible for the workplace

conduct of his crew and that he establishes what is acceptable and not acceptable. Harmon
agrees that a leader leads by example and takes responsibility for and should be accountable
9
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for his actions. He agrees that a captain must set the example for his crew and to train them
in what is and is not appropriate.
33.

The City does not have a pure progressive discipline system and, based on the

severity of the conduct, an employee can be terminated without progressive discipline first
being imposed.
34.

Chief Mathieu believes that Harmon was dishonest and also displayed an

intent to be dishonest at the second predetermination hearing when Harmon denied the
Weedkiller Incident.
35.

The City trains its supervisors and other employees to keep sexual issues out

of the workplace.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Given that the Facts are as found by Chief Mathieu, the Commission must affirm the
sanction of dismissal: (a) if it is appropriate to the offenses, and (b) if it is consistent with
previous sanctions imposed by OFD, This second factor is not at issue here because Harmon
failed to provide any evidence that his dismissal was inconsistent with previous sanctions
imposed by OFD. Thus, the only consideration here is whether the sanction of dismissal is
appropriate to Harmon's offenses.
In remanding to the Commission to determine this issue, the Utah Court of Appeals
provided instruction on how to proceed. The Court instructed that in weighing Harmon's
punishment against the offenses: (a) the Commission must give deference to Chief
Mathieu's decision to terminate because as head of OFD, he is in the best position to balance
the competing concerns in pursuing a particular disciplinary action, (b) that discipline
imposed for OFD employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of Chief Mathieu, and
10
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(c) that whether or not to use progressive discipline is committed to Chief Mathieu's
discretion, based on Chief Mathieu's determination of the severity of the offense. The
Commission can reverse Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon only when the
discipline imposed is "clearly disproportionate" to the offenses and "exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality."
The Court also provided the following limited instruction as to factors that might be
considered in balancing the proportionality of the punishment to the offense:
We have noted that an exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of
misconduct may tip the balance against termination. On the other hand,
dishonesty or a series of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective
progressive discipline may support termination. Other courts have given
weight to consideration of; (a) whether the violation is directly related to the
employee's official duties and impedes his or her ability to carry out those
duties; (b) whether the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public
confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense undermines the morale
and effectiveness of the department; or (d) whether the offense was
committed willingly or knowingly; rather than negligently or inadvertently.
Courts have further considered whether the misconduct is likely to reoccur.
Based on these standards, and taking into account any alleged mitigating factors, the
Commission finds no fault with Chief Mathieu's decision to terminate Harmon.
It is significant here that the Horseplay, MDA, Zucchini, Drafting Pit, Shower, and
Weedkiller Incidents all revolve around conduct having sexual overtones. In evaluating the
seriousness of these Incidents, it is important to consider sexual harassment law in the
context of the employer's legal duties and responsibility to monitor inappropriate sexual
conduct, whether or not such conduct might later to found by a court to rise to the level of a
hostile work environment based on sexual harassment. State and federal discrimination laws
impose strict penalties on employers for overtly allowing, or condoning by ignoring, sexual
harassment in the workplace. The goal of employers therefore is to stop all sexual conduct
11
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before it reaches the point of becoming legally actionable sexual harassment.
Harmon undisputedly was a captain and supervisor at the time of at least five of these
incidents and as such he stood in the place of the City with a clear responsibility to himself
refrain from inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace, as well as to stop any such
conduct by subordinates. The City had provided training in sexual harassment which
Harmon acknowledges having received. Instead of fulfilling this obligation, however,
Harmon himself became the source of inappropriate sexually-based conduct.
That Harmon's crew may have laughed at Ms. Cassiday's comment about the
zucchini did not relieve Harmon of his responsibility to correct Ms. Cassiday for her
inappropriate comment. Nor does Ms. Cassiday's laughter at Harmon's zucchini comment
alleviate Harmon's own inappropriate conduct in responding to Ms. Cassiday's comment. It
is also irrelevant that Ms. Cassiday's estranged husband, a firefighter in another city, was the
person to first report the incident to Chief Mathieu. Haimon himself should have corrected
Ms. Cassiday's conduct and/or reported her to the appropriate City officials, rather than
responding in kind. Harmon was a captain with more than fifteen years of service at the
time of the Zucchini Incident. He had attended annual training sessions dealing with
establishing and maintaining a workplace sensitive to and aware of inappropriate activities
of a sexual nature. He cannot be rewarded for failing to perform his duty. We also agree
with the Dissent to the November 20,2003 Decision, which concluded that Harmon's
behavior in the Zucchini Incident was inappropriate and detrimental to the order and
discipline of OFD, and that it was Harmon's duty as an OFD officer to set a good example
and be a leader to his subordinates in improving the workplace so that there was decreased
risk of offending individuals with inappropriate sexual conduct, and to avoid any activities
12
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that would bring discredit to OFD and the City.
As for the Shower Incident, it is irrelevant whether or not Harmon was or was not a
captain at the time of the Incident. It is also irrelevant that the incident may have occurred
many years prior, Since Harmon was hired before Gunnell was hired, he clearly was senior
to Gunnell based on years of service as well as under OFD Rules 3008 and 3009. Moreover,
there is no time limit on considering an act of inappropriate conduct, particularly this one
where Gunnell was left standing in Harmon's urine. As aptly noted in the Dissent to the
November 20, 2003 Decision, urinating into an occupied shower stall is inappropriate by any
measure and the rank of the individuals involved is of little consequence and does not
mitigate the conduct in any way, Gunnell himself testified that he was alarmed and felt
disrespected by Harmon's action.
Furthermore, when the Shower incident is combined with the Drafting Pit and
Weedkiller Incidents, a pattern of behavior by Harmon emerges where public urination is the
centerpiece. This conduct is totally inappropriate and bizarre for anyone in the workplace,
let alone a captain who should be an example to subordinates.
Harmon's participating in and allowing subordinates to participate in the Horseplay
Incidents also shows poor judgment and poor leadership. It is irrelevant that the Horseplay
Incidents may have involved only male crew members. Relevant legal standards make clear
that same-gender sexual conduct can create a hostile workplace and create employer liability.
It should be clear to any rational person that even if females were not participants and were
only bystanders or just simply aware of the conduct, this type of conduct also can create a
hostile work environment for them. It is also irrelevant whether or not such conduct
allegedly was common in OFD. Conduct with sexual overtones is inappropriate in the
13
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workplace regardless of whether it might be consensual or even common because it creates a
hostile work environment for everyone exposed to it. It is also impossible to know whether
such conduct is consensual, particularly when a captain, who is in a position of authority, is
the individual who is leading or participating in it. Such conduct may not be complained
about at the time but may later become the basis for complaints by others. In particular,
Harmon's conduct in the Zucchini and Horseplay Incidents are inappropriate and can be
construed as condoning inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace.
As a captain, Harmon is held to a higher duty and is expected to set an example for
subordinates and his crew. Instead, he was the source of improper conduct in at least the
Weedkiller, Horseplay, Zucchini, and Drafting Pit Incidents, In addition, he failed to
correct, and even facilitated, inappropriate conduct that occurred during the MDA Incident.
Significantly, he failed to comply with Chief Mathieu's directive that the women preparing
the MDA meal be appropriately clad, and admits that he led a cover-up of the MDA
Incident. Thus, in addition to inappropriate conduct, there also is a clear element of deceit in
Harmon's actions concerning the MDA Incident.
In addition to considering these six Incidents, Chief Mathieu testified that he also
considered that Harmon had failed to appear at four scheduled meetings during the eighteen
months prior to his termination, and that his performance record had not been stellar for a
number of years. It was appropriate for Chief Mathieu to consider all of these factors in
combination when making his decision. As noted by the Dissent to the November 30,2000
Decision, u[j]ust as promotions are based on an evaluation of an employee's complete record
of employment, so also should a decision to discipline an employee who sustains a record of
inappropriate behavior." An officer should be held to account for his conduct regardless of
14

Harmon's Addendum B

the lapse of time. Harmon's conduct repeatedly violated OFD's and the City's policies to
such a degree that termination was fully justified.
Nor did Chief Mathieu err in not providing progressive discipline prior to
termination. It is subject to Chief Mathieu's discretion whether or not to provide progressive
discipline before terminating an employee, and the severity of Harmon's actions in the
Incidents at issue show that Chief Mathieu cannot be faulted for not doing so. Hannon's
annual evaluations and disciplines show that he was regularly counseled on his performance
as to meeting his obligations as an officer. Moreover, Harmon himself was the major factor
in the Incidents not coming to light until incident to the investigation. Harmon cannot be
rewarded for his failure to timely come forward and admit to the incidents and his part in
them.
In assessing the appropriateness of termination, we also consider that Harmon did not
have an "exemplary service record" and that the evidence of his misconduct is not tenuous
and instead is essentially undisputed. Furthermore, the six Incidents, as well as Harmon's
evaluations and disciplines, are directly related to his duties as a captain and took place in
the workplace, thus impeding his ability to legitimately carry out his duties and to serve as
an example. Harmon's conduct is also of the type that would adversely affect the public's
confidence and respect for the City as well as its confidence in OFD's abilities to carry out
its duties. Hannon's actions also could have a grave effect on the morale of the OFD, which
itself leads to decreased effectiveness as a department. It is also significant that Hannon's
conduct obviously was knowing and willing, and not simply negligent or inadvertent.
Based on the foregoing, Hannon's termination is not "clearly disproportionate" to the
offenses, nor does it "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." The
15
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Commission finds that Chief Mathieu acted appropriately and that his termination of
Harmon was warranted.
ORDER
The Decision of the Ogden Fire Chief to terminate Captain Daniel Harmon is hereby
AFFIRMED.

DATED THIS / 3

DAY,OF APRIU2006

Commissioner J

16

Harmon's Addendum B

003W

ADDENDUM C

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

)

IN THE MATTER OF

)

CONCURRING OPINION OF

)

CAPTAIN DANIEL HARMON

)
)

COMMISSIONER LEMKE

)

1. The Utah Court of Appeals in its June 16,2004, decision reversed the Ogden
Civil Service Commission's (the Commission) Majority decision and remanded the case
to the Commission, As I understand that decision, the Court disagreed with the
Majority's analysis of the Shower Incident, the Zucchini Incident, and the Horseplay
Incident, stated that it considered the three incidents relevant and that they should have
been considered. The Court also directed the Commission to review in the allegation of
dishonesty and determine if it was supported by the evidence. Finally, the Court directed
the Commission, after reconsidering the proven charges, to reevaluate the punishment of
termination, giving deference to the Chiefs decision to terminate Harmon.

2. As one of the two members signing the original Majority Opinion (the other
member no longer serves on the Commission), I would first like to clarify what that
Majority decided. With respect to the Shower Incident, we found that the termination
decision was based upon a senior/subordination relationship, that is, Harmon was a
Captain on the date of the incident. The City was unable to prove that relationship and
we therefore found the charge not proven. Our mistake was in not considering the lesser
charge of simple urination on a fellowfirefighter,behavior which was a violation of the
general rules of conduct applicable to all firefighters. With regard to the Zucchini
Incident, we found that the termination decision was based upon sexual harassment and
we found that charge not proven because consensual behavior is not prohibited by the
Sexual Harassment Policy. Our mistake was in not considering that the behavior violated
1
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the general rules of conduct, was inappropriate for a Captain, and is punishable even if it
does not amount to sexual harassment. With respect to the Horseplay Incident, we found
that the Department had tacitly condoned this behavior and we therefore did not consider
it a violation of the general rules of conduct. Upon further review, it should have been
considered, but since the behavior had not previously been punished, this fact needs to be
considered in assessing Harmon's punishment. Thus, upon review, I find that all seven
incidents were punishable (but not all to the severity as reflected in the original charges)
and were properly before the Chief when making his decision on punishment.

3. The Dishonesty Allegation was not given thorough consideration by the
original Majority (this conduct is also referred to, in the Court's opinion, as "evasive" and
as a failure to "properly answer questions"). Dishonesty was not listed as one of the
seven incidents included in the Chiefs March 16,2001, explanation of his termination
decision and his mention of "inconsistency" was only contained in his discussion of the
Weed Killer Incident. The original Majority did refer to Harmon's written response to
the Second Predetermination Letter and found "his denial (of the Weed Killer Incident)
was based upon the technicalities of the wording in the accusation" but it did not further
explore this issue or Harmon's conduct in the Second Predetermination Hearing.

4. I disagree with the Majority Opinion that the seven misconduct incidents, as
proven, deserve termination. As originally charged, including sexual harassment, they
could support termination, but with sexual harassment not being proven and others
reduced in severity, demotion is the more appropriate punishment for these misconduct
charges.

5. The Appeals Court asked the Commission to reconsider the dishonesty
allegation. Although the Majority has determined that this allegation need not be proved
to support termination, I believe it needs to be considered and I believe it was considered
by the Chief in making his termination decision. As I understand the allegation, it arose
from the Second Predetermination Notice, from Harmon's written response to the
2
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allegations in that Notice, and from Harmon's responses to questions asked in the
Hearing. The Chief, in his December 15, 2000, termination letter cited "Behavior or
activity which reflects an intent to be dishonest or untruthful" and also cited
"Insubordination or disrespectful conduct or language toward members of the public,
superiors, or other employees" as rules of conduct Harmon violated. I believe that
Harmon's conduct should be considered under both these provisions.

6. The Second Predetermination Notice incorrectly referred to the Weed Killer
Incident as the "representation of the provision of weed killer as urine." Harmon in his
written response denied the allegation as written — his denial was accurate in that his
misconduct was providing urine rather than the weed killer he agreed to provide and this
denial therefore cannot be considered dishonest. When Harmon made that response he
knew what the real accusation was and also knew that there was clear evidence of what he
had done. During the Predetermination Hearing, it was apparent that the Chief was not
aware of the mistake in the Notice and that he incorrectly believed that Harmon was
denying the Weed Killer Incident. However, during the Hearing, the Chief asked Harmon
a correctly worded question. He said "It has been reported to me that your former
Battalion Chief asked for some of that (weed killer) and in so doing, instead of providing
weed killer, you provided him urine. Did that occur?" Harmon's response was "My
response to that is in the letter also." The problem with this response is that it did not
answer the question asked and taken literally was false — his letter did not respond to this
correctly worded allegation. Harmon, rather than truthfully answering the question asked
and admitting his misconduct, decided that he would continue with his "game" and do
nothing to clarify the Chiefs misunderstanding. His written response may not have been
dishonest, but his oral response to the Chiefs question was a clear evasion and it was
insubordinate and disrespectful conduct toward a superior and also inconsistent with the
trust a Chief must have in his Captains.

7. The question of what is the appropriate punishment for a group of incidents
over an extended period is difficult. Although 1 believe that the seven misconduct
3
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incidents warrant demotion rather than termination,11 also believe that Harmon's actions
in the Second Predetermination Hearing are misconduct and can be considered in
determining the appropriate punishment. His actions show that he lacked the judgment to
appraise his situation. He knew that he was about to be punished and that the punishment
was likely to be at least demotion, but yet he continued to play games with the Chief and
he could not bring himself to acknowledge what he had done. This is much less than is
expected from a Captain with twenty years of service and it raises serious concerns about
Harmon's trustworthiness. It was a legitimate factor in the Chiefs termination decision
and, I believe, sufficiently serious that when added to the other misconduct can support
termination. Therefore, I join the Majority in finding that Harmon's misconduct justified
termination.

,-iV

Dated ±± February 2006

'The Appeals Court requires deference to the Chiefs punishment decision, but that deference is premised
on proof of all the charges upon which the decision was based. When some charges, such as sexual
harassment, are reduced to less serious charges, there can be no deference for the simple reason that the
original decision was based upon unproven facts. This was the reason the original Majority found it
inappropriate to defer to the Chiefs termination decision. My change of opinion is not based upon
deference, but rather upon a more thorough review of Harmon's conduct at the Second Predetermination
Hearing.
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ADDENDUM D

Amend. V

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Searches and seizures: validity of searches
conducted as condition of entering public
premises—state cases, 28 AX.R.4th 1250.
Sufficiency of description of business records
under Fourth Amendment requirement of
particularity in federal warrant authorizing
search and seizure, 53 A.L.R. Fed. 679.
Use of electronic sensing device to detect
shoplifting as unconstitutional search and
seizure, 10 A.L.R.4th 376.
Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or
drugs as unreasonable search in violation of
Fourth Amendment, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 399.
Validity of police roadblocks or* checkpoints
for purpose of discovery of alcoholic intoxication—Post-Sitz cases, 74 A.L.R.5th 319.
Validity, under Federal Constitution, of
search conducted as condition of entering
public building, 53 A.L.R. Fed. 888.
Validity, under Fourth Amendment, of "mail
cover", 57 A.L.R. Fed. 742.
What circumstances fall within "inevitable
discovery" exception to rule precluding admission, in criminal case, of evidence obtained in violation of Federal Constitution,
81A.L.R;Fed.331.
What constitutes "an opportunity for full and
fair litigation" in state court precluding habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C.A. sec.

2254 in federal court of state prisoner's
Fourth Amendment claims, 75 A.L.R. Fed.
9.
When is consent voluntarily given so as to
justify search conducted on basis of that
consent—Supreme Court cases, 148 A.L.R.
Fed. 271.
Forms
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Forms 1 et
seq. (Requisites of Valid Warrant).
—
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Forms 51 et
seq. (Effect of Illegal Search and Seizure in
Criminal Proceeding).
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Forms 121 et
seq. (Civil Liability for Wrongful Search
and Seizure).
Treatises and Practice Aids
47 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Admissibility and Reliability of Hair Sample Testing to
Prove Illegal Drug Use.
69 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Wrongful Death of Minor in Police Custody.

Amendment V, Grand jury indictment for capital crimes; double jeopardy;
self-incrimination; due process of law; just compensation for property
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
CnmmaTtaw <&»4TT7
Double Jeopardy <s=»21, 51, 131.

Library References
Westlaw Topic Nos. 110, 135H.
CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 211, 213, 245.

Research References
Admissibility of expert testimony regarding
ALR Library
credibility of confession, 73 AX.R.5th 581.
Acquittal or conviction in state court as bar to
federal prosecution based on same act or
Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile
transaction, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 393.
court proceedings, 5 A.L.R.4th 234.
Admissibility, in criminal case, of physical
Application, to drug or narcotic records mainevidence obtained without consent by surgitained by druggist or physician, of "recal removal from person's body, 41
quired records" exception to privilege
A.L.R.4th 60.
against self-incrimination, 96 A.L.R. Fed.
Admissibility of evidence relating to accused's
868.
attempt to commit suicide, 73 A.L.R.5th
615.
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\3NTTEI> STATES CONSTITUTION

A m e n d m e n t X I I I . Slavery abolished; enforcement
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Historical Notes
Proposal and Ratification
Louisiana, Feb. 17, 1865; Minnesota, Feb. 23,
This amendment was proposed to the iegisla- 1865; Wisconsin, Feb. 24, .1865;. Vermont,„Mar.
tures of the several 'States by the" Thirty-eighth 9, 1865; Tennessee, Apr. 7, 1865; Arkansas,
Congress, on January 31, 1865, and was de- Apr. 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New
clared, in a proclamation of the Secretary of Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South Carolina, Nov.
State, dated December* 18, 1865, to have been i3 > j865; Alabama, Dec. 2, 1865; North Carratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the o l i n a , D e c . 4, 1865, and Georgia, Dec. 6, 1865.
thirty-six States. The States- which ratified this
„,, T . , ^
. 0x A
£4L r t l
amendment, and the dates of ratification, are: a The legislatures of the Mowing States ratiIllinois, Feb. 1, 1865; Rhode Island, Feb. 2, fced * * ™ £ ^ t
**f D e c * 6> 1 8 6 5 ; 0 r e 1865; Michigan, Feb. 2, 1865; Maryland, Feb. S°n> P e c " 8 ' 1 8 6 5 ' California, Dec. 19, 1865;
3, 1865; New York, Feb. 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, Florida, Dec. 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified on
Feb. 3, 1865; West Virginia, Feb. 3, 1865; Mis- June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new constisouri, Feb. 6, 1865; Maine, Feb. 7, 1865; Kan- tution); Iowa, Jan. 15, 1866; New Jersey, Jan.
sas, Feb. 7, 1865; Massachusetts, Feb. 7, 1865; 23, 1866; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870, Delaware, Feb.
Virginia, Feb. 9, 1865; Ohio, Feb. 10, 1865; 12, 1901; Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976, and MissisIndiana, Feb. 13, 1865; Nevada, Feb. 16, 1865; sippi, Mar. 16, 1995.

<

S>

Slaves S= 24.
Westlaw Topic No. 356.

Library References
C.J.S. Peonage §§ 3 to 5.
CJ.S. Slaves § 10.

Research References
ALR Library
Purposeful inclusion of Negroes in grand or
Court appointment of attorney to represent,
pen^ jury as unconstitutional discrimination
without compensation, indigent in civil acjustifying relief in federal court, 4 A.L.R.
tion. 52 A.L.R.4th 1063.
Fed. 449.

Amendment XTV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process;
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of
officers; public debt; enforcement
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
34
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Amend. XIV

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

'State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
.other, crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or" as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
^State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
-the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Historical Notes
Proposal and Ratification
This amendment was proposed to the legisla"tures of the several States by the Thirty-ninth
Congress, on June 13, 1866. On July 21, 1868,
Congress adopted and transmitted to the Department of State a concurrent resolution, dedaring that "the legislatures of the States of
Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon,
Vermont, New York, Ohio Illinois, West Virgima, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts Ne-bmska -Iowa, ^kansas; -flonda. "North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana
being three-fourths and more or the several
States of the Union, have ratified the fourteenth
article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, duly proposed by two-thirds of
each House of the Thirty-ninth Congress:
Therefore, Resolved, That said fourteenth article
is hereby declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it shall be duly
promulgated as such by the Secretary of State."
The Secretary of State accordingly issued a
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, declaring
that the proposed fourteenth amendment had
been ratified by the legislatures of thirty of the

thirty-six States. The amendment was ratified
by the State Legislatures on the following dates:
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire,
July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 1866; New
Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866;
Vermont, Oct. 30, 1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867;
M ew York, Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11,
1 8 6 7 ; Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia,
Jan> 1 6 , 1 8 6 7 ; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; Minnesota ^ J a n 1 6 1 8 o 7 ; M a i n e > J a n 1 9 1 8 6 7 ; N e ^ ^ Jan 22 1867; Indiana Jan 23
m7;
M i s s o u r i / Jan> 25/1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7,
lg6?
W i s c o n s i n , Feb> 7 1 8 6 7 ; P e i m s y l v a n i a ,
^ , \~ .~cn J. A u ***** »** ™ I O ^
2
**• "• 1?67; ^ a ^ u s T e t t 8 ' ^
% ]*3
Nebraska, June 15 1867; owa, Mar. 16, 868;
Arkansas, Apr. 6 868; Florida, June 9 1868;
N
< « * i*™1}™' ^ 4 ' " * * • n L ? u * i a n a ; ( u l y 9 '
1868
> S o u t h Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama,
Jul
y 1 3 ' 1 8 6 * Georgia, July 21, 1868. Subse<luent to the proclamation the following States
ratified this amendment: Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869;
Mississippi, Jan. 17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18,
1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr.
4, 1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976.
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UECLABATION OF RIGHTS

Art. 1, § 7

chambeau, 1991, 820 P.2d 920. Criminal Law
<&* 1030(2)

Sec. 7. [Due process of law]
'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Cross References
Abortion, findings and policies of legislature, see § 76-7-301.1.
Crimes involving civil rights, penalties for hate crimes, see § 76-3-203.3.
Eminent domain, generally, see § 78-34-1 et seq.
Law Review and Journal Commentaries
^Constitutionality of Utah's Medical MalpracState v. Herrera: The Utah Supreme Court
tice 'Damages Cap Under the Utah Constitution, Rules in Favor of Utah's Controversial Insanity
Magleby, 21 J. Contemp. L. 217 (1995).
Defense Statute, 22 J. Contemp. L. 221 (1996).
"Eyewitness Identification in Utah: A Changing
State v. Ramirez: Strengthening Utah's StanPerspective, Hale, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 113 dard for Admitting Evidence Identification Evi(1988).
dence, Whitehead, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 647
If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who is
the Next Target?-An Examination of the En- (1992).
Termination of Parental Rights Statute in
trapment Theory, Zabriskie, 19 J. Contemp. L.
Utah: An Argument for Statutory Specificity,
217(1993).
--KUTV v. Wilkinson: Another Episode in the Kendell, 13 J. Contemp. L. 341 (1987).
Fair Trial/Free Press Saga, Hagen, 1985 Utah L.
Toward a Framework for Assessing When a
Rev. 739 (1985).
Defendant is Capable of Knowingly and Intelli^Rethinking Utah's Death Penalty Statute: A gently Waiving the Right to Counsel, 1994 Utah
Constitutional Requirement for the Substantive L. Rev. 325 (1994).
Narrowing of Aggravating Circumstances, WerUtah Supreme Court and the Utah State Conon, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1107 (1994).
- State Constitutions as a Source of Individual stitution, Marsden, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319
Liberties: Expanding Protection for Abortion (1986).
Under Medicaid, Vuernick, 19 J. Contemp. L.
Youth Interrogations and the Utah Constitu185 (1993).
tion, Booher, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 777 (2001).
Library References
Constitutional Law <s=>251.
C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 704, 945 to 963,
Westlaw Key Number Search: 92k251.
966 to 976, 1004, 1095 to 1111, 1206.

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Investigating Employee Conduct App 1-10,
r
> Appendix I-10. Due Process Laws.
*f^al^ftandbook -for "Utah Lawyers § 12:28,
Witnesses, objection to eyewitness identifications.

Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 1:23, Improper exclusion of evidence.

United States Supreme Court
Due process, Immigration and NationaliDue process, in general,
ty Act, detention of aliens without bail
Alienage,
during pendency of removal proceedAliens, searches and seizures, see U.S. v.
ings, see Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim,
Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S.Cal.1990, 110
U.S.Cal.2003, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 538 U.S.
S.Ct. 1056, 494 U.S. 259, 108 L.Ed.2d
510.
222, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 1839,
Foreign nationals, habeas corpus, proce494 U.S. 1092, 108 L.Ed.2d 968, on
dural default, consular notification, Vienna Convention, see Breard v. Greene,
remand 902 F.2d 773.
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§ 10-3-1010

CITIES & TOW»

Note 3

1|
I

council had statutory authority to adopt rules,
establish procedures, and recommend guidelines that were binding on the fire chief, making
complete rehef available to eitheri party even
without the fire chief U C A 1953, 17-28-2 4,

17-28-13(1). Rules Civ Proc Rule 19(d)(1)
Cassidy v Salt Lake County fire ( m l Sun tee
Council, 1999, 976 P 2d 607, 364 Utah \<iv
Rep 6, 1999 UT App 65 c^rtioian ckmtd 982
P 2d 89 Municipal Corporations <3» 197

§ 10—3—1011. Temporary employees
The head of each department, with the advice and consent of tHe board (of
city commissioners, may employ any person for temporary work only, without
making the appointment from the certified list, but the appointment shall not be
longer than one month in the same calendar year, andjnnderjno^circumsj^n^^
shall the temporary employee be appomted to a permanent position unless lie
shall have been duly certified by the civil service commission as m other cases^
Laws 1977, c 48, § 5
Library References
C J S Municipal Corporations §§601 60r4*
608 to 611, 615 619

Municipal Corporations<s=»2172
Westlaw Key Numbes Search 268k217*2

§ 1 0 - 3 - 1 0 1 2 . Suspension or discharge by department head—Appeal to
commission—Hearing and decision
(1) All persons in the classified civil service may be suspended as provided m
Section 10-3-912, or removed from office or employment by the head of the
department for misconduct, mcompetency, failure to perform duties, or failure
to observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by; the
;/
suspended or discharged person to the civil service commission.
(2) Any person suspended or discharged may, within five days from the
issuance by the head of the department of the order of suspension or dischaige,
appeal to the civil service commission, which shall fully hear and determine the
matter.
,
(3) The suspended or discharged person shall be entitled to appear in pei son
and to have counsel and a public hearing.
(4) The finding and decision of the civil service commission upon the hearing
shall be certified to the head of the department from whose orderthe appeal te
taken, and shall be final and immediately enforced by the head.
n
Laws 1977, c 48, § 3, Laws 1991, c 221, § 2, Laws 200r, c. 178, § 6, eff Apnl 3(V2001
Library References
r
Municipal Corporations <®=»218(3), 218(8),
C J S Municipal Corporations §§ 599 63^
218(9)
635 to 636, 638 to 639, 641 t>41 to 647
Westlaw Key Number Searches 268k218(3),
268k218(8), 268k218(9)
£
Notes of Decisions
Administrative review 20
Cause, grounds for suspension or disthatg**
Breach of duty, grounds for suspension or dis11
charge 10
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Note 24
Supreme Court, in reviewing judgment of Civil Service Commission on appeal from order
discharging police officer, had no jurisdiction f o
interfere with exercise of commission's jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of cause for
removal, but was limited to a determination of

whether commission regularly pursued thei authority conferred upon it and did not act arbi*
trarily or capriciously. Utah Code 1943,;
15-9-21. Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission
of Salt Lake City, 1944, 106 Utah 83, 145 P.2d
792. Municipal Corporations <S=» 185(12)

§ 1 0 - 3 - 1 0 1 2 . 5 . Appeal to Court of Appeals—Scope of review
Any final action or order of the commission rriay be appealed to the Court'of
Appeals for review. The notice of appeal, must be filed within 30 days of, tlie;
issuance of the final action or order of the commission. The review by CourTof
Appeals shall be on the Tecord'oPthe commission '^d^lmU'rJ(TfofTh^pirpose
of determining if the commission has abused its5 discretion or exceeded its
authority.
Laws 1991, c. 221, § 3.
Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Kitzmiller, Demotion and Discharge of Municipal Employees in Utah, 16 Utah B.J. 20
(April 2003).
Library References
Municipal Corporations <®»218(9).
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 633, 635-to
Westlaw Key Number Search: 268k218(9).
636, 638 to 639, 641, 644 to 647.

Notes of Decisions
Certiorari 3
Determination and disposition
Due process 1
Scope of review 2
1. Due process
Dismissal of former police officer's appeal of
his employment termination for failure to comply with discovery requirements did not violate
officer's due process right to a post-deprivation
hearing before city civil service commission;
officer not only ignored at least seven requests
from the city over, the course of ten months, and
admitted fault in failing to produce the requested material but, thereafter, failed to avail himseiL-of one final opportunity to comply with
city's request for the documents. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14. Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 2002, 53 P.3d 11, 452 Utah
Adv. Rep. 43, 2002 UT App 254, certiorari denied 63 P.3d 104, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct.
133, 157 L.Ed.2d 40, 2003 WL 21382978. Constitutional Law ®=» 278.4(5); Municipal Corporations <®=> 185(12)
City civil service commission's error in excluding from post-termination hearing evidence
of retaliatory discharge in violation of police
officer's due process rights was not harmless,
where proffered evidence directly related to

credibility of two of three witnesses upon
whose testimony commission relied in reaching
its decision and had commission heard suchv.ev-^
idence, there was substantial likelihood of different outcome. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service C6m'n,>
1997, 949 P.2d 746, 331 Utah Adv. &ep..,15.
Municipal Corporations @» 185(12)
2. Scope of review
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review
finding o£ city civil service commission denying
former police officer's motion to strike its* order
of dismissal of officer's appeal of his termii
nation, given express grant of jurisdiction to the
Court for specific purpose of reviewing? decisions made by municipal commissions* U.G-A+
1953 § 10-3-1012.5 (1999). Joseph v. Salt Lake
City Civil Service Com'n, 2002, 53 P.3d 1U 452
Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 2002. UT App 254, certiorari
denied 63 P.3d 104, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct.,
133, 157 L.Ed.2d 40, 2003 WL 21382978. Municipal Corporations <S» 185(12)
Court of Appeals would review the final decrJ
sion of a city civiL service commission, upholding the police chiefs termination of a police
officer for conduct unbecoming an officer, only
for the purpose of determining if the commission had abused its discretion or exceeded its'
authority. U.C.A. 1953, 10-3-1012.5. Kelly v
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\2 U.S.C.A. § 1983
Jnited States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
* 1 Chapter 21, Civil Rights (Refs &Annos)
*H Subchapter I. Generally
• • § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
ivery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
"erritory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
itates or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
nmunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
3w, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
jdicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
e granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
urposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
onsidered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
REDIT(S)

*.S. § 1979; Pub.L 96-170, 5 1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub.L 104-317, Title HI, 5 309(c),
ct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)
ISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
evision Notes and Legislative Reports
979 Acts. House Report No. 96-548, see 1979 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 2609.
996 Acts. Senate Report No. 104-366, see 1996 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 4202.
Ddifications

S. § 1979 is from Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
action was formerly classified to section 43 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.
nendments
)96 Amendments. Pub.L. 104-317, § 309(c), inserted provisions relating to immunity of judicial
ficers from injunctive relief unless declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.
179 Amendments. Pub.L. 96-170 added "or the District of Columbia" following "Territory," and
ovisions relating to Acts of Congress applicable solely to the District of Columbia.
:

ective and Applicability Provisions

79 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 96-170 applicable with respect to any deprivation of rights,
vileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws occurring after Dec. 29, 1979, see
:tion 3 of Pub.L. 96-170, set out ^ | | I ^ ^ W ^ e A | f ^ ^ ( ^ ^ f 5 T i t l e 2 8 ' Judiciary and Judicial

p://web2.westiawxom/result/documenttext.aspx?findt...SCAS1983&rD=%2fFind%2fdefault

w1#<?ervirp=FinH,«rfri= tr»r» n

rtfl\in/onnn<:

i .n*.-»"» T»W

42USCAsl983

Procedure.

Harmon's Addendum D
-J* coAciooap_^o/.ofF1-t,^o/^f^fi„1itxA/l^^rvir.e=Find&fn= too (2 of 2)10/9/2006 1:04:32 PM

ADDENDUM E

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

APPEAL OF

FINDING OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF

CAPTAIN DANIEL HARMON

LAW AND ORDER

A hearing before the Ogden City Civil Service Commission was held on September 10,11,
12, and 15,2003, to consider the appeal of Captain Daniel Harmon of his termination of
employment as a firefighter. All three commissioners were present. Captain Daniel Harmon
(hereafter "Harmon"), was also present along with his attorney, Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr. Ogdcn
City was represented by Gary R Williams, Assistant Ogden City Attorney. The Civil Service
Commission's Legal Advisor, Attorney Douglas J. Holmes, was also present Based on the
testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the Commission being fully advised in the
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

Finding of Fact
L Harmon was hired as afirefighterby Ogden City on September 10,1979. He was
promoted to Captain on March 2,1991.
2. On September 8,2000; the husband of a female firefighter went to the Ogden City Fire
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Chief and reported incidents that he said occurred between variousfirefightersand his w f e (the
couple was going through a divorce at the time). One of these incidents, which became known as
the "zucchin?' incident, involved Hannon. This incident took place approximately two years prior
to the time the husband reported it to the Fire Chief
3. As a result of the husband's complaint, the Chief ordered an investigation into any
"inappropriate behavior" that had taken place among fire department personnel Deputy Chief
Greg Chamberlain was assigned to lead the investigation.
4. On September 12,2000, Deputy Chief Chamberlain, along with Deputy Chief Bruce
Champion and Battalion Chief Mike Wood, met with Harmon. Deputy Chief Chamberlain
conducted the questioning. He began by stating, basically what we'd like to do is give you the
opportunity to outlay to us any type of activity that has occurred in the workplace over the past
four years, approximately four years, that may not be known to us that could be reasonably
deemed inappropriate behavior in the workplace. Whether you were party to it, witness to it or
have knowledge about it and within that outlay we expect you to identify the players and their
roles in it and we'll do some questioning as we go through. So, is there anything that comes to
mind? I know that this is pretty broad**. Chief Chamberlain called this a "confessional style*'
interview.
5. Earlier in that interview, Chief Chamberlain had set the ground rules by saying, "What I
want to reiterate with you Dan before we start is the feet we are after those three virtues we
talked about: lie, steal, cheat and the feet that if any of those are violated, and principally the one
we are talking about today is getting the truth out of things so otherwise, if we find out that you
have misrepresented yourself in questioning or lie about the questioning that could result in your
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termination. Do you understand that?" Harmon answered that he understood.
6. On November 6,2000, Deputy Chief Chamberlain, Deputy Chief Chanopion, and
Battalion Chief Wood issued a "Joint Statement of Findings and Disciplinary Recommendation in
Investigation of Accusations of Inappropriate Conduct and Failure to Act by Captain Daniel
Harmon." This statement detailed three incidents "of a sexual nature" that have come to be
known as the "zucchini", "MDA", and **horseplay" incidents. As a result of the investigation into
these incidents, Deputy Chief Chamberlain and his associates recommended that Harmon be
demoted to the rank that he held prior to being promoted to Captain.
7. On November 14,2000 Chief Mathieu wrote Harmon setting the date for a
Predetermination Hearing. On November 21, that hearing date was rescheduled to December 1,
2000. On November 29, the Chief wrote Harmon a letter enclosing a copy of the Joint Statement
and Findings of Deputy Chief Chamberlain. In that letter he also stated that "at the hearing we will
consider your failure to appear at a reserve corps training session on November 14,2000."
Even though it was not mentioned in the letter, Chief Mathieu also considered a "Notice of
Caution" that Harmon had received for missing three meetings in 1999.
8. The Predetermination Hearing was held on December 1,2000, attended by Chief
Mathieu, Jim Bristow, Ogden City Human Resource Director, Deputy Chief Chamberlain,
Captain Harmon and his attorney, Joseph O'Keefe. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Chief
said he would make a decision within 10 days.
9. On December 8,2001, Chief Mathieu sent aletter to Harmon stating that he had
received information about three additional allegations of misconduct regarding urinating in a
shower stall while a subordinate was showering, urinating in a drafting pit in a fire department

3
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training area, and "misrepresenting weed killer as urine" to a Battalion Chief Due to this new
information, the Chief stated that he would reconvene the predetermination hearing on December
11,2000. It should be noted that December 8,2000, was Friday and December ll,2000wasa
Monday.
10. On December 9,2000, Harmon wrote a letter to Chief Mathieu stating that he didn't
need another hearing and that he denied allegation number one, admitted allegation number two,
and denied allegation number three.
11. Despite Harmon's letter, Chief Mathieu held a continuation of the predetermination
hearing on December 11,2000. Chief Mathieu asked Harmon about each of the urination
allegations, and Harmon's reply to each question was worded to the effect that his response was
in histetter.It is noteworthy that Harmon's attorney was unable to attend this hearing due to a
scheduling conflict and also that the Chief had not read Harmon's letter before questioning him.
12. On December 15,2000, Chief Mathieu issued a termination letter to Harmon effective
December 16,2000. As reasons for this action, the Chief stated:
u

. . , I have determined you violated or didn't adhere to certain Fire Department

regulations and City personnel policies and procedures. They are as follows:.
L Ogden City Fire Department Regulation R-0497 - Sections 13,15,16,30, and 32.
2. Under City Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual Chapter DC Section F
Employee Conduct and Work Rules as follows:
* Actions which violate City ordinances or other local, state or federal laws:
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including statements or comments which serve as proof or an admission of proof
that the employee violated such laws, whether or not a conviction occurred with
respect to such violation*
* Violations of applicable Departmental rules and procedures.
* Behavior or activity which reflects an intent to be dishonest or untruthful
* Insubordination or disrespectful conduct or language toward members of the
public, superiors, or other employees.
* Actions which serve to discredit the name, reputation, or public mission or
interest of the City.
* Boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace; behavior or activity which
serve to create disharmony or a disorderly environment without regard for the
interest of the City in conducting its business in an efficient, effective and orderly
manner.
* Unsatis&ctory performance or conduct."
Although this letter cites violations of Fire Department and City regulations and policies, it
does not relate these violations to the specific incidents discussed above. Subsequently, and well
after Harmon had made his appeal, the City decided it needed to make a list of the specific
reasons for the termination decision.. Chief Mathieu prepared a 6 page memorandum setting forth
the reasons in detail. In that memo dated March 16,2001, the Chief describes seven distinct
incidents that he alleges to have violated the specific regulations and policies. Near the end of the
memo he also stated he "had received inconsistent answers from him (Harmon) compared to what
I heard from otherfirefightersinvolved in these situations" and he offered Harmon the
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opportunity to take a polygraph, which he declined. He ended the memo by stating "Captain Dan
Harmon was terminated for the collection of all these acts he participated in". These seven
incidents will now be discussed in chronological order.
a. Sometime in the late eighties or early nineties, eight to ten years before the
investigation, it was alleged that Harmon opened a shower door while another male firefighter
was showering and urinated at his feet. It was unclear whether the urine stream actually struck
his feet or merely the shower floor. Harmon believed that this incident occurred before he was
promoted to Captain; so the otherfirefighterinvolved was not his subordinate as alleged by the
Chief. Since this incident took place so many years before the investigation, no one coukl be sure
exactly when it took place. Because Harmon believed that this incident took place before he was
promoted, he denied the truth of this allegation in his December 9,2000, response to the Chiefs
December 8,2000, letter informing Harmon of the continuation of the predetermination hearing.
The otherfirefighternever reported this incident to anyone, and he and Harmon remained
friends after it. Harmon never received any disciplinary action for this incident prior to being
terminated.
Although Chief Mathieu initially considered this incident as a violation ofUtah Code
Annotated Section 76-9-707 Public Urination, a Class C Misdemeanor, the Assistant City
attorney in his closing argument determined that the criminal charge was not appropriate because
the shower room was not a public place which was a requirement of the statute.
b. Sometime in the fell of 1996, approximately four years before the investigation, there
occurred the "MDA" (Muscular Dystrophy Association) incident. Harmon had been an official of
the Firefighters' Union and as such had for several years coordinated the efibrts of the firefighters
6
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to raise money for the Muscular Dystrophy Association. In this endeavor he worked with an
MDA representative. For the two or three years prior to the 1996 campaign, the MDA
representative had promised Harmon that the Jazz Dancers would prepare a meal for the
firefightersfromthe station whose personnel had raised the most money.
However, these promises had never come to fruition. Once again, the MDA
representative made the same commitment to Harmon, and tins time an event took place. Chief
Mathieu testified that he had a conversation with Harmon setting forth some ground rules before
he approved the event. These rules were that the event be a luncheon and that the Jazz Dancers
be "appropriately attired.9' Harmon did not remember receiving these explicit instructions from
Chief Mathieu.
It is unclear how the meal became a dinner rather than a luncheoa A few days prior to
the dinner, the MDA representative informed Harmon that he could not get the Jazz Dancers but
he would get another group called the 'Honey Bears". It is also unclear when Harmon learned
that the MDA representative could not get the "Honey Bears" either but he could get a group
called the <cBudweiser Girls". Harmon did not advise the Chief of this change or of the luncheon
becoming a dinner.
The dinner took place at Fire Station Number 2 since the personnel from that station had
raised the most money for the Muscular Dystrophy Association during that fell's drive. Although
Harmon was not assigned to that station, he was allowed to attend the dinner since he bad been
the coordinator for the Fire Department. When he arrived at Station 2, three "Budweiser Girls"
were already there dressed in bikini swimsuits and high heels and preparing dinner.
At some point during the evening, one of the girls went downstairs to the apparatus or
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"app" room and was having her picture taken infrontof afireengine and ambulance with various
firefighters. After the picture taking had gone onfora time, the girl removed her swimsuit top
and more pictures were taken. She was also wearing a "thong" bottom to her bikini
About this time, after viewing this activity, Harmon and his driver left Station 2 to return
to their own station. The driver and Harmon discussed what had gone on and concluded that
things had gotten out of control and gone too far. Harmon called the Captain at Station 2 and
discussed the situation with him and they decided that the station Captain would gather up all the
film and disposable cameras and destroy them in order to preserve marriages and promotion
opportunities and avoid negative publicity for thefiredepartment. Either that same evening or in
the next day or two, a group, of at least the officers who were present, decided for the same
reasons to keep quiet about the event.
In addition to Harmon, there were three other Captains and one Battalion Chief who were
there at some point during the time the pictures were being taken, any of whom could have
stopped the picture taking. Harmon admitted that as the coordinator of the event he was probably
in the best position to have stopped events before they "got out of hand".
Thefirefighterswho were at this event were successful in keeping the happenings quiet
and the Chief did notfindout about it until the investigation triggered by thefemalefirefighter's
husband's complaint to the Fire Chief. No one was disciplined for the activities until Harmon was
terminated. Two of the more senior officers present at the dinner were then given warnings due
to their failure to take corrective action during the event or to report the activities to the Fire
Chief or the Deputy Fire Chiefi.
Chief Mathieu was critical of Harmon for not following the Chiefs directions that the
8
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event be a luncheon and that the Jazz Dancers or whoever appeared be appropriately dressed, that
he did not inform the Chief when things changed from the agreed-upon-format, and that Harmon
did not stop the event before it got out of hand.
c. During November 1998, about two years before the Chamberlain investigation, there
occurred what has come to be called the "zucchini" incident. A female firefighter who was a
probationary employee was assigned to Harmon's crew. She was sitting at a table and held up a
cucumber or zucchini and said, "Do you know what they call these where I'm ftom-'home
wreckers'"? She said this in front of the whole crew, and everyone laughed at the joke.
Later that evening while the femalefirefighterwas on the phone, Harmon showed a
greased zucchini or cucumber to her and said»"Is this big enough?' Both Harmon and the
woman again laughed. Harmon found out later that she had been talking to her husband on the
phone.
Since thefemalefirefighterhad initiated the sexually-oriented joke and laughed at
Harmon's later continuation of the joke and had not taken offense at it, and nothing had been said
about it for two years, Harmon initially did not think the incident was a problem. Harmon later
acknowledged that the type ofjoke with a sexual connotation was not appropriate in the work
place. No one complained of this incident at the time it occurred, and no one was disciplined for
it. It only came to light two years after the feet when the female firefighter's soon-to-be-exhusband brought it to the Chiefs attentioa There were no other incidents involving Harmon and
femalefirefightersand one femalefirefighterwitness testified that Harmon treated women with
respect.
d. In the summer of 1999, over a year before the investigation led by Deputy ChiQf
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Chamberlain took place, a retired Battalion Chief who bad been Harmon's supervisor asked
Harmon to provide him with about a pint of Round-Up for his personal use. It was well known
among thefirefightersthat Harmon could get this product at a reduced price because he had a
lawn fertilizing business on the side. It was also well known that Harmon and this retired
Battalion Chief had had a bad relationship while be was Harmon's supervisor.
Harmon agreed to get the product for his former boss and directed him to drop a
container off at Station 3 where it could be picked up a few days later. After the container sat on
the counter in the kitchen of the station for a time, one of thefirefighterson Harmon's crew
picked the container up, took it to the restroom, urinated in it, and returned it. Later, another
firefighter on Harmon's crew did the same thing and,finally,Harmon also urinated in the
container and returned it to the counter.
At some point, someone put the container under the counter. Harmon stated that he and
the others considered this to be a joke and intended to empty the bottle out and not have the
retired Battalion Chief pick it up. Nevertheless, he did pick it up, recognized that it was urine,
and poured it out Harmon stated that after he got off from his 24-hour shift, he realized that he
had not emptied the urine out of the container, so he called the retired Battalion Chiefs house and
left a message on the answering machine, advising the Chief not to pick up the container because
he hadn't had time to get the Round Up yet. Harmon then called the station and asked about the
container. Thefirefighterwho answered stated that the Battalion Chief had already picked up the
container.
Harmon stated he denied this allegation in his December 9,2000, letter to Chief Mathieu
because the Chiefs December 8,2000, letter was inaccurate in that it stated that Harmon
10
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''misrepresented the provision of weed killer as urine" whereas it should have stated "urine as
weed killer," " to a Battalion Chief," whereas the individual was at this time a retired Battalion
Chief, and that Harmon did not "provide" the urine to him because he did not give the container
to the retired Battalion Chief
e. On October 11,1999, Harmon received a "Notice of Caution" for missing meetings he
was scheduled to participate in on June 10, August 17,and September 18,1999. All three
meetings involved training for Reserve Corps personnel. Harmon was removed as the Team
Leader for the Reserve Corps, but he remained as the Reserve Corps Captain for A-Shift. On
November 14,2000, Harmon missed a meeting wherein he was scheduled to repeat "Evolution
#1" at the training tower for the reservists.
Harmon was on a scheduled vacation at the time of the November 14,2000, missed
meeting which was scheduled at least eight months in advance. A monthly schedule of training
was posted at the beginning of each month. Harmon's training obligations were clearly delineated
on both the yearly and monthly schedules. Being on vacation relieves a firefighter of his shaft
duties but not his special duties such as the November 14,2000, meeting. Harmon admitted that
he just forgot this meeting.
On one of the three meetings missed in the summer of 1999, Harmon had spoken to
another qualified Captain to substitute for him, but thatfirefighterforgot the meeting. Harmon
simply forgot that he was scheduled for the other two meetings.
f. In the spring or early summer of 2000, Harmon and his crew went to assist another crew
in putting things away after this crew had completed some training at the drill tower at the
training grounds on West 12* Street in Ogden. The training consisted of inserting a hose into a
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drafting pit and then sucking water out of that open source. The drafting pit is a cement vault in
the ground that holdsfiveto ten thousand gallons of water. The purpose of the training was to
give the firefighters experience in pumping waterfroman outside source, such as a lake, so that
they could do it if necessary tofightafirein an area where nofirehydrants were available.
Harmon's crew arrived at the training site just as the other crew wasfinishingits training.
Harmon needed to relieve himself) so he chose to urinate into the drafting pit instead of getting a
keyfromthefireengine and unlocking the training tower so he could use the restroom in there or
going to the more isolated back part of the training area.
Otherfirefighterswere present and could see what he was doing. They seemed to think it
was a joke and laughed about it. After urinating in the pit, Harmon started to withdraw the hose
from the pit himself but anotherfirefightercame to assist him. In his December 9,2000, letter to
Chief Mathieu answering the allegations in the Chief's December 8,2000, letter of notification of
a reconvening of the predetermination hearing. Harmon admitted to this incident.
g. From the month before the investigation began, that is, August 2000, going back to the
time Harmon began working for Ogden City as afirefighterin September 1979, Harmon stated
that sexually-oriented horseplay took place among the malefirefighters.It occurred between
firefighters of equal rank and between supervisors and subordinates.
This came to be called "dry humping" and consisted of one man coming up behind
another, putting his hands in the man's pockets, and tickling his hip bones which caused the man
infrontto bend forwardfromthe waist The man in backfrequentlywould then imitate the sex
act by performing pelvic thrusts. Afterwards, both parties would fell down laughing*
While Harmon and his crew had engaged in this horseplay more than other crews, the
12
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activity seems to have been widespread and occurred over a long period of time. No one ever
complained about it, and no one was disciplined for it prior to Harmon's termination. There was
no indication that this type of activity took place between male andfemalefirefighters.

Conclusions of Law
The Utah Court of Appeals in a series of cases have set out the procedure by which a civil
service commission shall proceed in deciding an appeal brought before it. In a 1997 case, the
Court said, "The Utah Supreme Court, in Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission. 106 Utah 83,145
P2d 792,844, established that the Commission's review of disciplinary decisions involve two
inquiries: (1) "do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and (2) do the
charges warrant the sanction imposed?" Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission. 949
P2d 746, 758 (Utah court of Appeals, 1997.)
The Court reiterated and expanded this ruling in a later case. It stated, 'The Commission
has the statutory authority to conduct appeals brought by suspended or discharged employees,
and in that regard, to make two inquiries: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the
department head, and, if so, (2) do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" In re: Discharge
ofJoneg. 720 P2d 1356,1361 (Utah 1986), Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service r^mmfofr^
8 ?.3d 1088,1052 (Utah 2000)).
The Court went on to say, "Under the specific circumstances of this case, the second
questk>n-"do the charges warrant the sanction imposed,'* In re: Discharge of Jones* 720 p.2d
1356,1361 Utah 1986 (Utah 1986)-breaks down into two sub-questions. First, is the sanction
proportional and second, is the sanction consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the
1:3
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department pursuant to its own policies." Id. at 1054.
The Court went on to state,"... the Commission's role is simply to affirm or reverse the
police chiefs decision, and it lacks the power to modify or remand. See Salt Lake Citv Corps, v.
Salt Lake Citv Civ Ser. Commission, 908 P.2d 871,875 (UtahCt. App 1995." Id.
1. Do the Facts Support the Charges Made by the Department Head?
a. In thefirstincident, Harmon was charged with urinating in a shower stall while
a subordinate was showering. Because this incident occurred several years before the
investigation took place, it was impossible to determine if the incident occurred before or
after Harmon became a Captain. If it took place while Harmon and the otherfirefighter
were the same rank, then he had not urinated in a shower stall while a subordinate was
showering. In addition, the event was so old that it was not appropriate to consider it in a
termination decision made nearly 10 years laier.
For these reasons, thefectsdo not support this charge.
b. In the MDA incident, the Fire Chief testified that he had a meeting with
Harmon to discuss theformatforthe event before he (the Chief) would approve it.
Harmon was told that "the event was approved as a luncheon and that the Jazz Dancers
who were to prepare the meal were to be appropriately dressed," Without going back to
the Chief for approval, the event was changedfroma luncheon to a dinner, the women
preparing the meal were changedfromthe Jazz Dancers to the Budweiser Girls and the
"appropriate attire" became bikinis and high heels. After one of the Budweiser Girls who
was having her picture taken took her bikini top off and was wearing a thong bikini
bottom, it was clear that the event should have been stopped. Although there were other
14
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Captains and a Battalion Chief present who could have stopped the event, Harmon
admitted that as the coordinator of the event, he was in the best position to stop it and he
did not.
The facts do support the charge in this incident.
c. In the third incident the femalefirefightermade a sexually suggestive remark
about a zucchini and all who heard it took it as a joke and laughed. Later when
Harmon made a similarly suggestive remark to the female fire fighter she laughed
and was not offended. No other fire fighter complained or reported the incident
and it was forgotten until the female fire fighter's husband mentioned it to the
Chief when he and bis wife (the female fire fighter) were going through a divorce.
Although the conduct of both individuals may have been inappropriate, because it was
a consensual exchange, was isolated, and was not offensive to either party, it could not
be considered sexual harassment or considered to otherwise violate Department policy.
The fects in this incident do not support the charges.
d. Although in his letter of December 9,2000, Harmon denied the truth of the
accusation in the Chiefs letter of December 8,2000, concerning providing urine
instead of Round-Up to a retired Battalion Chief; the denial was based upon the
technicalities of the wording in the accusation. At the hearing Harmon admitted the
essence of the accusation, i.e. that he and two members of his crew urinated in a
bottle that a retired Battalion Chief had left with Harmon for Harmon to provide him
with Round-Up at a reduced cost. Harmon stated that this was done as a joke and that
he intended to pour it out. That did not happen and the retired Battalion Chief did
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pick up the bottle with the urine still in it.
The tacts of this incident do support the charge against Harmon.
e. In October, 1999, Hannon received a 4<Notice of Caution for missing 3 reserve
training sessions where he was scheduled to be the instructor. On November 14,
2000, he missed another training session at which he was scheduled to be the
instructor. Although he had a good excuse for missing one of the meetings, he had no
excuseformissing the other three meetings.
The facts of this incident do support the charge made.
£ The incident at the drafting pit occurred in the spring or early summer of 2000.
Harmon's crew went there to assist another crew in putting away equipment, etc.
after that crew had completed its training. Whenfindingthe need to relieve
himself Hannon chose to do so into the ilrafting pit. No evidence was presented
to indicate that is constituted a health hazard. Although this incident was
witnessed by otherfirefighters,no one complained or brought it to the attention
of senior officers. The Chief in his March 2001 memo alleges that this incident was a
criminal act and also violated several policies.
The facts do not support a criminal violation, but do support the other charges
made.
g. Thefinalcharge against Harmon involved sexually-oriented horseplay between
malefirefighterswherein one male would grab another male's hip bones through
his pockets and tickle him which caused thefrontfirefighterto bendover. The
backfirefighterwould then simulate the sex act by doing pelvic thrusts, both
16
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would then laugh andfrequentlyfelldown. This type of horseplay occurred
frequently throughout the department. There was no evidence that anyone ever
complained about it and no one was disciplined for it prior to Harmon's
termination. The horseplay might support the charge. However, given that this
activity was common in the Department, did not involve females, was consensual,
and had continued for many years without any one ever being told that it violated
Department policy, the Department had tacitly condoned the activity.
The horseplay incident, therefore, should not have been considered in the
termination decision.
h. In summary, the fects do support the charges in the Muscular Dystrophy
Association (MDA) incident, the urine as Round-Up incident, the drafting pit
incident, and the incident of the missed meetings. In the urination in the shower
incident and the zucchini incident the fects do not support the charges. For the
reasons noted above, the horseplay incident should not have been considered in the
termination decision-,

2. Do the charges warrant the Sanction Imposed?
a. Is the Sanction Proportional: The sanction imposed, termination, after 21 years
as afirefighterfor Ogden City was not proportional to all seven charges made fay
the Fire Chief and was certainly not proportional to the incidents where the fects
supported the charges. Harmon's behavior in these incidents was not above reproach.
At times it was crude, juvenile, inappropriate and deserved some punishment, but it
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did not warrant termination.
First of all, the incidents Harmon was charged with extended back over a long
period of time, several years. We're not sure know long because thefirstincident,
urinating in the shower stall, occurred so long before the investigation that no one
could say exactly when it happened. We are not aware of any other firefighters
whose record was scrutinized for inappropriate behavior over that long of a time
period.
Next, Harmon was not given progressive punishment with corrective action fox
his perceived inappropriate behavior. He was given no punishment at all until the
seven incidents were lumped together and be was terminated. Had he been
disciplined when each incident occurred, he could have modified his inappropriate
behavior before it reached the point where the Chief felt the need to terminate
him.
Finally, in some of the incidents otherfirefightersparticipated in similar activity
but were not punished as severely as Harmon, In the MDA incident other officers of
equal or greater rank were present and could have stopped the objectionable activity
before it got of out hand. The horseplay activity was of long standing and many fire
fighters participated in it Harmon was disciplined for missing four meetings in 21
years yet anotherfirefighterwas complimented during the hearing for missing two
meetings in 10 years.
b. Is the Sanction Consistent wftkJg»gvious Sanctions Imposed by the
Department?
18
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No evidence was introduced at the hearing regarding any otherfirefighterwho
had been charged with the variety of offenses over such an extended period of
time as Harmon. Therefore, the Commissionfindsthat fbe question is inapplicable
to the Harmon case
In the hearing, repeated references were made to the Garrity warning. Given the
decision reached by the Commission, it does not believe this issue needs to be
decided.

Order

The decision of the Ogden City Fire Chief tenmnating Harmon is hereby reversed.

Dated the ^

Day of November, 2003

HLjuQ^sAiL
Commissioner VickieMcCall
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ADDENDUM F

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Concurring decision of Commissioner John R. Lemke
I concur with the Commission's decision that termination was not an appropriate
punishment for the acknowledged violations of Department policies. However, I would like to
make a few additional comments.
First, I believe that because of the composition of the three member investigating group
appointed in September 2000, its findings and disciplinary recommendation were tainted. One
member of the group was present at the MDA event and, at that time, out-ranked Captain
Harmon. That involvement was not disclosed. The result was that an individual who was later
disciplined for matters related to the event sat in judgement on another individual involved in the
event The importance of this conflict is magnified by, the relative seriousness of the MDA
event.
Secondly, I believe progressive discipline is important, particularly in cases such as this
where none of the individual incidents would, standing alone, merit significant discipline. The
principle behind progressive discipline is to give the employee clear notice of bad behavior and
the opportunity to correct it, with the understanding that continuing bad behavior will result in
progressively more serious punishment. In effect, it gives the employee the opportunity to make
a knowledgeable decision whether or not he wants to remain an employee. Letting bad behavior
continue, without notice that a change is necessary, and then suddenly terminating the employee
for the continuous behavior is poor management.
Related to progressive discipline is my difficulty in believing that the Department's senior
management did not know of Harmon's behavior well before the investigation began. There are
not many more than 100 employees in the Department and many of them seemed to know of
Harmon's activities, but evidently senior management did not have a good information network
and/or was consciously indifferent to those activities. But, even assuming they did not know,
once having learned of the behavior and deciding that a change needed to be made, it is simply
not fair to make Harmon's termination the instrument of that change.
Thirdly, I disagree with the Utah Supreme Court in its interpretation of Utah Code 10-31012 (see Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission). This Code Section
provides in part that the Commission "shall fully hear and determine the matter'9 and that the
Commission's decision shall be "final." The Court has interpreted the Code language as
requiring the Commission to either affirm or reverse the original disciplinary decision and
prohibiting itfrommodifying that initial decision. Discipline is usually not an all or nothing
situation and I do not understand why the Court believes that fully hearing and determining the
matter should be so limited.
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In this case, it is clear that Captain Harmon has a history of violating Department rules
and that he deserves to be punished. It is the Conlmission's majority decision that termination is
not warranted for the violations, but I certainly do not believe that he should be reinstated
without some punishment, for no other reason than any other employee would have been
punished for the same behavior However, much to my regret, the Utah Supreme Court prevents
us from folly determining the matter and making a just decision.
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ADDENDUM G

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OGDEN CITY, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FINDING OF FACT,

APPEAL OF

CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, ORDER, AND

CAPTAIN DANIEL HARMON

DISSENTING OPINION

1 respectfully dissent from the Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by
Commissioners John Lemke and Vicki McCall and submitted as the Majority Opinion and Order
at a Special Meeting of the Commission in the Ogden City Council Chamber on November 20,
2003, concerning the Appeal of Captain Daniel Harmon.
It is my opinion that the Findings of Fact revealed in the course of the Commission
hearings of September 10,11,12 and 15,2003, and recorded in the five volumes of testimony and
in dozens of exhibits taken at the proceedings, fully support the entire list of seven charges made
by Ogden Fire Chief Mathieu in reaching his decision to terminate the employment of Captain
Harmon. Further, it is nry opinion the charges warranted the sanction of termination imposed by
Chief Mathieu. The sanction of termination was both proportional and consistent with previous
sanctions imposed by Chief Mathieu during his tenure as Fire Chief in Ogden. On the basis of the
facts, and contrary to the Majority Opinion, I affirm the Fire Chiefs decision to terminate the
employment of Captain Harmon
The basis of my Dissenting Opinion is as follows:

Harmon's Addendum G

uoi 64

(l)

DraPrQc$?a,
The central and critical issue in this case surfaced between December 1,2000 and

December 11,2000, the dates of two Predetermination Hearings. Specifically, the Appellant,
with advicefromCounsel, concluded that the two Predetermination Hearings were separate
events while Ogden City and Chief Mathieu considered the second Predetermination Hearing a
reconvening and continuation of thefirstmeeting held ten days before. The Appellant's entire
strategy for dealing with the three additional allegations concerning his behavior as an officer in
the Ogden Fire Department was based on his conclusion that the "reconvened" portion of the
hearing violated due process. Specifically, the Appellant's position was and remains that the
December 8,2000 letter to HarmonfromMathieu stating that three additional allegations of
misconduct (urinating in a shower stall, urinating in a drafting pit, and "misrepresenting weed
killer as urine") would require a reconvening of the initial December 1,2000 Predetermination
Hearing that did not conform to either Ogden City policy or Utah Code (Lucas v, Murray City).
The Appellant contends that the call for a second hearing required a notice of the charges, an
explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond, and that none of this occurred.
Having concluded that the December 11 hearing was inappropriate, the Appellant chose a course
of action that was in sharp conflict with the course chosen by Ogden City and Chief Mathieu. The
Appellant responded to the additional allegations with a letter that denied two of the three
allegations and admitted the third The Appellant presented this response to Mathieu on the day
of the "reconvened" hearing and only reluctantly agreed to submit to additional questioning.
Under questioning, the Appellant warded off most of the additional questions with a response that
"the answer is in the letter". Unfortunately, the responses in the letter were composed to answer
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the allegations in the Mathieu letter of December 8,2003 and when applied to the questions
posed by Mathieu at the "reconvened" hearing these written answers resulted in a conclusion by
Mathieu that the responses were misleading and less than truthfiiL Briefly, the Appellant chose to
deny he urinated in the shower stall because the allegation charged that the stall was occupied fay
a subordinate. Appellant contended that both he and the occupant (Gunnel!) were of equal rank,
therefore the allegation was incorrect and deniable. Appellant denied "providing" urine in place
of to weedkiller to aformerBattalion Chief (Thompson) on the basis of the wording of the
written allegation that inverted '^weedkiller as urine" vice providing "urine as weedkiller." In
addition, Appellant contended that he did not "provide" the urine to the Battalion Oiie£ He
denied this allegation on three bases: (1) the "Battalion Chief was a former Battalion Chief; (2)
he did not "provide" the urine since he did not deliver it to former Battalion Chief Thonqwonthe Battalion Chief picked it up at the Fire Station; and (3) the inversion of "weedkiller" as urine
rendered the allegation deniable on its face.
The City contends that at the "reconvened" hearing, which was their right to call and
conformed completely with both City policy and Lucas v. Murray City, afforded Harmon his full
rights and the opportunity to respond to the three allegations as stated by Chief Mathieu at the
"reconvened" hearing. The verbatim transcript of the "reconvened" hearing makes it clear that
aBy confusion created in the December 8 letter could have been cleared by the precision of Chief
Maihieu's questions at the December 11 hearing, if Harman had elected to answer the questions
posed at this hearing- For example, Battalion Chief Thong>son was specifically identified as
"former Battalion Chief Thompson".
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Never-the-less, Appellant continued to deny two of the three charges at the "reconvened"
hearing: and as the "reconvened" hearing progressed, Harmon's denials became defiance.
Chief Mathieu, with substantial evidence that Harmon had infeetcommitted the alleged
acts of misconduct, and forced with adamant denials and no attempt by Harmon to provide a
rationale for the denials, could only conclude that Harmon was being misleading and less than
truthful.
Mathieu therefore had no alternative but to add the three urination allegations of Ms
December 8 letter to the original four allegations considered at the initial Predetermination
Hearing on December 1,2000. In addition, while not added to the charges, the Chief was left
with the reasonable conclusion that one of his officers, Captain Haimon, was not telling the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Accordingly, he decided, after an additional period of
several days of deliberation, to terminate Captain Harmoa
It israyopinion that Ogden City met the requirements of both the stated policy and Utah
Code in the conduct of the Predetermination Hearing and that Harmon was accorded due process
in eveiy respect. Harmon's choice to be less than forthcoming at the "reconvened" portion of his
"day in court" with Chief Mathieu was a fatal mistake. He left his leader with no other choice but
termination. His choice destroyed any residual trust and confidence his Chief may have retained
following the consideration of the initialfourcharges presented at the initial hearing on December
1,2000.
(2)

Jfc Seven Charges.
The Majority Opinion presents Finding of Fact that are incomplete. Dissenting Opinion.

Therefore, the following additional Facts, Conclusions and Opinions are submitted to support my
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argument that the termination of Harmon by Chief Mathieu wasfollyjustified and should have
been supported by the Commission. The seven charges are considered point by point.
(a) Tlrination in the shower. The Appellant has not denied urinating in the shower
occupied by fellowfirefighterGunnelL In feet, at the Civil Service Commission Hearing he
admitted under oath that the incident occurred as testified by GunnelL The issues cited in the
Majority opinion that the event occurred too many years ago to be considered; that the charge
that Gunnell was an equal and not subordinate at the time of the incident; and that the act went
unreported and therefore has little or no significance, are unacceptable positions for concluding
that the fects do not support the allegation. On the contrary, the ficts fully support the charge.
There is no time limit on considering this act of inappropriate behavior, and no question of
law on this issue was presented at the Commission Hearing. While the unprovoked act of
opening a glass shower stall door and urinating on or near a fellow firefighter in the workplace, on
Ogden City property, was initially denied by Harmon, he admitted not only to urinating in the
shower but at one point in the Commission Hearing agreed that his urine struck GunnelL At any
rate, Gunnell was left standing in Harmon's urine. Gunnell testified that he was "alarmed and
disrespected" by Harmon's inappropriate and unusual behavior. The feet that Harmon was also
charged and admitted in the hearing, that he had urinated in the drafting pit and into a bottle that
was subsequently in the possession of former Battalion Chief Thompson make inclusion of the
shower incident in the "pattern of behavior" argument that was the basis of Chief Mathieu's
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decision to terminate Harmon reasonable and acceptable. Two relatively recent incidents (Spring
2000) of inappropriate behavior involving urination opened the door for the inclusion ofthe third
event despite the passage of time.
As for the issue of whether or not Gunnell was a subordinate of Harmon's at the time of
the incident, I consider the Majority Opinion to be in total error. First, urinating into an occupied
shower stall is inappropriate behavior by any measure and the rank of the individuals involved is
of little consequence. However, a strong case was made that Harmon was senior to Guimell at
the time of the incident on the basis of years of service. Gunnell was several years junior (and
therefore subordinate) to Harmon according to testimony offered by Harmon himself It should
be noted here that Harmon's denial of this incident at the "reconvened* Predetermination Hearing
was based on this issue of Gunnell not being subordinate. Thefeetis, time in service is a critical
determinant of who is in charge at the scene of an emergency when officers orfirefightersof equal
rank are at the scene. It is my opinion, supported by the facts, and the testimony of Harmon, that
Harmon was senior and Gunnell subordinate at the time of the incident involving Harmon
urinating in Gunnell's shower.
The Majority Opinion implies that the facts do not support the charge because it went
unreported. However, the incident was common knowledge among the personnel at that Fire
Station and eventually the incident would surface as an example of inappropriate behavior. The
incident was eventually reported, as is wont to happen with "bizarre" incidents of this nature.
Gunnell testified that he was "shocked" and "offended" by the act and that it was unprovoked aod
"disrespectful". It is my opinion that this was inappropriate behavior and contributed to the
pattern of inappropriate behavior charged by Chief Mathieu and included in his decision to
6
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terminate Hannon. The requirement for good order and discipline and maintaining a good work
place for Fire Department employees as described in Ogden City policies was violated ty
Harmon's Ill-advised conduct in this incident.
While this incident alone may or may not have justified termination, it was reasonable for
Mathieu to have included the charge in his allegations.
(b) The "MDA incident". I concur with the Majority Opinion that the facts do support the
charges.
(c) The "Zucchini incident*1. The Majority Opinion concludes that the facts do not support
the charges. I do not agree with this opinion. On the contrary, the activities ofHarmon in this
incident can only be considered a serious breach of Ogden City rules and policies as well as a
lapse of good judgement by an officer who should have known better. His behavior was
inappropriate by any standard. The Majority Opinion states that because the incident involved
consensual activity that was not offensive to either individual, the incident was not sexual
frnrefqmiffit or in violation of Ogden City policy. This opinion ignores the fects presented in the
Commission Hearing. Hannon at the time of the incident was a Captain, an officer in the Fire
Department ofOgden City with more that 15 years service. He had attended five annual training
sessions concerning establishing and maintaining an appropriate work place sensitive to and aware
of the risk to individuals, the Department, and the City with respect to activities with a sexual
connotation including, but not limited to, sexual harassment. Hannon testified that he had
attended these training sessions and the City presented evidence of this attendance* Harmon and
other witnesses testified that as a result of this training, behavior with a sexual connotation was
reduced or eliminated for a period after this training before resimring as time went by. Included in
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the facts supporting this charge is the testimony of Cassiday that... "in Dan Harmon's crew it was
common for employees to engage in (activity) of a sexual nature". Another witness (Anderson)
testified that... "...about anything goes with Dan (Harmon)".
In this incident, Harmon admits that he presented Firefighter Cassiday, a female
subordinate and recently hired probationary employee, a greased zucchini with a comment of
sexual connotation ("...will his do?9). The incident took place in the Fire Station and over time
became known to many others, including Cassiday's husband, an officer in a neighboring city Fire
Department.
In my opinion this conduct by Harmon was both inappropriate and detrimental to the good
order and discipline of the Department. It was his duty as an officer in the Department to set a
good example and lead his subordinates to an improved workplace and environment with respect
to increased sensitivity and awareness of the risk of offending individuals or bringing discredit
upon the Department and the City in the area of sexual matters. The opportunity to follow the
evolving campaign to put emphasis on reducing or eliminating behavior and actions with sexual
overtones was ignored by Harmon. Instead, he initiated and participated in behavior diametrically
opposed to the path sought by Ogden City. The testimony of Cassiday supports this conclusion.
She stated that "...conversation and joking of a sexual nature in the presence of Captain Harmon
was common9*. In addition, she testified that... *1 found other captains to be more guarded and
reserved9' and that they set boundaries for professional conduct in the workplace* Harmon's
presentation of a greased zucchini, with accompanying remarks, to a very junior female under his
direct supervision, which he admitted at the Commission Hearing, was fully supported by the facts
and does support the charges that led to his termination.
8
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(d) The "Urine as Round-Up Weedkiller incident". The Majority Opinion states that the
"facts of this incident do support the charges", I concur whh this opinion.
(e) The "Missed Meeting incident". The Majority Opinion states that the "fects of this
incident do support the charge". I concur with this opinion. In addition, I would like to point out
that this incident is critical in refuting the Majority Opinion that Harmon was "not given
progressive punishment with corrective action for his perceived inappropriate behavior". On the
contrary, the record of Counseling and Notice of Caution whh regard to missing meetings was
presented at the Commission Hearing. I consider it important to note that this charge was added
to the list of allegations and the pattern of inappropriate behavior after Harmon had been made
fulry aware that his record of employment and behavior was under investigation beginning in
September 2000. In fact, Harmon acknowledged during the investigation that he knew his job'
wasatrisk. Never-the-less, he missed an additional and important training assignment in
November. My point is this: even after repeated counseling by his supervisors, a Notice of
Caution, a six-month period of probation and close supervision, and several notations in Ins
employment record (his annual evaluations), and during a time when he was fully aware that his
overall conduct was at issue, he failed once again to be at the appointed place at the appointed
time.
It is my opinion that even without the additional three charges of urination surfacing in
December 2000, Chief Mathieu had reasonable grounds for the termination o f Harmon as an
employee of the Ogden Cky Fire Department. He had been repeatedly warned and counseled
about missing meetings and when it counted most, he missed another one.
(f) The "Urination in the Drafting Pit" incident. The Majority Opinion is that "the facta do
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not support a criminal charge but do support the other charges", I concur with the Majority
Opinion. Harmon admitted urinating in the drafting pit and other witnesses to the incident
testified at the Commission Hearing. Contrary to the impression left by the Majority Opinion that
"no one complained or brought it to the attention of senior officers", the witnesses were
"alarmed" and one called the behavior of Harmon exposing his genitals to other Fire Fighters in
this setting "bizarre". The incident took place in a very open area, visibly accessible to the public,
in the fullview of several Fire Fighters, including new personnel. Harmon was, at the time, the
senior officer on the scene. When asked under oath if he thought this was inappropriate
behavior, Harmon stated that it was "a stupid thing to do". One witness (Kennedy) to this
incident stated that Harmon "has always done things like that". Another witness (QunneO) stated
that he told Harmon 4<you are sick" at the time of the incident but did not report it to the Chief
because he "didn't want to create a problem".
In making a case for "a pattern of inappropriate behavior" this Spring 2000 incident ties to
a pattern of behavior that started in the early 1990*8. While this incident, by itself may or may
not be punishable by termination, it certainly contributes to the total sequence of behaviors that
folly justified Chief Mathieu's ultimate decision to terminate Harmoa
(g) The "Horseplay incidents". The Majority Opinion states that this incident "should not
have been considered in the termination decision". I do not concur. The facts do support the
charge and Mathieu was correct in including this incident in his decision and action to terminate.
The Majority Opinion states that "given that this activity was common in the Department, did not
involve females, was consensual, and had continued for many years without anyone ever being
told that it violated Department policy, the Department had tacitly condoned the activity".
10
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The Majority fails to note that evidence was presented that horseplay, or "dry - humping"
as this activity was called, included male on male mounting and pelvic thrusting, which certainly
meets the definition of activity of a sexual nature, was more likely to occur in Harmon's area of
responsibility than any other officer's and that a campaign of training to increase awareness and
sensitivity to sexually oriented behaviors of all kinds had been underway in the Department for
severalyears. The Majority also fails to note that where the Department has been able to place
blame for participation in this activity it has done so. In other words, the Department was
conducting appropriate training with the reasonable expectation that all officers, including
Harmon, would take appropriate action to identify and eliminate behaviors that included sexual
overtones. When the issue came to the attention of Mathicu, be took immediate and firm action not just to admonish Harmon, but every officer who could be identified as a participant.
Harmon admitted his participation in this inappropriate behavior while a Captain and
leader of men. While this offense may not be grounds for termination, inclusion of this incident in
"the pattern of inappropriate behavior** by Chief Mathieu was reasonable.
The facts do support the charges.
It is my opinion that all seven charges are fully supported by the preponderance of
evidence and facts presented at the Commission Hearing.
(3) Do the Charges Warrant the Sanctions Imposed? The Majority Opinion states that the
charges are not proportional to the incidents where the facts supported the charges. This
Dissenting Opinion is based on the conclusion that all seven incidents are supported by a
preponderance of evidence, the facts and admissions by the Appellant.

11
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The Majority also based their opinion on a conclusion that Ogden City has base>d their case
on a set of charges extending back several years, as if this was unfair and unreasonable. I do not
concur with this conclusion. Just as promotions are based on an evaluation of an employee's
complete record of employment, so also should a decision to discipline an employee who sustains
a record of inappropriate behavior. I consider it fair, just and reasonable to hold an officer to
account for his action, regardless of elapsed time. Harmon's inappropriate behavior repeatedly
violated Ogden City policy to such a degree, in my opinion, that termination was fully justified.
The Majority statement that "We are not aware of any otherfirefighterswhose record was
scrutinized for inappropriate behavior over that long a period of a time period" implies that Ogden
City was unfair or vindictive in their pursuit of the case against Harmon. I do not concur with this
implication. Infeet,evidence was introduced by both Ogden City and the Appellant that many
other employees of the Fire Department who participated in the incidents and inappropriate
activities surfaced in the course of Chief Mathieu's investigation were appropriately identified and
punished. Unfortunately for Harmon, the course of the investigation resulted in the discovery of
his participation in several incidents of inappropriate behavior. There was no evidence presented
that the investigation was unfair or biased. There was no evidence presented that supports a
conclusion that the termination of Harmon was the result of a conspiracy or concerted effort to
build a casefortermination.
On the contrary, the facts show that Mathieu was prepared to act on an investigation and
initial Predetermination Hearing based on four incidents. However, when the results of other
ongoing Department-wide inquiries surfiiced other questionable conduct, not just by Harmon, but

12
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by several others as well, Mathieu had no option but to include consideration of the three
urination incidents in his disposition of the Harmon case.
Thfe Majority also contends that Harmon "was not given progressive punishment whh
corrective action for his perceived inappropriate behavior". I do not agree as noted above with
respect to the missed meeting incident. Harmon's entire set of annual performance evaluations
were introduced as evidence and make it clear that he was regularly counseled on his performance
with respect to meeting his obligations. While the incidents of inappropriate behavior are not
included in this record since they did not surface until the September investigation by Chief
Chamberlain, it is unreasonable to require progressive punishment where the full range and record
is not known until fully disclosed. When the pattern of Harmon's inappropriate
behavior-identified, admitted and proven- was known, Chief Mathieu took the appropriate attion
- termination. That pattern of inappropriate behavior'included: the unprovoked urination into a
shower stall occupied by a fellow Firefighter; the exposure of his genitals and urination into a
drafting pit in the middle of a training session while serving as the senior officer present; the
urination into a bottle that was subsequently in the possession of an unsuspecting human being;
the presentation of a greased zucchini to a young subordinate female probationary Firefighter
while in a position of being her direct supervisor; missing a meeting after being repeatedly warned
and cautioned to correct this deficient behavior; planning and coordinating an event that
developed contrary to the explicit orders of the Chief that resulted in pictures of a bare breasted
dancer being taken in a Fire Station; and participation in activities that included male on male
pelvic thrusting as an officer with responsibilities to lead and set an example worthy of emulation.
In addition, when given the opportunity to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth

13
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at a "reconvened" Predetermination Hearing, he chose to continue denials of events he .would
later admit, thereby destroying the trust and confidence essential between the Captains and
officers of the Fire Department and the Chief By his conduct and actions, Harmon left Chief
Mathieu no other alternative than termination. This pattern of behavior clearly meets the test that
the employee behavior be "detrimental to the efficiency of the employing agency" in order to
justify the sanction of termination.
The Majority also contends that other Fire Fighters participating in similar activity were
not punished as severely as Harmon* I do not concur. The facts presented indicate that all
identifiable violations led to punishment in one form or another at the discretioii of the Chief The
punishment of termination meted out to Harmon exceeds other punishments because there is no
evidence that other Fire Fighters or officers participated in more that two of the activities for
which Harmon was charged. In addition, it is reasonable that Captain Harmon as an officer
should be held to a higher standard of accountability than subordinate Fire Fighters.
It is my opinion that the sanction imposed - termination - is fully supported by the
charges.
(i)ftr?the Sanctions Consistent with Previous Sanctions Imposed bv the Department? I concur
with the Majority Opinion.
(5) Jhe Garritv Warning. The Majority Opinion states that "due to the decision reached by the
Commission, it docs not believe this issue needs to be decided".
In view of thefeetthat this Dissenting Opinion reaches an entirely different conclusion, Le.
that the termination of Harmon by Mathieu and Ogden City was appropriate, justified and fully
supported by the facts, it is necessary to briefly address the issue of Qanity raised in this hearing.
14

Harmon's Addendum G

uui77

The Appellant contends that hisrightshave been violated and cites Lucas v. Murray City,
among others. It is my opinion that Harmon was accorded due process in every respect. The
Appellant cites Loudermill in the Lucas case in challenging the process employed by Ogden City
k pursuing its case against Harmon. Appellant contends that he was not given adequate oral or
written notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence against him, and an opportunity to
present his side of the story. I do not concur with these conclusions based on the evidence
presented at the Commission hearing. It appears to me that due process requirements were met in
this case.
The issue of a "timely post-termination hearing", Le. the Civil Service taimmssion
Hearing, was not raised during the hearing. However, almost three years elapsed between the
termination and the hearing. I am unaware of any Mures on the part of Ogden City to deny or
delay the hearing and can state that during my tenure'as Chair of the Commission starting in
December 2002, every effort was made by the Commission to schedule and conduct the hearing
that wasfinallyconcluded in September 2003.
It is my opinion that the action taken by Ogden City in the prosecution of the Harmon
investigation, Predetermination Hearing and Conduct of the Hearing were in accordance with the
Utah Code and the policies of Ogden Chy. It is also my opinion that in ordering the reinstatement
of Captain Harmon the Majority has adversely impacted the ability of Chief Mathieu to manage
and direct his ofiScers. In my opinion the Majority order ignores important fects presented at the
hearing and, if carried out, will serve to undermine the Chiefs authority. An appeal of their order
by Ogden City is most strongly recommended.
(6) Summary. It is my conclusion in this Dissenting Opinion that the fects presented at the
15

Harmon's Addendum G

oui;,«?

Commission Hearing do support all seven charges that were the basis for Chief Mathjeu'5
decision to terminate the employment of Captain Harmon. Further, the sanction o f termination
imposed in this case was warranted and the sanction was both proportional and consistent with
previous sanctions administered by Chief Mathieu.

Dated the \\

Day of December 2003

JSX^

Commissioner Jerenqy Taylcfft Presiding Chair
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ADDENDUM H

DECEIVED

D.Bruce Oliver#5120
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300
Attorney for Daniel Harmon

BEFORE THE OGDEN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF

DANIEL HARMON'S BRIEF TO THE
OGDEN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

DANIEL HARMON.

Daniel Harmon respectfully submits this brief to the Ogden Civil Service Commission
("Commission").
INTRODUCTION,
On June 16,2005, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's November 20,
2003 majority (2 to 1) decision which had reversed Chief Mike Mathieu's termination of Captain
Daniel Harmon ("Harmon")fromthe Ogden Fire Department ("OFD"). The Court remanded
this matter to the Commission with instructions, reversing only the Commission's Conclusions
of Law. The Commission's findings are in tact and can fully be relied on without taking
additional evidence and with no additional evidentiary hearings being necessary.1 See Atlas
Steel. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053 (Utah 2002)("When reviewing formal

Hence the reason for the agreement entered on November 10,2005, wherein the City and
Harmon agreed that no further evidence would be considered on remand and that the record provided
to the Court of Appeals would be the record on remand.
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adjudicative proceedings of the Commission, we 'grant the commission deference concerning its
written findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard,' but we 'grant the commission
no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard, unless
there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue before us"') (citations
omitted).
THE COURT OF APPEALS' INSTRUCTIONS ON REMAND.
(A). The Commission "must affirm the sanction [of dismissal] if it is (1) appropriate to
the offense and (2) consistent with the previous sanctions imposed by the department." See
Court of Appeals Opinion, page 6 (citations omitted).
(B). The Commission, in weighing the punishment against die offense, "must give
deference to the chiefs choice of punishment because, as the head of the Fire Department, he is
in a position to balance the competing concerns in pursuing a particular disciplinary action. Id.,
at page 6 (citations omitted).
(C). The Commission "may reverse the chiefs choice of discipline as unduly excessive
only when the punishment is 'clearly disproportionate' to the offense, and 'exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality.'" Id., at pages 6-7 (citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals advised that
Utah law has provided little guidance on the precise factors used to balance the
proportionality of the punishment to the offense. He have noted that an exemplary
service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the balance against
termination. On the other hand, dishonesty, or a series of violations accompanied by
apparently ineffective progressive discipline may support termination. Id., at 7 (citations
omitted).
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RESPONSE TO THE CTCY'S CLAIMED RELEVANT FACTS.
Harmon's objects to the City's statements effect, in light of the Court of Appeals
decision. In this matter, thefindingsof the Commission are not disturbed. The Commission
should only redress it's conclusions of law in light of the instructions provided by the Court of
Appeals. However, because the City included the section, Harmon addresses grounds for
objection to each with specificity provided.
I.

HARMON'S WORK PERFORMANCE.
1-

Admitted, Harmon was hired by the City as afirefighteron September 10,1979.

R. 143. He became a captain on March 2,1991, and held that position until he was terminated
on December 15,2000. R. 431. This statement of fact conveys jurisdiction upon this tribunal as
Harmon is clearly vested career service status.
2.

Admitted. The record demonstrates that Harmon received training for sexual

harassment onfiveoccasions 12/18/1993; 12/29/1994; 8/20/1996; 10/28/1998; and 9/8/1999).
R. 364-369.
3.

Objection. The record clearly demonstrates that (1)from1993 to 1998 Harmon's

Battalion Chief was Chief Steve Thompson and that he was indifferent to Harmon and other
knew that, and (2) the record also shows that Chief Mathieu did not review performance
evaluations when he signed them. Any action taken at this point based upon past performance
evaluations of Harmon's is both arbitrary and waived as untimely. Dan Gibson testified "It was
no secret that he didn't care for [Harmon.] R. 2506. Susan Davis testified "Chief Thompson did
not like Dan. And Chief Thompson wasfromthe old school... Chief Thompson didn't really
appreciate women on the fire department either." R. 2500.
3
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4.

Objection. The City distorts facts. The December 13, 1995 written warning was

by Chief Thompson. It was not a "Second Written Warning;" it was a first written warning.
Sadly, the waming was non-specific typical of Chief Thompson towards Harmon cautioning him
for "poor work performance, inefficient work habits, failure to discipline subordinates, conflicts
with peer supervisors, and failure to stay on-tasks" is too generic to inform an employee in taking
corrective action. Moreover, Battalion Chief Mike Wood's performance evaluation of March
2000 was his best ever rating his performance very favorably.
5.

Objection. The record clearly demonstrates that (1) from 1993 to 1998 Harmon's

Battalion Chief was Chief Steve Thompson and that he was indifferent to Harmon and other
knew that, and (2) the record also shows that Chief Mathieu did not review performance
evaluations when he signed them. Any action taken at this point based upon past performance
evaluations of Harmon's is both arbitrary and waived as untimely.
6.

Objection. The record clearly demonstrates that (1) from 1993 to 1998 Harmon's

Battalion Chief was Chief Steve Thompson and that he was indifferent to Harmon and other
knew that, and (2) the record also shows that Chief Mathieu did not review performance
evaluations when he signed them. Any action taken at this point based upon past performance
evaluations of Harmon's is both arbitrary and waived as untimely.
7.

Objection. The March 3,1998 annual evaluation was the first of Harmon's

evaluations by Chief Wood. At that time Wood hadn't gotten to know Harmon yet and his
impression was influenced by past evaluations or that of others.
8-

Objection. The record is distorted by the City. The City has combined to

difference sentences with material omissions creating a new sentence with entirely different

A
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meaning. The fact is Harmon's crew liked him and would do anything for him.
9.

Objection. See above.

10.

Objection. The alleged four missed meetings by the City concerning the course of

Harmon's 21 year career averaged one missed meeting for every five years. The reconi in this
proceeding shows that another employee was commended for missing only two meetings within
a 10 year period. The ratio is the same. However, the record also shows that the August 17,
1999 CPR class was delegated to Susan Davis, who explained she simply forgot about it. As for
the November 14,2000 class, Harmon worked only one day during that period, he was on
vacation for the duration of that month.
n.
IL

Objection. The removal was partially Susan Davis's fault

HARMON'S ALLEGED INFRACTIONS.
(A).

The MDA Swimsuit Incident.

12,

Objection. To correct the stated the fact, Harmon did not know that the women

preparing the meal would be wearing swimsuits. It was believed that the outfits would be similar
to the Jazz Dancers. Also the bikini's were not "g-strings."
13,

Objection. To correct the stated fact, Harmon did not have any camera. The

findings stated:
Harmon called [Captain Owens] at Station 2 and discussed the situation with him and
they decided that [Captain Owens] would gather up all the film and disposable cameras
and destroy them in order to preserve marriages and promotion opportunities and avoid
negative publicity for the fire department.
(Decision, at page 8).
14,

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, the station was not Harmon's station; the

station was Captain Owen's (Station 2). Both Captain Owens (a promoted Deputy Chief) and
5
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Captain Mike Wood (a promoted Battalion Chief) were not terminated for their involvement.
Since the investigation into the MDA event, they have been promoted even though they both
were nottipfrontabout theifknowledge," The Chief even testified that Wood lied during the
proceeding.
15.

Objection. The correct the stated fact, Harmon did not attempt to "hide" the

incident Rather, he suggested to Captain Owens to collect the photos and dispose of them to
protect Captain Owens, who was up for promotion to Battalion Chief.
(B).

The Horseplay Incidents.

16-

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, the conduct described has been happening

for forty years and still occurs to this day. This Commission's findings (which controls) stated:
While Haimon and his crew had engaged in this horseplay more than other crews,
the activity seems to have been widespread and occurred over a long period of
time. No one ever complained about it, and no one was disciplined for it prior to
Harmon's termination. There was no indication that this type of activity took
place between male and female firefighters.
(Decision, at page 12).
17.

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, there was no policy concerning horseplay of

this nature until after Harmon's discharge.
18.

No dispute. The conduct was non-offensive, and admittedly occurred in other

stations-not just Harmon's.
19.

No dispute. The conduct was non-offensive, and admittedly occurred in other

stations-not just Harmon's. Katie Cassiday is now a lieutenant with South Ogden and credits
Harmon's training for her success.
(C).

The Zucchini Incident.
6
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20.

Not disputed. However, it should be noted that James Bristow is no longer with

Ogden City as the Human Resources Manager.
21-

Objection. To clarify the stated fact. It is uncertain whether the Zucchini was

greased or not due to the remoteness of the incident. Also, it is important to note that the reason
Ms. Cassiday's husband reported the incident two years following the alleged incident was
seeking to get Ms. Cassiday fired due to their pending divorce. Moreover, the Commission's
findings read:
Since the femalefirefighterhad initiated the sexually-oriented joke and laughed at
Harmon's later continuation of the joke and had not taken offense at it, and nothing had
been said about it for two years, Harmon initially did not think the incident was a
problem. Harmon later acknowledged that the type of joke was a sexual connotation was
not appropriate in the work place. No one complained of this incident at the time it
occurred, and no one was disciplined for it. It only came to light two years after the fact
when the female firefighter's soon-to-be-ex-husband brought it to the Chiefs attention.
There were no other incidents involving Harmon and the femalefirefightersand one
femalefirefighterwitness testified that Harmon treated women with respect.
(Decision, at page 9).
22.

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, the conduct was not "sexual harassment" by

definition. Popular public misconceptions defines "Sexual harassment" as a separate
freestanding tort. It is not, it is a form of employment discrimination. In this matter, there was
no discrimination. See, e.g., Jamison v. Wilev. 14F.3d222,237(4 th Cir. 1994) (supervisor's
unfair criticism of subordinate's woric in retaliation for rejecting his sexual advances not within
scope of employment); Wood v. United States. 995 F.2d 1122,1123 (l8t Cir. 1993)).
(D).

The Shower Incident.

23.

Not disputed.

24.

Objection. To correct the stated fact, the Commission's findings read:
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Sometime in the late eighties or early nineties, eight to ten years before the investigation,
it was alleged that Harmon opened a shower door while another male firefighter was
showering and urinated at his feet. Harmon believed that this incident occurred before he
was promoted to Captain, so the other firefighter involved was not his subordinate as
alleged by the Chief. Since the incident took place so many years before the
investigation, no one could be sure exactly when it took place. Because Harmon believed
that this incident took place before he was promoted, he denied the truth of this allegation
in his December 9, 2000, response to the Chiefs December 8,2000, letter"
(Decision, at page 6). See R. 344-345.
(E).

The Drafting Pit Incident.

25.

Objection, To clarify the stated fact, the testimony relied on was Dennis

Kennedy, who was involved in the closet incident with Harmon. R. 2176-2178. Kennedy was
recently rehired by the department despite the past incident This Commission can take judicial
notice of the recent re-hire. Moreover, the Commission's findings read:
Harmon needed to relieve himself, so he chose to urinate into the drafting pit instead of
getting a key from the fire engine and unlocking the training tower so he could use the
restroom in there or going to the more isolated back part of the training area.
Otherfirefighterswere present and could see what he was doing. They seemed to think
it was a joke and laughed about it. After urinating in the pit, Harmon started to withdraw
the hose from the pit himself but anotherfirefightercame to assist him. In his December
9,2000, letter to Chief Mathieu answering the allegations in the Chiefs December 8,
2000, letter
Harmon admitted to this incident.
(Decision, at page 12).
26.

Objection. See above.

27.

Objection. See above.

28.

Objection. See above.

29.

Objection. See above.

(F).

The Weedkiller Incident.

30.

Objection. To correct the stated feet, the Commission's own findings read:

3
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Harmon agreed to get the product for his former boss and directed him to drop a container
off at Station 3 where it could be picked up a few days later. After the container sat on
the counter in the kitchen of the station for a time, one of thefirefighterson Harmon's
crew picked the container up, took it to the restroora, urinated in it, and returned it. Later,
another firefighter bn"Harmon?s"crew did the same thing and, finally, Harmon also
urinated in the container and returned it to the counter.
At some point, someone put the container under the counter. Harmon stated that he
and the others considered this to be a joke and intended to empty the bottle out and not
have the retired Battalion Chief pick it up. Nevertheless, he did pick it up, recognized
that it was urine, and poured it out. Harmon stated that after he got off from his 24-hour
shift, he realized that he had not emptied the urine out of the container, so he called the
retired Battalion Chiefs house and left a message on the answering machine, advising the
Chief not to pick up the container because he hadn't had time to get the Round Up yet.
Harmon then called the station and asked about the container. The firefighter who
answered stated that the Battalion Chief had already picked up the container.
31.
III.

Objection. See above.

HARMON'S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
32.

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, Harmon acknowledged, not admitted, the

33.

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, Harmon acknowledged, not admitted, the

34,

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, Harmon acknowledged, not admitted, the

35.

Objection. To clarify the stated fact, Harmon acknowledged, not admitted, the

fact.

fact.

fact.

fact.
IV.

HARMON'S HONESTY QUESTION.
36.

Admitted. However, the swimsuit was not a thong.

37.

Not disputed.

38.

Admitted in part, denied in part. To clarify the stated fact, Harmon admits he was
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waiting for the second predetermination hearing to start when the chief came out to ask him to
come in. And at that point he handed the chief a letter that had been written December 9,2000.
Harmon denies Benyinglhe weedkiller incident. The letter denied the allegation as drafted. R.
344-345. The Commission's findings read:
Harmon stated he denied this allegation in his December 9, 2000, letter to Chief Mathieu
because the Chiefs December 8, 2000, letter was inaccurate in that it stated that Harmon
"misrepresented the provision of weed killer as urine" whereas it should have stated
"urine as weed killer," "to the Battalion Chief," whereas the individual was at this time a
retired Battalion Chief, and that Harmon did not "provide" the urine to him because he
did not give the container to the returned Battalion Chief.
(Decision, at pages 10-11).
Because it took a year for the Chief to discover the alleged conduct, its clear that the Battalion
Chief took the conduct as humor. If he had complained the conclusion could have been drawn
differently.
39.

Objection. See above.

40.

Objection. See above.

41.

Objection. See above.

42.

Objection. See above. It was another firefighter who provided the urine to the

Battalion Chief.
43.

Objection. See above. The Chief and the letter failed to address the correct issue.

44.

Objection. The record and testimony speak for themselves. The City distorts the

fact and the Court's findings.
45.

Objection. Although in his letter of December 9,2000, Harmon denied the truth

of the accusation in the Chiefs letter of December 8,2000, concerning providing urine instead of
Round-Up to a retired Battalion Chief, the denial was based upon the technicalities of the
xo
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wording in the accusation. At the hearing Harmon admitted the essence of the accusation, Le.,
that he and two members of his crew urinated in a bottle that a retired Battalion Chief had left
with Harmon for Harmon to provide him with Round-Up at a reduced cost. Harmon stated that
this was done as a joke and that he intended to pour it out. Others agree that filling the bottle was
a joke and was to end after filling the bottle. R. 483-485. (Dan Gibson's Affidavit).
V.

CHIEF MATHIEU'S TERMINATION DECISION.
46.

Denied. The decision to discharge and the severity of the offenses over a 21 year

career absent progressive discipline, the lack of complaints against Captain Harmon, and in view
of the admitted prejudice Battalion Chief Thompson had for Harmon, the discharge is "clearly
disproportionate" and "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." As suggested by
the Court of Appeals, this Commission may conclude that the discharge is either (1)
disproportionate or (2) exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality, because the chief
unduly focused only on Harmon and that no others in an organization where the activity is
widespread is sanctions for their behavior.
47.

Admitted.

48.

Objection. The record is clear that (1) the chief never, or rarely reviewed past

evaluations, and (2) Harmon's Battalion Chief Thompson was knowingly prejudiced against
Harmon which reflected in his evaluations. Once an impartial evaluator was assigned over
Harmon, Battalion Chief Wood in 2000 gave Captain Harmon a high evaluation.
Also the record is clear that Battalion Chief Thompson was prejudice. Dan Gibson
testified "It was no secret that he didn't care for [Harmon.] R. 2506. Susan Davis testified
"Chief Thompson did not like Dan. And Chief Thompson was from the old school... Chief

li
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Thompson didn't really appreciate women on the fire department either." R. 2500. Also, Steve
Reynolds, another firefighter, testified that Chief Thompson disliked Harmon. R. 2557
49.

Objection. There was no "intent to "be dislionest. In tight of Garrity and pursuant

to attorney's advice, Harmon submitted a letter denying the allegation that he, himself provided
urine to a Chief falsely representing it to be Round-Up. Never had such a knowing
misrepresentation or false statement been made. Because of an untimely complaint concerning
the weed killer incident, the logical and rational conclusion is that even the Battalion Chief
believed it was provided in humor.
Moreover, although in his letter of December 9,2000, Harmon denied the truth of the
accusation in the Chiefs letter of December 8,2000, concerning providing urine instead of
Round-Up to a retired Battalion Chie$ the denial was based upon the technicalities of the
wording in the accusation. At the hearing Harmon admitted the essence of the accusation, i.e.,
that he and two members of his crew urinated in a bottle that a retired Battalion Chief had left
with Harmon for Harmon to provide him with Round-Up at a reduced cost Harmon stated that
this was done as a joke and that he intended to pour it out. Others agree that filling the bottle was
a joke and was to end after filling the botde. R. 483-485. (Dan Gibson's Affidavit).
50.

Objection. Over the course of 21 years, three urination incidents is not so

profound where the conduct did not cause affront or alarm to the individuals. A lack of reporting
demonstrates no affront or alarm. In this matter, no report was brought to light for many years.
One incident, the Shower incident, was in the eighties or early nineties, one incident, the RoundUp incident, was a year before the investigation in 1999, and one incident, the Draft Pit incident,
took place in the Spring or Summer of 2000.

12
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51.

Objection. The decision was arbitrary and capricious. In light of a 21 career, a

lack of reporting, and in light of the entire body of conduct surrounding the work environment,
the decision is disproportionate, and not bound by reasonableness and rationality.

ARGUMENTS.
POINT ONE. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS REMAIN IN TACT AND SHOULD NOT
BE DISTURBED.
In this matter, the City suggests that this Commission should reconsider some of its
findings-presumably because one of the majority members of the November 20,2003 decision of
this Commission is no longer a panelist at present. This Commission should not be prejudiced
by the Relevant fact" section of the City's brief. This Commission should deliberate in private
placing deference it is previous ruling. The truth is the Court of Appeals' decision does not upset
this Commission's previous findings. The case law of Utah is clear on this point. In Atlas Steelt
hie, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 61 P.3d 1053 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court reiterated,
"When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings of the Commission, we 'grant the commission
deference concerning its writtenfindingsof fact, applying a substantial evidence standard/ but
we 'grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction
of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue
before us'") (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals stated that *The majority of the
Commission disregarded the shower incident primarily because it occurred several years to the
investigation. Although an incident's remoteness in time may be relevant in mitigating the
degree of discipline imposed, it does not erase the fact that Harmon committed a violation of
department rules which merited discipline." (Court of Appeals Opinion, at page 4). This
13
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coupled with Harmon's mitigating admission to the Chief query should not warrant discharge but
a lesser form of discipline. Harmon does not believe that the Commission disregarded the
incident. ATeadingxrfthre decision demonstrates that the Commission "addressed it and
understood it, but that it was so old that it was not sure the conduct was while Harmon was a
Captain.
The Court of Appeals also stated, "Similarly the majority commissioners disregarded the
"zucchini" incident on grounds that the femalefirefighterwas a willing and active participant.
Here too, the fact that no offense was expressed may mitigate the degree of discipline imposed,
but the fact remains that such behavior was contrary to applicable policies and regulations and, as
Harmon acknowledges, inappropriate for the workplace." (Court of Appeals Opinion, at page 5).
The female's participation was not just participation, rather it was one of initiation. There is no
record or her receiving discipline for this behavior. The truth is the conduct was not sexual
harassment by either participant. Popular public misconceptions defines "Sexual harassment" as
a separatefreestandingtort It is not, it is a form of employment discrimination. In this matter,
there was no discrimination. See, e.g., Jamison v. Wilev. 14 FJd 222,237 (4th Cir. 1994)
(supervisor's unfair criticism of subordinate's work in retaliation for rejecting his sexual
advances not within scope of employment); Wood v. Lfoited States. 995 F,2d 1122,1123 (1* Cir.
1993)).
Finally the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of ongoing sexual horseplay. The Court
stated, "the majority concedes that the ongoing sexual horseplay among the firefighters 'might
support the charge* against Harmon, but conceded that it was permissible given that such
horseplay occurredfrequentlyfor several years without complaint... such considerations are
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relevant only in that they may affect the degree of discipline imposed."
Overall, the Court of Appeals appears to be suggesting that if any sanction should
imposed it "certainly can be for lesser degree. Given that fact, in li^ht of the Court's "clearly
disproportionate" and "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" advise, this
Commission may draw conclusions that result the same-that this Commission can declare that
the decision of the Chief should be reversed because of the remoteness of claims, the uncertainty
of claims, the lack of complaints against Harmon, the devotion by his subordinates, the prejudice
by his former Battalion Chief, the high evaluation of Battalion Chief Wood, the arbitrariness of
Chief Mathieu's investigation in light of the overwhelming evidence that conduct was not
isolated to just Harmon, involved others, and was supported and condoned or accepted as humor
around the department and among the stations.

POINT TWO. THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ATTACKS ONLY FORM OF CONCLUSION NOT SUBSTANCE.
Harmon believes that this Commission should not change its order. It is clear that the
Commission's decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals because it was persuaded by the
City's appellate counsel that the Commission disregarded the shower incident, disregarded the
"zucchini" incident, and disregarded ongoing sexual horseplay. That is not so, the Commission
did weigh all the facts as identified in it findings of fact. It as the trier of fact, can place the
weight it deems appropriate. The Commission in the capacity it exercises authority in this matter
is acting with judicial authority. It can resolve this matter simply by just choosing other
phraseology that would otherwise pass appellate review that all of the evidence was considered
by that the Commission concludes that it would be "clearly disproportionate" or that the Chief
15
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"exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" to arrive to the same outcome.

POINT THREE. TERMINATIONS NOTRATIONAL AS PREVIOUSLY OPINED BY THE
COMMISSION.

in this matter, the City is defiant against this Commission. It quickly embraces City
favorable rulings. The Commission is not established to offer grieving employees lip service.
The procedure was created out of the 19th century to cure for city corruption and politics. The
rationale used by the Commission is sound exercise of discretionary powers. The Commission
sided with Harmon believing the decision to discharge was disproportionate or exceeded,
reasonableness and rationality. Harmon agrees with the Commission that it would be clearly
disproportionate and unreasonable or irrational to affirm Chief Mathieu's discharge. The
decision was absolutely arbitrary and capricious. Captain Harmon has received no progressive
discipline for the alleged conduct. Harmon is not the only employee who has engaged in the
alleged activities. The record shows that an employee lied concerning the MDA incident; not
Harmon. R. 803-805,2588. The record shows that Hannon did not initiate the "zucchini"
incident, the probationary female firefighter did. The record shows that it took two persons to
engage in the sexual horseplay, and this Commission decided the City failed to meet its burden of
proof concerning the shower incident taking place whilst Harmon was a Captain because it
allegedly took place in the eighties or early nineties. Also this Commission did accept Harmon's
explanation concerning the weed killer denial. As Harmon explained, he denied providing the
Battalion Chief with urine representing it to be Round-Up. Given the feet, a year passed without
it being reported to the City, the Round-Up incident must have been dismissed by the retired

16
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Battalion Chief as a joke.
In this matter the City attempts to bolster the decision to discharge was warranted by
drawing emphasis to Harmon's evaluations during Battalion Chief Thompson's supervision. It is
would unreasonable or irrational to agree with the Chief at this junction given (1) his prior
testimony and (2) the well known bias he harbored against Harmon. Chief Mathieu testified that
his decision to discharge was after considering all of the offenses-the seven alleged incidents, not
his past evaluations. R. 1755. Dan Gibson testified "It was no secret that he didn't care for
[Harmon.] R. 2506. Susan Davis testified "Chief Thompson did not like Dan. And Chief
Thompson wasfromthe old school... Chief Thompson didn't really appreciate women on the
fire department either." R. 2500. Also, Steve Reynolds, anotherfirefighter,testified that Chief
Thompson disliked Harmon. R. 2557. It seems unfair to now consider the discharge of Harmon
for any evaluation prepared by Chief Thompson from 1993 to 1998 against Harmon when the
chief admitted in testimony they he did not read the evaluations as though as a "rubber stamp"
signing.
CONCLUSION.
Based upon the foregoing, and in the words of Chief Mathieu during testimony, in
summation Harmon's "a very capablefireofficer who made bad choices under some
circumstances." R. 2630. The Chief s reference to bad choices only refers to the seven issues at
hand and is not a reference to Harmon's annual evaluations. Given the entire body of conduct
concerning the entire work environment, this Commission should not take the position to affirm
the Chiefs decision. It would be unreasonable and irrational to affirm arbitrary decisions of any
chief. It is clearfromthe record that the Chief was disproportionate in his treatment of Harmon.
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Investigating only Harmon expanding his entire 21 year career finding fault in him worthy
discharge is just the behavior Civil Service jurisprudence was intended to avoid after the
corruption following the 19th Century.
Dated this 24th day of January, 2006.

D.BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Daniel Harmon

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DANIEL HARMON, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and via email (where available), to:
Stanley J. Preston #4119
Camille N. Johnson #5494
Judith D. Wolferts #7023
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MART1NEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

jdw@scmlaw.com

Ogden City Civil Service Commission
A.K. Greenwood, Presiding Chair
2549 Washington Blv±, Suite 210
Ogden, Utah 84401-3111

ffioriabfo.ct.ogdcn.ut.us

Douglas Holmes
274 1/2 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Dated this 24th day of January, 2006.
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ADDENDUM I

CITY'S EXHIBIT #8
December 9,2000
Chief Mike Mathieu
Ogden City Fire Department
2186 Lincoln Ave.
Ogden, Utah 84401-1343
Re: Allegations of Misconduct
Dear Chief:
When this investigation started, I was accused of inappropriate behavior by a disgruntled,
soon to be ex-husband, that occurred two plus years ago. Chief Chamberlain sat me down, gave
me the Garrity warning, and told me to tell him every situation I'd ever participated in, been
near, or could have been a part of that could have been take as sexual misconduct, and if I lied, or
made some mistake, I may be terminated.
Not being informed as to the specific allegations against me, I had to go back through my
career to try to remember events that may have been significant to others but certainly were not
to me. I truthfully answered questions and obviously harmed myself by "offering up" those
events that I did remember. I told them the way I remember them happening.
As you could see from my demeanor at the predetermination hearing, this "open ended
investigation" has taken a significant toll on me, I cannot believe even now that this type of
investigation can take place in a modern society. How many people could pass this type of
scrutiny. Could any member of this department be sat down and told, "Now I'm thinking of
something you've done wrong and I want to know about it. I'm not going to tell you what it is,
but I will tell you that if you don't tell me about it you may be fired. And, ifyou don't tell me
what I believe is the truth, then you may also be fired." Any member of the department, faced
with this type of "star chamber" investigation would either "confess" to things not at issue or
remember things differently than others.
Now, even though I have addressed the specific concerns first brought to this department
by a retired disgruntledfirefighterwho has never worked a day for Ogden City, never once place
his life on the line for an Ogden citizen, and never once observed the camaraderie of an Ogden
Station House, I am now being asked to address issues that as best I can remember may go back
eight to ten years. I am amazed by this.
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I need not have a hearing. My specific answers to you concerns are these. As to your
concern #1,1 deny that this has happened since I have been a Captain. If this ever happened, and
I don't specifically remember that it has, it happened ten years ago or more when I was a
firefighter. If it is true, and it happened that long ago, how it could possibly be relevant to me
now is beyond my comprehensioli.
As for your second concern, I admit this.
As for your third concern, I deny.
I cannot go through another emotional event. Please accept these as my responses, and I suppose
that you will make whatever decision you feel is just. I hope that your decision is based upon
how valuable I am to the Department now not on an accumulation of every negative thing that I
have ever been involved in since I hired on this department.

Captain Dan Harmon
Ogden Fire Department
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ADDENDUM J

CITY'S EXHIBIT #9
1
2
3
4
5

SECOND PREDETERMINATION HEARING
CAPTAIN DAN HARMON
DECEMBER 11,2000
Mathieu:

I have scheduled a pre-determination hearing this morning at 9:00. My name is

6

Mike Mathieu. I am the Fire Chief as well as the hearing officer. I am trying to

7

continue on with the investigation regarding Dan Harmon and regarding some

8

allegations that occurred and the reason for reconvening this hearing is that in the

9

course of following up on some information in the previous hearing, I had some

10

new issues come to my attention that I needed to ask questions about and get

11

verification of. Within regards to that, I sent Dan Harmon a notice of a new pre-

12

determination hearing or a continuance of a pre-determination hearing to help me

13

understand more information about some allegations of possible misconduct.

14

So with that we are here today, and also present is Andy Blackburn-City

15

Attorney, Jim Bristow-Personnel Manager for the City, and Dan Harmon. Dan

16

has told me prior to turning on this recordmg that he would like to submit a letter

i7

in response to these allegations and I'll let him speak for himself as whether or

18

not he would like to answer questions that I have about these allegations. With

19

that, Dan, can you tell me what you would like to do because it is my preference

20

to ask some questions because I have some unanswered questions in my mind and

21

Fm trying to validate what has occurred. I am not sure that your letter has all

22

answers to my questions since I have not asked them yet. I just want to tell you

23

that this hearing is an opportunity for you to respond to allegations to either clear

24

yourself or to validate or verify what did occur or hasn't or has occurred. I want

25

to tell you that from my standpoint having answers to these questions that I have

26

yet to ask helps me a lot more in regards to making a determination in this

27

situation and carrying out my responsibilities in a true, fair, and honest fashion.

28

With that I'll let you go ahead and speak for yourself.

29

Harmon:

My sole comments on this entire issue are in that letter.

30

Mathieu:
Okay. So from your standpoint, I have four questions I would like to ask, you
Second Harmon Predetermination Hearing
December 11,2000
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would prefer that I don't ask those. And if I ask those, you are stating that your

2

responses are within this letter or you are choosing not to answer these questions.

3

Harmon:

You can ask them but my only reply would be in the letter to them.

4

Mathieu:

Okay. Let me go ahead then. Thefirstquestion is, do you know how many times

5

you have opened up a shower stall when a subordinate was showering and you

6

either urinated on the person or in the shower stall while that other person was

7

showering? Do you know how many times you have done that since you have

8

been a Captain?

9

Harmon:

My response is in that letter.

10

Mathieu:

Okay. The Spring of 2000 it has been reported to me that in public and in public

11

view you urinated in a drafting pit just prior to the ADO testing, and just prior to

12

otherfirefightersneeding to use the drafting pit for the purpose of ADO testing.

13

Did that occur?

14

Harmon:

My response is in that letter also.

15

Mathieu:

Okay. It has also been reported to me that on an occasion you provided weed

16

killer because of your private lawn care business to other members of the Fire

17

Department because it was an advantage for them to acquire itfromyou because

18

they could get it a little bit cheaper. It has been reported to me that your former

19

Battalion Chief asked for some of that and in so doing, instead of providing weed

20

killer, you provided him urine. Did that occur?

21

Harmon:

My response to that is also in the letter.

22

Mathieu:

Did you also partake in activity boasting to otherfirefightersabout that act and

23

doing that to your former Battalion Chief?

24

Harmon:

My response to that is in the letter also.

25

Mathieu:

Okay, My last question then is in regards to going out and verifying some

26

statements made previously in thefirstpre-determination hearing. I came across

27

some answersfromother folks that were inconsistent with answers I received

28

from you. In all fairness to you, it is my desire to get to the truth and to determine
Second Harmon Predetermination Hearing
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1

the truth. Because of these inconsistencies I would like to use another tool that

2

may afford me the opportunity to understand what the truth is. Because of the

3

inconsistent responses that I have received, would you be willing to take a

4

polygraph test to help me determine the actual facts to certain circumstances.

5

Harmon:

My response is in the letter to that also.

6

Mathieu:

All right, that is all the questions I have. With that we'll go ahead and close the

7

hearing unless you have anything else to provide or want to provide any additional

8

information.

9

Harmon:

No, I don't.

10

Mathieu:

Okay. All right! Thanks for coming in.

11

Harmon:

Okay, thanks!
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